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During the 1990s, a number of “developing” countries became interested in upgrading 
the technology of their national media industries to acquire Internet, satellite broadcast, and 
cellular phone capacities, because digital technologies like these offered opportunities for 
sustainable development.  Each of these countries had a divergent understanding of what 
constituted “national” or, increasingly, “regional” interests.  Yet, Western policymakers and 
global financing institutions aggressively promoted standardized neoliberal policies, including 
privatization and deregulation of national media industries--the subsequent “opening” of these 
industries to free market forces.  Although little empirical evidence existed to support the 
benefits of this policy framework, development aid from these Western institutions was often 
contingent upon the adoption of it.  The justification was simply that the application of neoliberal 
policies to national media industries was understood to be superior to any others.   
Scholarship in political economy of communication made strides in criticizing the 
dominance of Western policy frameworks and the effects of neoliberalism on national media 
industries in the developing world.  Within a political economy model, the imperative of the 
present project is to consider the bi-lateral relationship between the developed and the 
developing world as one that can also be located within a more regionalized and heterogeneous 
structure.  In the last decade, regional economic alliances have become recognized as a feasible 
method for developing countries to enter into the global political economy.  These alliances are 
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often flexible networks among a dozen or more countries, and the reasons so many join are as 
varied as their membership. The most common reasons are because they foster: cost-sharing of 
communication technology acquisition, technology transfer and training programs among 
nations, financing through regional development banks, as well as policy frameworks that are not 
as heavily determined by neoliberal macroeconomic prescriptions.  Most importantly, they 
provide a place wherein developing countries can maintain their own “national” identities, but 
still benefit from a collective force in the global market place.  Central to this analysis are 
Vietnam and its membership in the Association of Southeast Nations, and South Africa in the 
South African Development Community, both of which in their own way signify the viability of 
this alternative model. 
 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... IX 
ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................. XII 
1.0 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF NATION................................................................................... 9 
1.2 TWO EXAMPLES FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD................................. 12 
1.3 TECHNOLOGY........................................................................................................ 17 
1.4 NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION....................................................................... 19 
1.5 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 33 
2.0 THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY ..................................................................... 35 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 35 
2.2 THE RATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND THE RATIONALES OF 
GLOBALIZATION............................................................................................................ 38 
2.3 NO TIME TO TRANSLATE: THE BRETTON WOODS ERA .......................... 50 
2.4 CAN’T KEEP IT PRIVATE: DEVELOPING WORLD COMMUNAL 
TECHNOLOGY................................................................................................................. 62 
2.5 MAKE IT, DON’T TAKE IT: THE BENEFITS OF THE REGIONAL 
ALLIANCE......................................................................................................................... 70 
 vi 
2.6 DRAWING FROM DIFFERENCE: THE CASE STUDIES OF VIETNAM AND 
SOUTH AFRICA................................................................................................................ 73 
2.7 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 86 
3.0 THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA INDUSTRY, ‘BACKWARDS’ AND THEN 
FORWARD ................................................................................................................................. 88 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 88 
3.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WARS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA
 96 
3.3 STEMMING WESTERN “FLOW” INTO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
VIETNAM......................................................................................................................... 105 
3.4 THE COMPULSION TO CAPITALISM............................................................. 108 
3.5 THE “ASEAN WAY” ............................................................................................. 114 
3.6 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN VIETNAM: ‘A PASSION FOR 
MODERNITY’ ................................................................................................................. 119 
3.7 CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 130 
4.0 SOUTH AFRICA’S MEDIA INDUSTRIES: FREEDOM IS ANOTHER WORD FOR 
NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE ................................................................................................... 134 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 134 
4.2 SOUTH AFRICA MEDIA HISTORY: ARSENAL OF OPPRESSION OR 
LIFELINE?....................................................................................................................... 142 
4.3 SCARS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY ..................... 154 
4.4 THE IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES OF APARTHEID AND 
CAPITALISM................................................................................................................... 161 
 vii 
4.5 THE SADC: ‘UNITED WE BARGAIN, DIVIDED WE BEG’ .......................... 165 
4.6 TECHNOLOGY IS COLOR BLIND, RACISM IS NOT ................................... 173 
4.7  CONCLUSION....................................................................................................... 179 
5.0 CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPING WORLD THROWS OUT THE ‘WESTERN’ 
YARDSTICK............................................................................................................................. 183 
APPENDIX A............................................................................................................................ 198 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 203 
 viii 
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Writing a dissertation is a very solitary, and oftentimes, lonely pursuit.  Fortunately, 
undertaking the research necessary to write it, and getting feedback from others about the best 
ways to present the research, are much more interactive stages in the process.  Happily, I have 
many people to thank for these more collaborative moments as the seeds of this dissertation grew 
and began to bear fruit.  
 Certainly most significant of all are my advisors Carol Stabile and Jonathan Sterne.  
Without their enthusiastic suggestion that I should forego Thailand, Germany, and Cuba as case 
studies, and instead focus on Vietnam and South Africa, I might not have ever discovered the 
significance of regional economic alliances as a strategy for the innovation to digital 
telecommunications in the developing world.  And lest I forget their guidance in helping this 
project make sense to others, I would like to convey my deepest gratitude to both of them for 
following through with suggestions for improving this project, even though their own careers 
have taken them either across the country or into neighboring Canada, and kept them quite busy 
with new responsibilities.  Moreover, their suggestion to study Vietnam sparked some of the 
most memorable moments of my life and resulted in life-long friendships.   Kathleen Blee, who 
at the beginning of my graduate studies gave me the initial idea that developing world issues are 
significant, also provided patient guidance as well as a model for incorporating my research in 
 ix 
Vietnam.  And Dr. Ronald Zboray was kind of enough to step in on this project during its last 
moments, and has tirelessly (as have all my other advisors) helped me navigate the university 
system and given me lots of useful advice and support on how to obtain the funding to make the 
necessary travel possible.  The Nationality Rooms Scholarship Committee—Maxine Bruhns, and 
Eileen Kiley—pulled the appropriate strings to provide the financial support to travel to 
Vietnam; while the Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellowship Committee and the Provost Development 
Fund Fellowship Committee provided the rest. 
While she would likely not consider herself essential to this project, the constant 
camaraderie of Cari An Coe of UCLA is without parallel.  With the small gift of a map of Hanoi 
that she slid under my door one morning, I was able to venture out into the Thang Xuan 
province, as well as the Old Quarter of Hanoi (and beyond) with a little confidence. Her 
offerings of company, Oreos, and hot tea during sweltering Vietnamese heat provided much 
needed psychological sustenance.  Her chutzpah in braving the streets of Hanoi on very obvious 
bright yellow motorbike with me on the back, made clear that the Lonely Planet Guide to 
Vietnam was wrong that women should not travel alone in Vietnam.  Her support and 
encouragement as I have tried to put my Vietnamese experience into words over this last year 
has also been appreciated.  My Vietnamese teacher, Hanh, was also central to providing me with 
a sense of connection in Vietnam, because she was a stable and reliable presence in what initially 
seemed like an overwhelmingly complex country, because she graciously opened the doors to 
her home to me, and because she taught me enough rudimentary Vietnamese to speak decently a 
few words in the Hanoi dialect before I would launch into my questions in English with 
interviewees.  Many thanks to her husband, Dat, also who found me exhausted and confused in 
the Hanoi airport late in the night upon my arrival, and delivered me into my dorm room at Dai 
 x 
Hoc Ngoai Ngu (Hanoi University of Foreign Studies) without incident.  My appreciation also to 
the faculty at the Language Center for providing a comfortable and friendly base camp that a 
graduate student could afford.  
More gratitude than I can convey to: Nguyen Thi Minh Nguyet, Institute For Journalism 
and Communications, Faculty of Foreign Communications, Hanoi; Nguyen Thi My Hanh, Hanoi 
University of Foreign Studies; Le Kim Dzung, Hanoi University of Foreign Studies; Tran Hong 
Truong, Hanoi University of Foreign Studies; Ta Bich Loan and her assistant, Thuy; Nguyen 
Huu Hung; Sam Taylor, Deutsche Presse Agentur; Moises Saab Lorenzo, editorial advisor, 
Vietnam News Agency; Pham Doan Trang, Nguyen Kim Trung; Tran Ba Thai; Thang Duc 
Thang; Tran Duc Nghia; Nguyen My Ngoc; and Mark Procter, MobiFone, Public Relations 
Department.  A special nod to Nguyen Qui Duc, Martha Ann Overland, William Molden, Karen 
Housset, and the Vietnamese Study Group who provided me with many of the above contacts! 
Thank you to the following organizations for hosting my interviews in Vietnam: Vietnam 
Television, VietnamNet, VNExpress, NetNam, Ho Chi Minh City Television, Mobifone, and 
FPT. 
And finally, I must give an anticipatory thanks to all of the individuals that will help me 
get to and navigate South Africa as I did Vietnam.  I hope to undertake this case study research 
on South Africa soon, so that I can realize plans of making this dissertation into a book 
manuscript.  Thus far, Sandra Braman at the University of Milwaukee at Wisconsin has been 
very helpful in helping me think about the contradictions of the South African media industries.  
 xi 
ACRONYMS 
General  
ADSL  Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line 
BCC  Business Cooperation Contract 
BOT  Build-Operate-Transfer 
DSL  Digital Subscriber Line 
GSM  Global Services for Mobile 
ICT  Information Communication Technology 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
ISP   Internet Service Provider 
ITU  International Telecommunications Union 
R&D  Research and Development 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programs 
SIM (card) Subscriber Identity Module 
SME  State Managed Enterprise  
SMS  Short Message Service 
SOE  State Owned Enterprise 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
VSAT  Very Small Aperture Terminal 
 xii 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
South Africa 
ABD  African Development Bank 
ANC  African National Congress 
COSATU Congress for a Democratic South Africa (black union umbrella federation)  
FAWO Film and Allied Workers Organization 
IBA  Independent Broadcast Authority 
ICASA Independent Communications Authority of South Africa 
NP  National Party 
RASCOM Regional African Satellite Communications Organisation 
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme 
SABC  South African Broadcasting Corporation 
SACP  South African Communist Party 
SACU  Southern Africa Customs Union 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
SADCC Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference 
SAPT  South African Posts and Telecommunications authority 
SATRA South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority 
TRASA Telecommunications Regulators Association of Southern Africa 
 Vietnam 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ABD  Asian Development Bank 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Community 
 xiii 
CMEA  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
IOIT  Institute of Information Technology 
LPRV  Local Poverty Reduction Vietnam 
THVN  South Vietnamese Television 
VASC  Value-Added Services Corporation 
VNCP   Vietnamese National Communist Party 
VNPT  Vietnam Posts and Telematics 
VTV  Vietnam Television 
 
 
 
 xiv 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“[I]t takes time for something false to become self-evident…” –Pierre Bourdieu1  
In Vietnam, July is the hottest month of the year. And it was during July that I scheduled 
to travel to Vietnam in order to interview as many employees in the various media industries as I 
could get to talk to me.  During a Vietnamese summer, the sun rises at 4:30am and the air 
reaches its peak temperature between 4pm and 5pm, before the sun will set two hours later.  It 
was during one of these sweltering late July afternoons that I walked quickly down a narrow 
alley in the tourist section of Hanoi, trying to navigate my way to the National Opera House.  I 
was scheduled to interview a Cuban journalist who was working temporarily at the Vietnam 
News Agency; I thought that obtaining an interview with a journalist from another Communist 
country who was working in Vietnam would provide a unique perspective on the way in which 
the Vietnamese ran their national media industry.  To jump ahead a bit what I learned instead 
from my interview with the Cuban journalist was that he believed he was in Vietnam to “teach” 
Vietnamese journalists the proper way to practice their craft; but I suspected the Vietnamese saw 
it differently.  I had already interviewed about a half-dozen other Vietnamese media 
professionals as part of my research on the recent history of Internet, cellular telephone, satellite 
                                                 
1 Bourdieu, Pierre, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market (New York: New Press, 1998). 
30. 
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broadcast, and digital film in Vietnam, and had learned that many of my own preconceived 
notions about media in the developing world were incorrect.   
I was running late for this interview, but still hoped to grab something quick to eat in the 
five minutes that were left before meeting at the Opera House.  I spotted a “dust food restaurant” 
(“dust food” because it is eaten so near the dusty street) on the alley sidewalk, and ordered a 
bowl of pho, or Vietnamese noodle soup.  What I did not realize as I squatted down on the tiny 
plastic stool, however, was that my casual dining companions would give me greater insight into 
Vietnam than would my impending interview.  As I waited for the soup, a well-spoken and 
confident young Vietnamese man sitting on another stool with his own dinner asked in English if 
I was an American.  But before I could even answer, he had gotten up and made me a glass of 
iced tea.  He put it down in front of me, and with a smile, said, “I know what Westerners think.  
You think if you drink our water, then you get sick and maybe die.  I give you some tea.  You 
will drink.”  I stammered that he was probably right, and smiled nervously as I drank the tea, 
trying to appear unflustered about our exchange, and trying to show only gratitude for the cold 
tea in the near 100-degree fahrenheit temperature.  But I thought to myself that I was more 
grateful that I had only a few more uncomfortable minutes to spend on the curb in his presence 
before I had to run to my interview, because I suddenly felt uncertain about my own attitudes.  
Later that night I had a chance to think over the event, specifically about what the young man 
had said and whether it held any truth for me.  As much as I would have liked to deny it, even to 
myself, he was right.  I had been worried about picking up a virus from the water supply since I 
had arrived, and whenever I drank any water or brushed my teeth, I used a bottle with a micron 
filter.  
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More broadly theoretical, however, I also realized that this stranger’s statement was about 
more than just Western attitudes toward drinking directly from the developing world tap.  His 
point reflected an understanding of a larger, pervasive Western attitude about nearly everything 
in developing nations like Vietnam.  He made it clear that it is obvious to citizens of the 
developing world that the West often assumes that, from water supply to politics to media 
industries, the Western way is the best way.  This attitude is a tree with deep historical roots from 
whose branches sprouted colonialism, imperialism, and globalization, seemingly the most 
current stage of the Western attempt at domination.  But it is also an attitude of which the 
developing world is well aware and has often sought to challenge.  Yet, can this dialectic be 
effectively challenged by anyone if we continue to argue about it in such terms? 
In “International Communication and Globalization: Contradictions and Directions” 
Oliver Boyd-Barrett suggests there are currently two different schools of thought from which 
globalization has been approached in international communication: cultural studies and neo-
Marxist political economy.2  Both schools embody the benefits and drawbacks of their particular 
theoretical legacies (as all do), which the second chapter of this project will explore.  Yet, a 
cursory but broad recount of their premises will illuminate why I believe a revised political 
economy of communication approach will be most appropriate for understanding the complex 
process by which developing countries adopt digital communication technologies.   
In his book broadly conceived book Orientalism, Edward Said made his own attempt to 
challenge the ideological nature of these and other Western assumptions by unearthing their 
                                                 
2 Boyd-Barrett, Oliver, “International Communication and Globalization: Contradictions and Directions,” 
in International Communication and Globalization, ed. Ali Mohammadi (London: Sage Publications, 
1997). 
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historical roots.  His goal was to illuminate the West from an Eastern perspective by retelling the 
history of the West in dominating, restructuring, or otherwise having authority over the East, 
which it labeled “the Orient.”3  In defining the West, Said emphasized the centrality of the 
British or French experience of the late eighteenth century to his analytic model.  Although it 
was relatively recent by comparison, he also acknowledged the increasing role of the United 
States on the modern stage of the East as it had taken over the European tradition of reinforcing 
its own cultural, economic, and political power.  U.S. hegemony started with Japanese, Korean, 
and Indochinese adventures, but rapidly expanded into the Middle East.  As the specter of the 
Cold War faded away during the decade of the 1990s, it seemed that the U.S. needed its own 
new cultural, political, and economic “surrogate” or “underground self” as had Europe; although 
this time it was the developing world countries that the U.S. would tried to remake in its own 
“gilded” image.  Galvanizing this modern Western project was the underlying assumption that 
the only useful way to differentiate countries around the globe was by labeling them “developed” 
or “developing,” either modern capitalist nation or not.  
From this heuristic, the next logical step was then to distinguish between developing 
countries, as well as their relative value by their location in relation to abundant natural or 
economic resources.  Latin America had oil reserves; Africa had precious minerals; and 
Southeast Asia had fertile soil, for example.  Their histories, political systems, cultures, and 
people were only relevant to the degree to which force—military, political, or economic—
needed to be applied to reconfigure them into both a resource for and image of the developed 
world.  From the West’s perspective, not taking the material reality of a developing country into 
consideration made it easier to maintain that the model of capitalist democracy could apply with 
                                                 
3 Said, Edward, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978). 
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equal effectiveness across both the developed and the developing world.  Calling it 
“modernization” was the rhetorical contortion necessary to promote this project as a beneficial 
one.  While this may not have represented the reality of the developing world, it was an attempt 
to present Western intentions in a more ethical light.  As it examines epistemological power and 
agency, this dissertation is interested in Said’s cultural studies analysis for its illumination of 
Western strategy and rhetoric in attempting to assert its power vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
Yet it still reinforces an understanding of world history and conflict as a two-party system.  
Following from the same conclusions as Said, other cultural studies scholars have chosen 
a more narrow focus and are “more interested in ‘culture’ in a sense close to that used by 
Raymond Williams (1961) as the day-to-day expression of shared human experience—and they 
look for evidence of convergence” in everyday social practices such as popular or mass culture.4  
Much useful work has been done in this arena, and most significant to this project are the 
analyses that find in global media content and programming “not a homogenized global culture, 
as a world in which, increasingly, every locality is typified by cultural hybridity and 
heterogeneity.”5  However, continuing with such an examination is not within the purview of 
this particular project; but considering global media content is, specifically for what it can reveal 
about the role that both the public and private national political economy has on its development.    
Boyd-Barrett describes political economy of communication as a second scholarly 
“camp” distinct from culture studies in its attempt to link media institutions to “other major 
centres of political, economic and social power in society,” to chart the “processes of 
deregulation, privatization,” integration, and “tendencies towards convergence (e.g. bringing 
                                                 
4 Boyd-Barrett, “International Communication and Globalization: Contradictions and Directions.” 12. 
5 Ibid. 
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together print, broadcasting, telephony, computing, music, electronic networking).”6  However, 
one of Boyd-Barrett’s criticisms of political economy of communication, besides its focus on the 
nation-state as a unit of analysis, is that there is “still a relative dearth of studies of professional 
practice” or the “inner workings of media industries.”7  For Boyd-Barrett, significant are the 
connections between the macro level of policy and industry and the micro level or the place in 
which media is produced and consumed.  Boyd-Barrett made this claim in 1997, and certainly 
other scholars have picked up this gauntlet.  I agree that these linkages between the micro and 
macro are important to consider, and I make a partial attempt at doing so—specifically looking at 
what individuals are able to do with telecommunications networks that have been established 
though government-corporate relationships—but closer to my own analytic goals is to pursue the 
current model political economy of communication, as well as cultural studies to a degree, and to 
bring their focus beyond the current orbit around the domination of the West over the rest of the 
world. 
The contribution of political economy of communication in the context of developing 
world national media industries was to underscore that the West has consistently asserted that its 
own private, free-market model would be the new standard of success for the developing world 
also, even though this description was hardly accurate of developed world media industry models 
themselves.  Presumptuously, neoliberalism would be the best model for all; context mattered 
little, except to note that developed countries would likely see the model as common sense, while 
developing countries would need to be “motivated” to adopt it.  International political 
economists often asserted that the consequence of such unchecked Western assumptions about 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 18.  
7 Ibid., 19. 
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the homogeneity of the developing world was that inappropriate policies like these were applied 
indiscriminately to their national industries as a part of IMF, World Bank, and WTO lending 
policy.8  The IMF in particular was “seen as a recession-inducing growth-wrecking agent.”9  
Political economists of communication also pointed out that these prescriptions frequently led to 
stagnation in national industries, media industries most importantly to the present study.  But 
when it became apparent that privatization, liberalization, and deregulation failed to work to 
undergird developing media industries, the neoliberal pundits have often responded that national 
governments simply were not stringent enough with their neoliberal macroeconomic measures.  
Regardless of intention, the failure of these policies ultimately reinforced Western rhetoric about 
the superiority of the developed world.  As developing countries sank further into economic 
nadirs, the label “developing” only gained rhetorical power.  Not only did developing countries 
have to prostrate themselves to the global lending agencies that help create and reinforce such 
labels, but in doing so they also had to accept (at least publically) the implication that their own 
national media agendas were insignificant, poorly conceptualized, and inexpertly run.   
The traditional political economy of communication model begins to give voice to 
developing world concerns about their more dominant counterparts.  At the same time, since it 
follows the Marxist qua Hegelian dialectic model, political economy of communication also 
translates into to an overvaluation of dominant media models as arenas of study.  More 
                                                 
8 Kolodko, Grzegorz W., From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist 
Transformation, ed. World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations 
University (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9 Goddard, C. Roe and Melissa H. Birch, “The International Monetary Fund,” in International Political 
Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order, ed. C. Roe Goddard, John T. Passe-
Smith, and John G. Conklin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). 250. 
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importantly, though, it leaves little room to think about alternative models where private interests 
were mitigated by, but collaborated successfully with, government policy.  So it is no wonder 
that in-depth research on the media industry practices of developing countries has been rare; 
many of these countries have had to negotiate just this boundary between public and private.  
Although these undervalued, under-examined models are often seen as inhabiting a liminal, 
“Third World” space in both the world economy and the international media market, at the least 
these national media industries provide intriguing examples where hope for a public-oriented 
media was still possible, even if corporate interests are involved. 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems theory could perhaps be the necessary 
intervention into these traditional dialectically framed analytic models.  Much of his work 
focuses on elaborating on the definition and function of the three levels of political economy, the 
periphery, the semi-periphery, and the core.10  Obviously, to assert the global political economy 
has, not two, but three significant elements is one of Wallerstein’s most well-known theoretical 
premises.  Less obviously, Wallerstein’s world systems theory is unique is that it undercuts the 
power of the dialectic of “developed” and “developing” by asserting that the core and semi-
periphery countries of the developed world are precisely the ones dependent on the developing, 
or peripheral countries, as much as it has been the other way around; at each level are 
vulnerabilities and dependence.  This also distances it theoretically from both cultural studies as 
well as traditional political economy of communication.  Since the present project is concerned 
with bringing the idea of regional economic alliances—or a collection of nations that operate 
                                                 
10 Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979).  See also Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Dependence in an Interdependent World." In International 
Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order, edited by C. Roe Goddard, 
John T. Passe-Smith, and John G. Conklin, 176-90. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. 
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under one regional identity in the global political economy—to bear on the political economy of 
the so-called “developing world,” Wallerstein’s theory provides a springboard for just such a 
consideration.  In much the same way as turtles use their shells as both a home and fortress, 
regional economic alliances have become the means by which developing nations enact their 
own role in the global ecology.  To participate with other “organisms” in this ecology, 
developing nations often need a way to assert and defend simultaneously.  In my own conception 
of applying Wallerstein’s world systems theory, I would like to combine it with the political 
economy of communication’s focus on national media industries as a level of world systems 
theory of analysis.   
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF NATION 
Before elaborating on the significance of national media industries as a window into the 
ways in which they represent themselves in the global political economy, it is still perhaps 
necessary to grapple with the nebulous concept (and nebulous reality) of the “nation” or “nation-
state.”  Postmodernists and poststructuralists persistently argue against the nation as a “basic unit 
of analysis.”11  Nationhood is a “myth” that only exists in “icons of ‘national’ power and 
influence such as national flags, anthems, monarchies, state architecture on government 
buildings.”12  Political economy of communication is cited as a scholarly field more guilty than 
others of “helping construct a myth of nationhood,” because political economy of 
                                                 
11 Boyd-Barrett, “International Communication and Globalization: Contradictions and Directions.” 15. 
12 Ibid. 
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communication attempts to “speak for and on behalf of a ‘nation’ which the media themselves 
helped construct.”13  Indeed, nationalism can also become the servant to ideological tyrants such 
as chauvinistic nationalism, jingoism, prejudice, racism, ethno-centrism, violence and so on.  But 
eliminating the concept of nation-state would not eliminate these phenomena.  Nor does adhering 
to the argument that globalization has virtually erased national boundaries, provide us with an 
alternative cogent locus from which to untangle the convoluted reticulation between 
corporations, countries, and regions.  The poststructuralist argument is no more helpful to 
developing countries in navigating this network either.  In Imagined Communities, Benedict 
Anderson points out that the “‘end of the era of nationalism’ so long prophesied,” is not even 
remotely in sight.14  The influx of Western political economy into other parts of the world has 
reinvigorated and interest in nationalism as a protective measure, and my own research into the 
developing world suggests that the nation-state has still specific use value.15  Regional alliances 
have become one of the most viable means of establishing agency in the global political 
economy for developing countries; and having a national identity balances the tension between 
being together, yet separate, as a regional alliance membership requires.  Thus, I agree with 
Anderson’s definition of the nation as “an imagined political community--and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign,” as well as his insight that it does not really matter whether a 
nation is “imagined.”16  Nation-ness is less about being false and more about being creative.  
What is most important is who has the agency to imagine it and what they do with that agency.  
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 3. 
15 Ibid., 96. 
16 Ibid., 6. 
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For the sake of clarifying the language with which this dissertation will speak and on what 
topics, I consider the “nation” to be a collection of entities, consisting of a government that 
purports to speak for those who live within its boundaries even if they would not necessarily 
agree with what is said, and to speak to external organizations with which the government 
interacts; commercial or private groups headquartered within these boundaries that are involved 
in the formation of public services and infrastructures; and individuals who are affected by the 
activities of the other two groups. 
In quickly returning to the idea of national media industries and their relationship to the 
above issues also, I claim that national telecommunications networks are particularly evidential 
of what is at stake for developing countries.  National telecommunication industries not only 
make cell phone, Internet, and cable technologies accessible to these countries.  More notably, a 
nation able to demonstrate to other members of the global political economy that it can afford to 
innovate from analog to digital also demonstrates that it is a viable economy adroit at generating 
profit.  As Wallerstein suggests, those at the periphery would like to be able to play the capitalist 
game, but on their own terms.  Regional economic alliances that promote technology 
standardization programs also facilitate this image for developing nations by: maintaining 
connections between member nations and making feasible technology and training sharing 
programs across national boundaries, and allowing these alliances to operate on par with the 
dominant economies of the West.  A developing nation may have a firm priority to provide (or 
deny) basic public infrastructures, stem the spread of disease, promote literacy, and lower infant 
mortality, but making a effort toward appearing to be establishing a state-of-the-art digital 
telecommunication network that support Internet, satellite programming distribution, and cellular 
telephone, embodies fungible power.  It tells the rest of the world that a nation is a prosperous, 
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forward thinking, and keen force to be reckoned with, developing nation or not. Perhaps then 
poststructuralist arguments about the limitations of the concept “nation” are still useful, mostly 
for reminding political economists of communication that nations and their national media 
industries are not just neutral agents! 
1.2 TWO EXAMPLES FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
In the interest of mining these examples, perhaps it is useful first to emphasize there can 
be an analogy made between human fingerprints and countries of the “developing” world.  Just 
as genetic make-up determines the layout of each ridge of a fingerprint and therefore defines its 
individuality, the political, cultural, economic, and technological history of a developing country 
is what makes it unique, also.  But as particular as each of these countries was in the 1990s (and 
still is), each of them also shared something in common.  As the sun rose on the decade, and new 
media technologies like satellite, Internet, cellular telephony, and digital film innovated to the 
point where they seemed as if they could be a tool harnessed for social, political, and economic 
development, the developing world accepted that financial support was crucial to acquisition of 
these technologies.  With the financial support of the global lending agencies, however, it 
seemed that each country would also face the force of globalization in the form of IMF, World 
Bank, and WTO policies, what were collectively considered to be an inexorable global political 
economy.  Yet the “fingerprint” of each country made it unlikely that it would respond to the 
pressures of foreign influence in the same way, or that it would make the same choices about 
world trends and events such as globalization.      
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When this dissertation began, my intention was to include Bourdieu’s point about the 
‘false becoming self-evident’ as a springboard to a critique of these Western neoliberal policies 
that were shopped around to the governments of the developing world in the 1990s. 
Privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of national media industries were tenets central to 
such policies, and the original claim underpinning this dissertation assumed that these policy 
choices were both destructive and nearly unavoidable.  In part, these assumptions dangerously 
mirrored one of the main myths of globalization, that a market-oriented approach to development 
of the media industry was the only policy option.  But, in getting at the heart of the ways in 
which developing countries reacted to the prescriptions of the developed world, it became clear 
that Bourdieu’s point better reflected the assumptions I had about how the developing world 
could or would choose to handle the macroeconomic forces that impinged upon their goal of 
updating their media industries from analog to digital technology.  I had assumed that these 
countries had two options at their disposal: to either accept or reject resources such as support 
from the global lending agencies, global trade forums, regional alliances, foreign direct 
investment, and technology transfer.  With global political dynamics being what they were at that 
time, indeed these countries faced many of the same pressures.  But when we take into 
consideration the particular context of each country, it becomes clearer that each one was unique 
in its possibilities and in its limitations for relating to the global political economy. 
As Bourdieu would predict, careful consideration of these two case studies disabused me 
of my earlier assumptions about choices in the developing world in short order.  As case studies, 
Vietnam and South Africa are intriguing for this same reason.  During the decade under 
consideration, the 1990s, both of these countries underwent significant political, economic, and 
social transformation.  After nearly a half-century of devastation and isolation Vietnam came out 
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of its shell: the U.S. lifted its embargo and Vietnam proceeded to make regional and international 
overtures.  Vietnam did not politically abandon Communism, but it was still able to forge 
relationships with foreign governments and corporations according to its own agenda and own 
goals of improving the economic health of the country.  Likewise, the decade of the 1990s was 
about metamorphosis for South Africa.  Apartheid was under siege domestically and 
internationally; for the first time in centuries, it seemed as if the nation’s raison d’être would be 
to rectify the injustices suffered by the underprivileged.  In contrast with Vietnam though, the 
new South African government—the African National Congress (ANC)—had difficulty 
maintaining its own goals of reconstruction and redistribution as it took tentative steps toward 
forging relationships within the global marketplace.  The contrast between the experiences of 
Vietnam and South Africa hints at the potential the developing world has to help us understand 
the global political economy during this time.  This project is supremely interested in smaller 
national media industries in the developing world, and believes that they should be located at the 
center of the conceptual constellation that neoliberal globalization, technology, and regional 
alliances represent, rather than as powerless victims at the margins.  Not only has the developing 
world become inseparable from the developed, but it has become inseparable from these 
concepts as well.  
Therefore, from the dust of my original inquiry, only one claim has survived: that in the 
developing world, there was simply no “best,” preconceived path for the development of 
technology or for the economic and political environments in which they could flourish, and no 
two sets of developing nations choices were the same.  Yet, this does not suggest that nothing but 
incoherence can come from plumbing the depths of the media technology examples that do exist 
in this context.  A central belief of this project is that we cannot fashion a general template for 
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media technology development that can be applied across the developing world, but there are 
moments from which we can glean what does not work for development, what happens when it 
does not, and why; and we can also draw from ideas and projects that worked under certain 
conditions.  However, as the case studies of Vietnam and South Africa will attest, running a fine-
toothed analytical comb through the convoluted strands of these examples does not prove easy.   
The 1990s are a seductive chronological moment in which to start this process in that at 
first glance they seemed to contain the rise of what now seems like some significant global 
“events.”  Digital technologies became a booming business for the nations that could produce 
them and a potential growth opportunity for those that could afford them.  Also, the IMF, World 
Bank, and WTO became acknowledged as the leading global financial and regulatory institutions 
during this time.  Consequently, globalization, neoliberalism, and technology were injected into a 
lexicon the world could share.  The regional alliance, on the other hand, did not necessarily 
become a part of this shared lexicon, but it did play a significant role for many nations in the 
developing world, particularly Vietnam and South Africa.  The regional alliance was an option 
that some developing nations like these could leverage to obtain the technology and do so with 
less intervention from the IMF, World Bank, or WTO.  The regional alliance was therefore 
useful in minimizing the impact of globalization. 
Thus, as a form of analytic therapy, the first imperative that motivates this project is 
coming to terms with the concepts—globalization, neoliberalism, and technology—that became 
theoretically tangled in the 1990s.  For many Western policymakers, this conceptual tangle was 
not a problem; it was a goal to be achieved.  For them, the privatized nature of Western 
technology was supreme because it was lucrative.  But numerous examples demonstrate how 
unsuccessful the Western approach was when adapted to Communist, Socialist, post-Socialist, or 
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even other Democratic developing states.  Yet for years, Western policymakers continued to 
prescribe it in exchange for development support.  And so reassuring it is to discover the 
potential for viable state controlled media infrastructures that tried to both maintain and innovate 
national media infrastructures on their own terms even in the face of such challenges.  As 
examples of such alternatives, Vietnam and South Africa were each remarkable in their own 
way: both represented examples of digital media technology intended for public-oriented media 
rather than multinational corporate profit.  Often radically different in their approaches—
communism with limited market tendencies or a capitalist democracy—these alternative models 
tried to navigate the shoals of corporate interest, foreign direct investment, and neoliberalism in 
order to adapt digital media to meet the needs of national economies, media industries, and the 
citizens they serve.   
The second aim of this investigation concerns the common assumptions from which this 
conceptual constellation emerged and seeks to intervene in the debate around these issues at 
several points: 1) the gospel of globalization and its political and economic implications for a 
“democratic” innovation and deployment of media systems in “smaller” nations; 2) the continued 
reliance on outdated notions such as diffusion of innovation and technological determinism in 
crafting media policy; and 3) the opportunities regional economic alliances presented for 
ameliorating the effects of globalization, as well as for creating positive transfer of technology 
and information networks and obtaining representation in the international media market.  Much 
scholarship has already been rendered on these first two points in several fields, including media 
studies, political economy of communication, development studies, as well as security studies, 
among others.  But without addressing the third issue of “opportunities,” it seems that often this 
analysis becomes shipwrecked on the sandbar of what was not possible for the developing world.  
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Thus, intervention here becomes about diving into what options did exist for developing nations 
in their goals of setting up a media infrastructure that would be able to perform several functions: 
fostering economic growth, forming relationships with other nations, building or re-building a 
cohesive national identity, and providing citizens with access to the opportunities that new 
technologies represent.  The flexibility of new digital media technologies in being adaptable to 
their host environment was the first of such opportunities that should be explored.  
1.3 TECHNOLOGY 
In his 1974 book, Television: Technology and Cultural Form, Raymond Williams looked 
at the development of broadcast technology in the West and emphasized that, generally speaking, 
the technology of broadcasting “was introduced as a marginal element” into society.17  This was 
not because radio and television were seen as insignificant.  On the contrary, they were so 
significant to national security, national integrity, as well as commerce, that the positionality of 
the technology in the complex web of culture meant that its development could never be self-
determined.  Instead, the “very complex social structures” in which the technology was 
introduced had the most impact. Williams’ point was that if we considered this growth within a 
variety of milieu—the U.S. compared with Britain, for example—then it would become “clear 
that the technology as such was in no way determining.”18  In Britain, the State determined what 
form broadcast would take, but in the U.S. it was the commercial manufacturers of broadcast 
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32. 
18 Ibid. 
 17 
equipment.  This resulted in a predominantly commercial industry in the U.S., but a more 
Keynesian, state-oriented one in Britain.  For Williams, the complex social structure was most 
important to the trajectory of the technology because of the contradictory intentions between 
manufacturers that were thinking of broadcasting possibilities, and political authorities that were 
thinking of the infrastructure itself.   
Although Williams was speaking primarily about the growth of broadcast under the 
general rubric of the West, nevertheless, his ideas about the significance of the social context 
could be applied to new digital technologies like satellite, Internet, and broadcast.  They could 
also be applied outside of the developed world.  In the developing world, these new technologies 
could also be controlled and shaped by the most powerful national groups, regardless if they 
were “public” or “private.”  Technological philosopher Brian Winston echoed this understanding 
of technology as a mutable tool.19  Winston insisted that media technology was never brought 
about by one nascent force, but rather required many sources of input before it could become 
functional; there was no prime mover.  In the case of satellite, for instance, different versions of 
the technology developed simultaneously in the scientific communities in the United States, 
Western Europe, and the Soviet Union.  Both the U.S. and Soviet Union argued they invented the 
technology first.  There may have been nothing more than competition between these countries; 
even so, their respective scientific communities were still in dialogue with each other, and this 
competitive atmosphere had a significant catalytic effect on the development of the technology.  
Satellite was exemplary of both Williams’ and Winston’s point that the growth of a new 
technology has always been a messy business.  Taking these points to their ultimate conclusion 
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Routledge, 1998). 
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in the developing world context, we must acknowledge that media technologies did not simply 
blow like a breeze from the West to the East or North to South; meaning that they were not 
foisted upon the developing world as a “finished product.”  More frequently in these countries, a 
digital media technology like satellite broadcast was used often for education and medical 
purposes, to teach citizens to use computer programs or how to take tuberculosis medication, for 
example.  And in places where people had difficulty affording cell phones and calling plans, 
phones were shared, with each person using their own pre-paid SIM card.  Thus, as opposed to 
the more private, leisure-oriented experience of media technologies like Internet and cell phone 
in developed countries, in the developing world, many new technologies have been communal 
tools. 
1.4 NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION 
In Globalization, Jan Aart Scholte, provides a brief but clear description of neoliberalism 
as a revival of “classical liberal arguments against proactive state intervention to guide or restrict 
operations of the market.”20  This new liberalism, resurrected from the work of Adam Smith and 
others, has been dusted off, polished until shines, and touted as being able to “bring prosperity, 
liberty, democracy and peace to the whole of humankind.”21  It is neoliberal in the sense that 
modern conservative policymakers returned to the eighteenth-century polemic against economic 
regulation by the ruling class, and adapted Smith’s distaste for a feudal society to the regulation 
                                                 
20 Scholte, Jan Aart, Globalizatin, a Critical Introduction (St. Martin's Press: New York, 2000). 34. 
21 Ibid.  
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by State governments, claiming that the State should never interfere in either the corporate world 
or more generally “the market.”22  In application, the neoliberal philosophy dictated that 
governments must only direct national industry in so far as it would create an atmosphere that 
catered to commercial interests, typically foreign direct investors and multinational media 
corporations. Neoliberal apologists have argued that in an increasingly global world, “the state 
lacks the capacity to control globalization.”23  Advances in telecommunication technology have 
definitively set money free of state control and national borders; so of course “public agencies 
should therefore let global markets work their magic unhindered by official limitations.”24  But it 
is this last statement of Scholte’s that points out the key to the neoliberalism’ self-contradiction: 
it never has been, nor will ever be free from political intervention since its life-blood is political 
in nature.  It needs policy to be born, and it needs policy to continue to live.  Despite these 
ideological weaknesses, it does seem as if this policy framework has prevailed, particularly in the 
developed world.  According to Pierre Bourdieu in Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of 
the Market, part of the key neoliberalism’s prevalence is that it is rhetorically aligned with a 
Western faith in the ideology of progress, reason, and science that helps obscure its 
contradictions.25  Bourdieu laments the positionality of journalists, academics, business people 
of those to make public the appeals of capitalism by espousing the irresistibility of maximum 
growth, maximum productivity, and maximum competitiveness as the ultimate goal of human 
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actions.26  Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man and Thomas Friedman’s 
The Lexus and the Olive Tree are exemplary of such appeals to the rationality of capitalism made 
by the “enlightened elite” that Bourdieu derides.27  But, for Bourdieu, the problem is not just that 
the enlightened elite are able to promote this rhetoric, but that they can also convince 
policymakers to put it into actions that exact not just a financial cost, but also exact a human 
misery that amounts to a “structural violence.”28
In Networking the World, Armand Mattelart’s keeps a focus on advances in 
telecommunication technologies as the bridgehead of neoliberalism’s imminently dematerialized 
global society.  The omnipresence of communication technologies helps ensure that globalization 
remains cohesive system that is integrated in terms of planning, design, production, and 
commercialization.  But Mattelart uses the notion of technology to point out that this 
dematerialization of finance and the ubiquity of technology to clarify that these conditions are for 
a rarefied few.  In Networking, Mattelart cites MIT experts that on eve of 2000, barely 2 percent 
of world population had access to the world information network.29
Historically, the combination of media technologies and economic hegemony allowed the 
developed world to try to disseminate its financial and political program around the globe to its 
own benefit.30  The most prolific scholars in the field of political economy of communication 
spent several decades surveying this terrain.  Cultural imperialism—the forcible dissemination of 
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First World Western culture into the Third World in the mid-twentieth century—was one of the 
most popular notions to come out of this scholarship.  As the century came to an end, however, 
political economy scholars like Mattelart began to recognize that cultural imperialism had given 
way to the more visible Western agenda of influencing the developing world through the 
technological advances of the global lending institutions, world trade agencies, and foreign direct 
investors.   
Agents in these organizations promised national governments that a neoliberal policy 
framework would be the green card necessary for entry into the rarefied stratums of the global 
marketplace.  The West had established itself as the primary global lender to the developing 
world by the 1990s, and their representative agencies—the IMF and World Bank—required 
borrower nations to adopt their economic policies.  One of the key macroeconomic requirements 
was that borrowers would have to open their markets to the rest of the world, and joining the 
World Trade Organization was typically the suggested route.  In part this made it appear as if the 
neoliberal phenomenon was becoming globalized in scope and rapid in pace.  Media 
technologies were implicated in these claims of both scope and pace since telecommunication 
systems were harnessed to provide a conduit for international finance, among other things.  
Commerce could be transmitted, either by global lending agencies or foreign investors, into the 
economy of the developing world at incredible speeds; but it could also take flight just as easily.  
The world seemed to be in a spatio-temporal collapse.  New communication technology created 
a situation in which nations on opposite sides of the globe could be close in unprecedented ways; 
and the logical leap, therefore, was that technology ran not just the world of finance but also the 
day-to-day world in which we all lived.  This, however, elides the fact that there were individuals 
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who made very deliberate decisions that would facilitate these processes.31  Political economy of 
communication scholars responded with a critical examination of this agenda, subsequently 
labeled “neoliberal globalization.”  
The critical scholarly analyses undertaken to study this “phenomenon” have been 
invaluable in underscoring that the West chronically exploited the developing world while it 
pretended that this relationship was at least mutually beneficial.32  They were also important in 
asserting that the developing world did not necessarily share the technological, political, or 
economic agendas of its global partners.  At the same time, in its analysis, the political economy 
of communication scholarship also unwittingly reinforced many of the assumptions of 
globalization itself, most significantly that the global political economy was both dichotomous 
and monolithic.  Admittedly, it was hard to resist looking at these issues in such dualistic terms, 
like macro versus micro, public versus private, or communism versus neoliberalism, developing 
versus developed, center versus margin, and so on.  But as Wallerstein emphasized, neither the 
developing world, nor the process of media technology innovation that occurred within it is so 
polarized.  
One cannot easily separate out the macroeconomic from the microeconomic goals of the 
developing world when it came to their ambition to update national media industries.  Without 
fostering large-scale economic growth, often through partnerships with other countries, the 
ability to provide the average citizen with access to the Internet, satellite broadcast, and cellular 
phone was not possible.  Therefore, when a national government drafted policies to help put a 
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telecommunication infrastructure in place, the choices it made had a clear and direct impact on 
individuals.  For example, when a nation joined others in a partnership to share a cellular 
communication satellite, and they all also agreed that the satellite would operate at a certain 
frequency, which gave individual cell phone users the opportunity to use their phones outside of 
national borders if necessary.  This was particularly helpful if workers needed to migrate in order 
to find work, but hoped to maintain connections at home.  For this reason, the exchange-oriented 
nature of relationships with the IMF or World Bank, or the “conditionality” of these relationships 
as the global funding agencies themselves described it, were not entered into lightly.  For a 
developing borrower, in contrast to exchanges with neighboring nations as a part of a regional 
alliance, an exchange with the IMF or World Bank was the most of uneven of relationships.  And 
since the goals of the IMF and World Bank were limited to the macroeconomic, while the goals 
of the developing world were often both micro and macroeconomic, the chances that funding 
could be garnered to support initiatives in favor of the average citizen were compromised. 
However, since most developing nations could not avoid relying on global lending 
agencies altogether, they also could not completely avoid making compromises either.  Although 
we still use rubrics or theoretical concepts like communism, capitalism, democracy, socialism, 
and so on, to describe the political orientation of states, in reality the purity of these concepts has 
been always been vitiated.  Historically, for the developing world this was due in part to the 
impact of the developed world in the global political economy; and since the mid-twentieth 
century, the IMF and World Bank embodied this influence.  Most developing nations procured 
funds from either agency at some point, and consequently also had to adopt their policies.  In the 
1990s, these were typically Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that required significantly 
reduced social spending, along with the privatization of national industries to create competition.  
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Even though these changes were supposed to attract foreign investment and make media 
technologies and products more affordable for both commerce and consumers, the result for the 
national media industries was that many obtained characteristics of both public and private 
industry.  By the end of the decade few existed that were not mixed.  They were private in that 
foreign companies could own either a part of a national media firm, could establish their own 
firm within national boundaries, or could lease national industry equipment or services in order 
to provide their own value-added niche services.  But these developing world national media 
industries were still public in that they prioritized the needs of the government, the military, and 
the people over the need to create revenue.  However, with an industry that was both public and 
private, the struggle for primacy between the two was always taking place. 
In “Legitimation Problems in the Modern State,” Jürgen Habermas emphasized the 
fundamental irreconcilability between the capitalist democracy model: that the State, dependent 
upon the economic system of private commerce, was torn between two equally pressing 
obligations: one, to foster the capitalist, commercial system without direct intervention; and two, 
to prevent or alleviate the destructive effects that the system could have on the social welfare of 
citizenry.33  Of course, the real trick to accomplishing the set of goals that favor citizens was to 
do so without putting limitations on the system of commerce itself.  While Habermas’ work 
undoubtedly referenced the dilemma that Western capitalist democracies began to recognize as 
the industrial age dawned, by the 1990s, the majority of the world faced similar issues.  This was 
particularly true of developing world national media industries since capitalist democracies were 
attempting to export their media industry models around the world.  Habermas’ conclusion was 
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that many national governments—and their national media industries by extension —really only 
had one option available in solving this dilemma: that of “representing the accomplishments of 
the capitalist economy as the best possible satisfaction of generalizable interests.”34  As this 
decade wore on, though, it seemed as if this dilemma could be reconciled, albeit with the 
sacrifice of the social welfare of citizenry.  But as “generalizable interests” turned out to apply 
only to the interests of capital, this project wishes to reclaim the importance of the idea of the 
“social welfare of citizenry,” particularly in the context of the national media industries of the 
developing world.  Here, this notion translates into the development a public digital media 
infrastructure that is materially (physically and economically) accessible to the majority of 
citizens and provides them with opportunities to improve their quality of life.    
In 1993, political economist Edward S. Herman offered a paradigm for public media by 
way of arguing against a comprehensive commercially supported media.  In his article, “The 
Externalities Effects of Commercial and Public Broadcasting,” Herman explicitly decried the 
change in the “balance between commercial and public broadcasting” toward the commercial.35  
Herman attributed this shift to the “conservative drift of politics over the past decade or so, 
which has fueled the deregulation process,” and “has also enhanced the political power of 
commercial media entrepreneurs.”36  For Herman, the media industries of “mature” capitalist 
nations no longer even tried to maintain legitimacy about having the goal of serving the social 
welfare of citizens.  Commercial industries, he asserted, “will tend systematically to ignore the 
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public goods aspects of broadcasting and are likely to produce negative externalities.”37  In other 
words, as a “market,” this form of media failed to produce goods in favor of the public.  Further, 
because of their substantial power, these same media systems were largely insulated from the 
consequences of their “market failures,” like a serious public debate that would try to rectify the 
failure through the political process.38  Nonetheless, in the face of what seemed like a hopeless 
situation, Herman noted examples of media institutions that demonstrated in varying degrees that 
the tradition of meeting public interest needs did still exist, among them Great Britain and the 
Netherlands.39  From these examples, Herman gleaned a model for public interest needs.  In his 
model, national media industries were obliged to acknowledge the “power to educate, enlighten, 
and help make better citizens, as well as entertain.”40  And this would translate into a legal 
obligation “to serve a varied fare (not just entertainment, or whatever best served the interest of 
the broadcaster), to reach minorities as well as the largest adult audience, to serve children’s 
special needs, and to provide universal service.”41  The present project adopts Herman’s 
broadcast model of public interest needs, with an ambition to apply its value to the establishment 
of newer digital media technologies in the developing world. 
Before leaping into the complexities of the Vietnamese and South African experiences 
with satisfying public interest needs while developing new media technologies in mixed 
public/private media infrastructures, though, first a chapter must be set aside to examine the 
larger global forces of the 1990s that constructed the milieu in which these countries operated.  
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The second chapter of this project will do this analytic labor by revisiting the international 
economic dynamics that began in the mid-twentieth century with the Bretton Woods institutions 
after the Second World War.  These opportunistic institutions, which became the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, tried to use the devastation of World War II as a 
means to influence the future of the global political economy.  After much of the Second World 
War reconstruction was complete, these institutions shifted their sphere of influence to the 
developing world.  The perceptibility of this shift brought the benevolence of the IMF and World 
Bank into question, however, and critics reinterpreted the connections between the Bretton 
Woods institutions and other powerful Western corporate and political groups.  Consequently, 
the sources of revenue from whence global lending coffers came, along with their political 
valence, suddenly became more obvious.  For example, in the developing world’s experience, 
applying for aid to upgrade a national media industry could always potentially have the opposite 
outcome, especially if one of the conditionality policies the IMF or World Bank required was a 
decrease in social spending, which is just what such an upgrade represented.  This often put goals 
of updating national media industries to digital technologies at risk or worse.  This second 
chapter considers the implications that these activities had for projects in the developing world 
during this moment of critical awakening.   
As a means of putting Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory into action, 
especially his claims about the struggle for power between the three main players in what he 
calls the capitalist world-economy, the second chapter delves into the regional alliance as a 
forum that developing nations enter to gain a modicum of control over their participation in this 
global political economy.  However, the type of regional alliance this project examines did not 
have the same character as those popularized in the West, such as NAFTA or the European 
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Union, or even that Socialist variety such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA).  The regional alliances of sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia could neither be 
narrowed down to a free trade zone or a form of military security.  Instead they were more 
broadly conceived as a viable development strategy, where members could improve their 
circumstances through interdependency, regardless of their economic or political status.  The 
regional alliances in these parts of the world were multifunctional.  Most generally, they were a 
space in which developing countries could interact with neighbors as equals in a way that was 
never possible on an international scale.  For the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), the 
political climate of member countries was often not up for discussion; and this was crucial to 
countries that did not ascribe to the thinking that capitalist democracy was the “end of history” 
and wanted to maintain their chosen political structure.  ASEAN was, however, often criticized 
in the Western media for this policy of mutual non-interference.  Even though the West criticized 
regional alliances for many of their policies, they still struck deals with these regional alliances.  
On their own, few countries in either ASEAN or the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) were able to successfully negotiate in the global marketplace. 
Despite their political differences, members of regional alliances managed to function 
collectively.  In the 1990s, relationships with large development banks like the Asian 
Development Bank or the African Development Bank, in which seed money could be deposited 
by member nations and used as needed for infrastructural projects, were some of the most useful 
for sustainable development without exorbitant political costs.  With money from the 
development banks, members also managed to pool their resources to share the cost of acquiring 
expensive infrastructural technologies like telecommunications, but they could also share the 
burden of establishing facilities to train their collective citizenry to learn how to both adopt and 
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adapt these products and services.  The standardization agreements that often resulted in 
transnational technology, like satellites and fiber optic cables, as well as concurrent national cell 
phone frequencies, were also often beneficial for citizens who used them.  Using shared 
technology was not only cheaper for national citizens, but a greater variety of content was 
available also.  Ultimately, regional alliances like these were an effective national and 
international alternative for the developing world. 
The third chapter analyzes the implications of acquiring new technologies in the context 
of the neoliberal movement for the Vietnamese experience within these global dynamics of the 
1990s.  In many ways, Vietnam was able to stave off the more pernicious pressures that 
globalization represented.  Certainly, Vietnam had a great interest in acquiring the digital 
technologies that rapidly became available during the last decade: the country had a history of 
interest in media technologies that could foster a cohesive national identity.  Yet, these 
technologies were seen as tools that could create and solidify development growth, too, because 
they would create the opportunity to network, both regionally and globally.  But for the most part 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) refused to undertake this process by traveling the 
neoliberal paths that had been worn so well by its developing world predecessors.  
Liberalization, privatization, and deregulation were not acceptable practices for the VNCP; as a 
result, Vietnam received scant support from the global funding agencies or even foreign direct 
investors.  Instead, their own strategy included joint ventures with either foreign development 
agencies in Canada, Australia, or Sweden for example, or with foreign media companies within 
their region.  The VNCP was largely successful in completing an upgrade in the national media 
infrastructure to a digital network, complete with Internet, cellular telephony, and satellite 
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broadcast, and so as a case study, Vietnam’s importance lies in its defiance of many of the most 
deeply entrenched principles of globalization.  
In the spirit of the claim that no two countries in the developing world are the same, the 
fourth chapter describing the South African experience with updating the national media 
infrastructure markedly contrasts with the Vietnamese.  For South Africa, the 1990s were deeply 
significant politically, culturally, and economically.  The African National Congress (ANC) 
began to negotiate for a transition from apartheid to democracy, communication and exchange 
became more open with the rest of the world, and many national industries—including the media 
industry—were privatized.  However, for over a decade the attitude of the ANC had been that the 
goal of reconstruction and redistribution would not be sacrificed to neoliberalism.  As this 
principle applied to the national media industry, maintaining nationalized industries translated 
into “universal access” to media for all peoples, and the ANC believed incorporating new digital 
media technologies could only help achieve this goal.  Digital media technologies would be 
cheaper than updating the present system, which was spread so unevenly across racial and 
geographic lines; a satellite footprint, on the other hand, would blanket a much greater area on an 
economy of scale.  The national media industry could then finally focus on representing the 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity of the country.  Adopting these technologies had also been a goal 
of the apartheid National Party, but the NP recognized early in the decade that this would not be 
a feasible goal, given that apartheid kept the nation cut off politically and economically from 
much of the rest of the world.  Consequently, global funding agencies would not provide the 
foreign assistance they would need to complete the upgrade.  Furthermore, the economically 
powerful, NP-affiliated Afrikaners, who would not be part of the ruling government any longer 
after the ANC took over, still recognized that a new digitized national media industry would be 
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controlled by this long-time enemy to the NP.  Thus, before the transition to democracy took 
place, Afrikaner interests made certain the NP sold off significant stakes in the national media 
industry.  The result was that the ANC had no choice but to accept the conditions they were 
handed from the National Party, but still try to work toward universal access for the average 
South African.  For the most part, this has seemed like an impossible task, but as a case study for 
examining digital innovation in the developing world, South Africa demonstrated some of the 
possible strategies for managing the middle ground between a public-private national media 
industry.   
The last chapter represents the climax of this project, as it is an attempt to analytically 
integrate the rest of this investigation so that we may consider the further implications and 
conclusions generated by it, and may especially inquire into the possibilities for national media 
industries to thrive outside the wake of globalization.  Also necessary is a pursuit of these 
possibilities as they might apply not just to Vietnam and South Africa, but also to other smaller 
national media industries more generally.  After all, considering policy applications in a cursory 
fashion is an analytic urge that should be denied.  As it applied to national media industries, 
Kolodko asserted for example that, “one cannot argue that a telecommunications company in 
Hungary is similar to one in Argentina merely because they both provide the same services, own 
similar physical assets, and use the same technologies or even the same management methods.  
There may be technical similarities, but real similarities are not that common in the social and 
political context.”42  In surveying the stage on which this scene was set, the consideration of 
possible media infrastructure alternatives, chapter five of the dissertation will consciously 
attempt to avoid a similar fate.   
                                                 
42 Kolodko, From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist Transformation. 115. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
In allegiance with Doug Henwood in After the New Economy, this project challenges the 
conventional wisdom of globalization, as a concept, as a rhetoric, as an excuse.  Globalization, 
says Henwood, “is a pretty spongy concept.”43  Elites “mean something like the internalization 
of economic, political, and cultural life, as if these haven’t been long internationalized,” while 
nonelites, including “quite a few antiglobalizataion activists, seem to mean everything bad that’s 
happened over the last decade or two.”44  Although hard to define, globalization has quite 
mistakenly gained valence as an authority-less phenomenon and an explanation for the growing 
inequity between the “haves” and the “have-nots.”  Within this valence, the concept achieved the 
status of simultaneously being both scapegoat and sacrificial lamb.  Governments, dominant 
multinational corporations, and neoliberal apologists blamed the “ineluctable” forces of 
technology, politics, and economics for their own vampirish compulsion to seek out and drain 
ever more markets.  Then these agents offered up globalization to the foreign markets and 
industries they exploited in the form of macroeconomic policies, mass-produced products, and 
technology transfer relationships (supposedly) as a means to ameliorate the self-same conditions 
they helped to create.   
But this is where I get off of Henwood’s bus and make a transfer to Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s Historical Capitalism.  While the present project is concerned with Henwood’s 
argument that globalization has not been explicitly defined, the bulk of the next chapter will be 
preoccupied with asking questions similar to those Wallerstein asks and then tries to answer in 
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44 Ibid. 
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his world-systems theory.  In the following chapter, my attention will turn first to Wallerstein’s 
question about “how people have manoeuvered within such an economic system to get the 
advantages for themselves and thereby deny them to others.”45  I translate “people” primarily to 
mean the Wallerstein’s “core” and “semi-periphery” as it is embodied in the West, most 
obviously in the founders of Bretton Woods Institutions and those who continue its mission, in 
multinational corporations headquartered in the West, and in national governments that collude 
with both of these groups.  This query will be followed by another neo-Marxist pursuit of 
looking at how those “who were the victims of such maldistribution maneuvered, first of all to 
minimize their losses in the operation of the system, and secondly to transform this system which 
was responsible for such manifest injustices.”46  Here, the spotlight will shine on the “periphery” 
or developing nations and their own relationships, between their national governments and 
corporations, as well as other members of the regional economic alliances to which they belong.  
The ways in which the developing world has tried to “transform” the maldistributive system by 
regional economic alliance and the adoption of digital media—Internet, cellular telephone, and 
satellite broadcast—prove that spaces have survived in which people believe that late capitalism 
is not the peak of economic development.  Toward the end of the next chapter, Vietnam and 
South Africa will stand as two such examples. 
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2.0  THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Tide waits for no man, and this is a revolutionary tide, sweeping through economic and 
social life. We must press on.” –Europe and the global information society: Recommendations to 
the European Council.1
Although it is as unqualified and hyperbolic as an advertisement, the above quotation was 
instead part of a report created by policymakers advising the European Council on how to 
proceed with an upgrade to a digital telecommunication network in the wake of what they 
heralded as the inexorable tide of globalization.  Like many other developed countries that were 
hoping to adopt these technologies at the end of the last century, policymakers advised the 
European Council (the main governing body of the European Union) that neoliberal economic 
and technological policy initiatives should automatically be a part of an entire 
telecommunication upgrade package.   
This report represents the portrait of an era.  It is just one example of countless others like 
it during the 1990s.  In the zeitgeist of this era and beyond, new digital communication 
technologies and neoliberal policymaking were a heady combination that made both corporations 
                                                 
1 Bangemann, Martin et al., “Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to the 
European Council,” ed. European Council (Brussels: European Council, 1994). 7.  
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and policymakers positively giddy in anticipation of the revenue that could be made from selling 
off pieces of media industries to speculative capital.  Western rallying cries about humanity 
being “unconstrained by distance, time and volume for the first time in human history,” rang out 
in corporate boardrooms and global financial institutions, and often were all that justified 
national governments turning over entire national media industries, not to mention national 
economies and political systems, to the “invisible hand” of the free market.2  What powers 
digital telecommunication networks like broadband and satellite seemed to possess that they 
could force the hand of national governments!  Or at least we could believe it was technology, 
not minions of multinational corporations, as long as we could agree to forget the countless other 
instances of technological “revolution” the world has witnessed, and the ways in which they 
were used to justify errant human decision making.   
In keeping with the ethos of such a belief, like many other neoliberals, these 
policymakers exhorted the European Union to “press on” aggressively with “regulatory reforms” 
they cast as the only viable means available to radically transform the various national media 
industries of Europe from analog to digital, by turning “monopolistic, anticompetitive” state-run 
institutions into wholly private entities.3  The rationale for such a one-hundred-and-eighty degree 
turn from a more Keynesian approach was that there was a “revolutionary tide” that just would 
not “wait”: new digital communication technologies like satellite, Internet, and cellular 
telephone.4  In their “Action Plan” for accomplishing such a mighty task, the advisory board 
                                                 
2 Hammer, Michael and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution (New York: HarperCollins: 1993). 
3 Bangemann, “Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations to the European Council,” 
8-16. 
4 Ibid. 
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focused on vilifying state-owned enterprises as the “real roadblocks” to success, while the 
market had the “drive” to separate the “winners” from the “losers” in the new information 
society.5  The actual impetus for this circulating the rhetoric of technological determinism was to 
distract national government policymakers from seeing that the real agents were the dominant 
neoliberal economies seeking to consolidate its capitalist world-system. 
But not all of the rationales used to promote what we now call “globalization” fell under 
this rubric of “premature optimism” about new communication technologies.  Fear was also 
another emotional appeal: if the State hesitated even slightly in adopting neoliberal policies the 
new technological infrastructure supposedly required, these same neoliberal agents proclaimed 
that nothing could save a nation from being lost forever in analog darkness and subsequent 
economic desolation.  Characterized by equal amounts of panic and enthusiasm, “even to stay 
where you are, you have to move,” was prototypical of another refrain popular during this era 
which emphasized the inevitably of media globalization.6  More disappointing, however, was 
that often not much else was necessary to convince media regulators to privatize, liberalize, and 
deregulate many of the national media industries in the developed parts of the world, and also to 
try to export these polices to the developing world. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jasic, Zoran, “The Globalisation of the World,” in Transfer of Technology: Information for 
Development, ed. Robert and Khairul Bashar Haas (Kuala Lumpur: Asian Institute for Development 
Communication, 1993). 
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2.2 THE RATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND THE RATIONALES OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
The fact that many of these methods for adopting new media technologies were less than 
efficacious for many of the developed countries that ventured to undertake them (but more 
importantly developing ones) reveals the ideological and irrational nature of the reforms 
popularized in the late twentieth century.  On considered examination, it is all too easy to see that 
the globalization rhetoric that promoted intense privatization in telecommunications was not a 
revolution, nor did an “invisible hand” guide it as was often claimed.  Paradoxically, to 
understand that in reality the process of globalization began more than a century ago is also to 
understand how it could be interpreted as a spontaneous revolution.  The wholesale dissolution 
of national media industries in the 1990s was made possible by a constellation of real people 
taking deliberate action and shaping events toward a particular outcome for at least three hundred 
years, actions that have historically affected the developing world with catastrophic 
consequences.   
It was hardly surprising then that modern proponents of neoliberal capitalism spoke of 
the pursuit of new markets, new revenue sources, and new pools of cheap labor as an inevitable 
organic process or as an obligation, even if it meant they would force other humans into this 
subordinate role.  For political economist Karl Marx, it would have been easy enough to predict 
that proponents of late capitalism would speak of the chronic search for ever-new revenue 
sources as an endeavor as natural to modern humans as hunting animals was to those of the 
prehistoric age.  Marx believed that capitalism was able to operate as a seemingly natural process 
by obscuring that the real mode of production was to compel people to commodify themselves.  
Marx referenced the rise of wool manufacturing in England during which the landed nobility 
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forced agrarian peasants off their land to turn it into sheep pasture.  The peasants were then 
obligated to sell themselves as laborers in order to survive.  Although to understand the history 
of the rationalization of capital has been important to understand the nature of its character, Marx 
also underscored that the future of the capitalist tendency is as important as its past.  In broad 
strokes, Marx was prescient about the ways in which the classical liberal economic theories of 
Adam Smith would be applied to a dialectic of global proportions. In the conclusion to Capital, 
Marx hinted that the “capitalist regime” was international in its ambitions and insatiable in its 
appetite to entangle “all peoples in the net of the world-market” in the same way wool 
manufacture had implicated peasants.7  Marx’s characterization of capitalism strikes a chord of 
resemblance with the present globalization phenomenon, particularly when he asserts that, 
“along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and 
monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, 
oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation.”8  Even in the 1800s it was evident that the 
capitalist impulse to concentrate power in the hands of the few at the expense of more vulnerable 
populations was a mobile, or global, one.   
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, sociologist Max Weber argues that 
capitalism has never been just an economic dimension of Western culture; it has been an 
ideology outside of which its subjects could never have lived, and cannot recognize that 
capitalism is part of a larger belief system.  As capitalism was linked to the rise of the Protestant 
religion in Europe and early U.S., the “spirit of capitalism…was present” even before the 
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capitalistic order.9  In Weber’s account, even though many of the earliest European settlers to 
colonize New England were Protestant preachers and seminary graduates, these colonies earned 
a reputation for a keen business sense, or “a peculiarly calculating sort of profit-seeking” 
rationalization of capital.10  In fact, a preoccupation with an insatiable pursuit of profit and 
prestige was an expression of their virtue; and for Weber, consequently it became a foundational 
moral principle endemic to the whole of Western culture.11  Thus, the alloy of spirituality and 
capitalism that came to undergird Western culture is holistic; it has become “an immense cosmos 
into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an 
unalterable order of things in which he must live.”12  Those living within the ambit of this 
capitalist “cosmos” implicitly accept the fact that capitalism dominates their economic life, and 
that the nature of things is for the system to select “economic subjects which it needs through a 
process of economic survival of the fittest.”13  Those with the power to impose this ideology on 
others during the colonial period especially believed that to do so was the path to virtue.  
Furthermore, those who cannot survive this social Darwinism deserve to be transformed into a 
commodity.  While the similarity of underlying assumptions may not be obvious with today’s 
global political economy, it is indeed uncanny how evocative is the current globalization rhetoric 
of this more eighteenth century attitude.  As the European Union report from the late twentieth 
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century mentioned above suggests, it is no less about zealously evangelizing what is “best” for 
others today, and those who do not take the advice have a subordinate, ready-made role to play.  
For Immanuel Wallerstein, the entwining of capitalism and religion would be irrelevant 
given capitalism’s lack of consciousness and conscience for that matter.  Concise in his 
observation on the valence capitalism has attained in Historical Capitalism, for Wallerstein, the 
“use of force by one party in a market transaction in order to improve his price” was not even an 
invention of capitalism.14  The unequal exchange at the heart of capitalism is an “ancient” human 
social practice that perhaps precedes early philosophical pondering on ethics, but certainly 
precedes Protestantism.15  According to Wallerstein, it became historical capitalism, or a “time-
bounded, space-bounded” reality, as early as the late fifteenth century when the terms of this 
“unequal exchange” were deliberately obscured; and it was on its way to becoming a “social 
system” of unequal exchange that has “had such great impact on the whole as to create 
conditions wherein the others have been forced to conform to the patterns or to suffer the 
consequences.”16  As much as Marx, Wallerstein believed that the capitalist aim of continuous 
accumulation or self-expansion has always predisposed it as a phenomenon of global 
proportions.  In fact, Wallerstein pushes Marx a little further in exclaiming that the “key” to 
hiding the “central mechanism” of capitalism lay in the fact that the economic was supposedly an 
arena separate from the political.17  The world seems like a collection of “sovereign states, each 
with autonomous responsibility for political decisions within its jurisdiction, and each disposing 
of armed forces to sustain its authority,” while in reality each is a part of a “world-wide social 
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division of labour” that comprises an integrated production process where all operate “for the 
endless accumulation of capital.”18  Also in Wallerstein’s “real world of historical capitalism, 
almost all commodity chains of any importance have traversed these state frontiers” from the 
very beginning.19  Even though capitalism strives to bury its exploitative and bottomless 
character, capitalism’s laborers have never found its goal toward maximization of capital to be 
rational, and neither do modern political economists.   
In the more narrowly-focused field of political economy of communication, later 
Marxist-inspired scholars—Thomas Guback, Herbert Schiller, Armand Mattelart, Robert 
McChesney, and Edward Herman among others—have also taken up Marx’s economic 
framework and to it have added a cultural dimension to explore how capitalism continues to 
evolve its tendency to exploit others.  These scholars pointed to the evolution from military 
imperialism to “cultural imperialism” via media industries as part of the strategy the U.S. has 
used to continue to promote their legacy as the current dominant purveyors of capitalism.  The 
early dissemination of film, radio, and advertising not only carved a one-way channel through 
which all later ideological and media “flows” would move into foreign markets, but also 
established a companion channel that, rather than carrying a return of media products to the U.S., 
would instead carry only capital the U.S. charged foreign markets in a one-way exchange.  Film 
in particular was one of the first media to reach a truly global market.  In the years following the 
birth of the medium in the early twentieth century, the U.S. produced and distributed 85 percent 
of the world’s films.20  In his 1969 book, The International Film Industry, Thomas Guback 
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traced the manner in which the U.S. has traditionally feigned an inability to accept films from 
foreign markets into its own.21  According to Guback, even though it is by definition a “free 
market,” the strictly profit-based U.S. market “has been one of the most difficult…to enter.”22  
Filmmakers and distributors from other industries might have been intrigued by the fact that the 
U.S. market is one without a screen quota or an import quota, and might also be deceived by this 
surface appearance into thinking that in such a “large, rich, easily accessible market…a foreign 
producer merely has to export to the United States and watch the money flow back to him”; but 
as Guback lamented, “this view of the market has not been supported by reality.”23
According to Schiller, coiner of the phrase “cultural imperialism,” the period from the 
Second World War through the Cold War became key to the U.S. establishing its free flow 
doctrine in which policymakers professed that an unrestricted movement of information 
resources across national borders was necessary to protect democracy.24  In truth this 
unrestricted movement—cemented by U.S. foreign policy since World War I—set a precedent 
for the U.S. to corner the European market on the distribution of media products, a situation also 
necessary for the U.S. to prop up what it believed was its waning global hegemony.   
Contributing to this growing political economy analysis of Western globalization, 
Armand Mattelart expanded upon Schiller and Guback.  In his analysis, Mattelart also 
determined that media are not simply cultural exports; but he added that they are also necessarily 
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technological ones.  Charging that technology flows are far from neutral, Mattelart argued that 
since 1965 “the producers of so-called mass culture” have increasingly become the ones who 
determine not only the development of programs and the content of messages, but also the 
manufacture of hardware and the installation of systems.25  It is in the best interest of 
corporations, which own both media production companies and electronics manufacturing, to get 
markets hooked on their entertainment products.  In so doing, perhaps these markets will not so 
much buy the technology to exhibit these products, but to establish their production facilities that 
run on a relaxed labor laws, cheap workers, and an open-door policy to all of those interested in 
relocating their production headquarters in these inexpensive locales.  Mattelart noted that while 
the U.S. was in the vanguard of innovation, the trend toward the accumulation of capital in 
communication technology industries has indeed become global, resulting in the proliferation of 
large multinational corporations that operate within and between several different kinds of 
markets, making it difficult for smaller industries in other countries to obtain a share.    
Several other prominent scholars, among them Edward Herman and Robert McChesney, 
also argued that the West harnessed technology to play the role of catalyzing the transnational 
trend toward deregulation and privatization in the economic uncertainty of the 1980s that started 
in the U.S. and rippled outward.  But Herman and McChesney put a unique spin on the idea to 
assert that in the 1980s the technological and economic upheaval created a situation where 
“nobody [had] a clear idea of exactly where things [were] heading.”26  Therefore, most firms 
believed the “smart course” was “to hedge [their] bets” by engaging in mergers and 
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acquisitions.27  In Herman and McChesney’s estimation, the result of these activities were new 
corporations of unprecedented size and scope, that would locate subsidiaries in technologically-
disadvantaged areas in order to expose foreign industries to technological innovation, creating a 
demand for these products in foreign markets and thus securing whatever additional revenue 
could be generated from both local consumers and local producers.  One way Western 
multinational corporations were able to do this was by convincing national governments of the 
developed and developing world that fewer restrictions on diversification, conglomeration, and 
flexible production would serve to quickly and inexpensively transfer technological innovation, 
not only from one company to another, but also from one nation to another.  While these 
brokered agreements often resulted in the transfer of technology from the developed to the 
developing world, a less than obvious result would also be a strengthening of the waning 
Western hegemony and a rearrangement of the global division of labor that would benefit the 
West, but might be to the disadvantage of developing nations.28
This logic follows Wallerstein’s claim made nearly a decade earlier that it is an “easy” 
empirical observation to perceive that “the geographical situs” of capitalism has grown over 
time, and that rendering the process of its expansion visible is not such an easy task.29  
Capitalism has no obligation or motivation to reveal its “hidden abode of production”; its 
purposes are better served if they seem to be part of the natural order of human progress.  As 
Schiller, Guback, Mattelart, Herman, and McChesney have echoed Wallerstein, the best 
diagnostic “clue” critics have to exposing capitalism’s abode is considering its growth spurts in 
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accord with technological innovation in transport, armaments, and (mostly relevant to this 
project) communication.  Harnessing these innovations should be seen as deliberate “responses 
to downturns” in capitalist cycles.30  However, it is important to emphasize a nuance of 
Wallerstein’s argument that the Western politics of exploitation and innovation were not 
primarily searches for “new markets in which to realize the profits of capitalist production.”31  In 
Wallerstein’s own words: 
This explanation however simply does not accord with the 
historical facts.  Areas external to historical capitalism have on the 
whole been reluctant purchasers of its products, in part because 
they didn’t ‘need’ them in terms of their own economic system… 
A much more plausible explanation is the search for low-cost 
labour forces.32
Intentionally or not, the political economy of communication search-for-markets logic tends to 
circumvent recognizing that developing nations were not ready-made markets just waiting to be 
tapped; that frequently either peripheral nations were not poised to afford what the developed 
world had to sell at developed world prices, or tastes for such goods had to be created.  It also 
crowds our ability to think about the ways in which, Wallerstein asserts, it was the “capitalist 
world that sought out the products” of the periphery in the form of a labor force, an “not the 
other way around.”33  
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In “A Private View of the Digital World,” Dan Schiller and RosaLinda Fregoso zeroed in 
on the U.S. telecommunications boom as one the catalysts affecting a rearrangement of global 
labor and capital to which Wallerstein’s claims point.  Schiller and Fregoso theorized that the 
manner in which global telecommunications came to fruition was under the direct auspices of the 
U.S. computer companies and their major business customers, and not as a mandate of the U.S. 
government on behalf of its citizens.  Telecommunication networks were set up by commercial 
entities that could profit from distributing “data and processing power as and where they 
needed.”34  But as the first several corporations began to develop the new digital technology that 
could accommodate large amounts of data at high speed in the U.S., a political-economic conflict 
broke out over the terms of entry into the new information society.  Governed by the Federal 
Communications Commission (like public telephone providers), the more traditional 
telecommunications industries were supply-side oriented and wanted to digitize the existing 
public telephone network with ISDNs or Integrated Services Digital Networks that would 
connect within and among subscribing nation-states.  This network would be available to both 
residential and commercial customers.  On the other hand, the strictly private, demand-oriented 
proponents like financial information corporations wanted merely to integrate the extensive 
corporate networks that already existed under their aegis.  They were not interested in financing 
any part of a network the public could use. 
Eventually corporate representatives on the demand side—the automobile industry, credit 
reporting and financial information companies, book publishers, media corporations, and 
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others—began to massage the close relationship that had always existed between business and 
government in the U.S.  The rhetoric of “freedom of the market” that had become a capitalist 
touchstone of the Cold War era became their slogan also.  These newer telecommunications 
“players” in the business wanted to be free to migrate to more private electronic service delivery 
systems they believed would minimize costs, protect against unpredictable rate increases and 
service problems, and provide more “customized applications” than would a public digital 
network.  Their solution was to lobby the U.S. government to desist from protecting “monopoly 
suppliers” like AT&T.35  As the U.S. government began to cater to these demands—by 
allocating free and unfettered microwave and satellite access to multinational media corporations 
for example—private industry and its needs became the dominant contender in the battle 
between truly private and semi-private telecommunications industries.   
The infrastructure experienced growing pains as it began to take shape when the 
research and development costs to further upgrade networks increased exponentially.  Many 
corporations believed that the much-sought-after domestic access they lobbied so hard for could 
not really continue to provide sufficient revenue to both continue the upgrade and yet satisfy 
shareholders.  To boost revenue their focus became international markets, and these 
corporations began to engage in “joint ventures across national borders.”36  For transnational 
corporations like CBS, HBO, and Citicorp that already specialized in some “transborder 
delivery of data and video,” the initial outlay for a basic digital network connecting the 
developing nations to the developing world had positive economy of scale potential.37  They 
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would, therefore, have much at stake in arguing with the U.S. government for further domestic 
and foreign deregulatory reform.  Their ambitions for global domination also required them to 
discover a way to convince developing national governments to deregulate in the same 
fashion.38   
Exploitation was the reality of these endeavors, yet they were repeatedly justified in the 
work of writers like Daniel Bell, Francis Fukuyama, and Thomas Friedman, not only as the 
organic evolution of “early” capitalism to “late” capitalism, but also as the “natural” spread of 
capitalist democracy.  However, Schiller and Fregoso emphasized that, 
within this context, the concerted drive to privatize 
telecommunications should be viewed as an effort to create a 
thoroughgoing global foundation for systematic corporate 
exploitation of information.  The objective was to create truly 
private transnational systems for information processing and 
transport, not only across the developed market economies but also 
across the less developed states.39  
 Thus, there was not a natural spread of democracy from the developed world to the developing 
any more than there was a natural spread of telecommunications technology products, services, 
and labor.  
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2.3 NO TIME TO TRANSLATE: THE BRETTON WOODS ERA 
What Schiller and Fregoso addressed obliquely, but did not explicitly pursue in their 
analysis is an exploration of the most crucial forces the West marshaled in order to expand a 
neoliberally organized telecommunication infrastructure to other markets abroad: both the global 
funding and regulatory agencies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the compulsory macroeconomic policies these 
institutions promoted.  Schiller and Fregoso rightly bring our attention to the fact that much of 
Western (read: U.S.) impact on the rest of the world was born from a mixed parentage of 
government and commercial, or public and private, interests.  It is likely beyond the scope of 
their article to bring the Bretton Woods Era institutions to bear on the spread of the 
telecommunications industries.  Yet, as international political economists C. Roe Goddard and 
Melissa H. Birch point out—alongside Ben Bagdikian, Herbert Schiller, Robert McChesney, and 
many others—since the mid-twentieth century the IMF and World Bank (and the WTO more 
recently), have put themselves in charge of “ensuring a smoothly operating international 
monetary system.”40  From here, few are the steps to becoming the most powerful connection 
between the developed and developing worlds, since the help they offered the developing world 
was based on prescriptive privatization policies that opened doors for multinational corporations 
to fashion financial and technological webs linking these two worlds together.  Once the IMF, 
World Bank, and WTO provided a regulatory framework on which these webs could hang, 
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multinational telecommunications corporations hawking cable and satellite were vanguard 
spinners, weaving a relation of “power and communication” that stretches “across the globe.”41  
In his book Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank, and WTO, scholar Richard Peet traced 
this universalization of Western capitalism back to one of the most powerful incarnations of 
liberal macroeconomics in the modern era: the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.  For Peet, the 
Conference was significant on numerous fronts, but mostly because when the ink finally dried on 
the final Bretton Woods agreements, it appeared that the U.S. had single-handedly granted itself 
control of the global economy that would have an impact for generations to come.  Supposedly, 
the original purpose of Bretton Woods was to orchestrate the stabilization of the global polity 
through the calibration of the global economy, mainly through several institutions that would 
help finance the reconstruction and development of the more vulnerable nations of the world.  
However, the U.S.’s Machiavellian orchestration of its role in the global political economy 
guaranteed that its interests would prevail beyond the conference.  Bretton Woods marked the 
birth of the global financial system in the form of the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the IBRD later became the World 
Bank), and the International Trade Organization (which finally became the World Trade 
Organization, or WTO).  The IMF was designed to provide short-term loans to countries in 
trouble with their balance of payments in the world trade market; the IBRD for longer-term 
development projects; and the ITO’s role was to facilitate world trade as a means to global 
economic stability.  
But in their final conception, the Bretton Woods institutions reflected a political economy 
in which capitalism and democracy were intimate.  The men who ruled from behind this curtain 
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of Bretton Woods were not just from the U.S. government administration—Roosevelt’s and then 
Truman’s after Roosevelt’s death—those driving the U.S. capitalist agenda to the heart of the 
global financial structure were also “bankers, prominent newspapers and influential 
Republicans,” a group often called the “Washington Consensus.”42  The brand of liberalism 
these individuals sold to the rest of the world was a not-so-distant relative of Adam Smith’s 
manifesto for a freedom from feudalism, and it translated Smith to understand the world as a 
“free market” comprised of sovereign member states that could each enjoy equal economic 
opportunity in an “‘open international system’.”43  In this new world order, the “free market” 
was the Holy Grail that would foster political harmony across the globe.  The U.S. and the U.K. 
were the reigning powers at the Conference and both nations could be characterized as capitalist 
democracies in differing degrees.  The U.K., however, advocated a more Keynesian socialism for 
the Bretton Woods institutions, because in the U.K., capitalism and democracy were more like 
strange bedfellows than partners.  Unfortunately, since the U.K. had limited economic power 
compared to the U.S., such Keynesian-inspired suggestions fell on deaf ears.   
The Western, U.S.-driven capitalist agenda left scant room for community building and 
negotiation that other participating countries assumed Bretton Woods would entail.  The 
developing world was largely left out of the drafting process, even though it would ultimately be 
most affected by it.  Leaving out developing nations while asserting a pre-existing equality 
among nations only further belied that the Bretton Woods brand of liberalism was a grave 
rhetorical manipulation.44  Yet the West continued promoting the potential goodwill that the 
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Bretton Woods institutions could embody for the rest of the world.  Like a wolf wearing sheep’s 
clothing, the U.S. cloaked its hegemony—in the form of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO—in 
the guise of being an international collective, or a group of institutions predicated on the 
cooperation of the world community.  The U.S. had stacked the voting heavily in its own favor, 
and the “aggressive desire of the capitalist market to expand globally beyond the boundaries of 
the developed industrial world” where “one nation-state uses the entire system to subordinate 
other nations that are weaker economically” eventually manifested itself openly in Bretton 
Woods.45
As the most economically powerful nation at the end of the Second World War, the U.S. 
granted itself one-third total voting power at the outset, even though most of the 45 countries 
originally involved in Bretton Woods wanted a more democratic “one-country-one-vote” system. 
In so doing, the U.S. “assured itself an effective veto power over future decision-making.”46  The 
U.K. was not too far behind with half the quota power of the U.S.  What paltry voting power that 
remained was divided up between the remaining thirty-two countries.  To shore up this position 
of dominance, however, the U.S. and U.K. determined that the amount of influence any other 
country would have over international lending was based on economic and political clout: the 
more gold reserves a country could deposit into the institution, the greater their role.  After 
World War II, however, most of the nations involved had little to buy an equal share in the 
institution in order to gain a modicum of control over its operations.  To add a petty insult to this 
dire injury, the Bretton Woods masterminds also set the final signing deadline for immediately 
after the first draft of the final documents, well before many of the participating could even 
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translate the documents into their own language.  Therefore, the opportunity to review and 
comment on these documents never even really existed.  Out of a total of 34 participating 
countries, only the U.S. and the U.K. had the chance to include their points of view about the set-
up of resulting institutions like the IMF and IBRD.  Consequently, most of the countries 
involved in Bretton Woods ended up signing a final agreement whose prescriptions they either 
did not support or of which they were not aware.47  By the 1990s, and without precedent, these 
three institutions had become the most significant global lending and regulatory agencies.  Given 
the history and power of these institutions to influence change in the national infrastructures of at 
least two hundred countries, one wonders what kind of role these institutions could have played 
if they had been organized under (ironically) a more democratic leadership. 
With U.S. bankers and businessmen at the helm of what by now had become the IMF and 
the World Bank, the management trends of the business world continued to infuse IMF and Bank 
policy.  Proponents of one of the most pervasive of these trends, management engineers Michael 
Hammer and James Champy wrote a corporate “manifesto” in 1993 that advocated  
“streamlining” by cutting employees, thereby cutting costs.  Since these were practices that 
larger corporations had adopted, and which threatened to put other, less powerful companies out 
of business, in Reengineering the Corporation, Hammer and Champy advocated that smaller 
corporations adopt a “discontinuous thinking.”48  This meant that weaker corporations should 
abandon “outdated” management policy to instead embrace “individualism, self-reliance, a 
willingness to accept risk, and a propensity for change.”49  Paramount to corporate shareholders 
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is an increase in the rate of revenue and a concomitant increase in dividends; and what corporate 
engineers like Hammer and Champy promised is that dividends are created by decentralized 
operations, increased competition, a decrease in the number of people it takes to complete a task, 
and an increase in the role of technology.  
How striking it is that the IMF, World Bank, and WTO not only sounded the same crisis 
alarm for the developing world, but made similar suggestions for preventing it.  “Streamlining” 
the national industries, the neoliberal narrative went, would keep these countries from being 
forced out of business.  Implicitly paramount to this narrative is rapid economic and 
technological growth; and what development engineers of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO 
promised weaker corporations and developing nation governments alike is that growth is created 
by risk and speculation.  For the developing world, risk and speculation meant dismantling state-
owned enterprises, allowing foreign investors to own a stake in national industries, reducing 
social assistance programs that would provide telecommunications to the public, and opening up 
national economies to world trade that would compete with local industries.50  IMF and World 
Bank-managed annual budgetary targets and currency exchange rates would also accompany 
these policies.  No longer important was the political, cultural, or economic stability that an 
infrastructural project represented—like a technological update to a national media industry, an 
irrigation system, or even a health care system—to the loan evaluation process of the global 
lending agencies, because these agencies were no longer “project oriented.”  With the 
Washington consensus powers lining the pockets of these agencies, they would make a loan only 
if a borrower agreed to these policy “adjustments” that they believed would spur economic 
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growth.51   The irony of the Bank and its policies was that many of the countries requesting 
funds for development were so poverty-stricken that they could not help but get deeper and 
deeper in debt to both the IMF and World Bank, particularly when the policies of these 
institutions devastated national economies, preventing further development or growth.  Most 
could only manage to pay back the interest accrued.  
Not unlike other neoliberal proclaimers of the time, Hammer and Champy declared that 
there were dire “costs of inaction” for a corporation that failed to streamline its operations when 
faced with a fall in the rate of revenue, and then their own demise.52  For an organization that did 
not change its policies to mirror those of the largest U.S. corporations, the organization would 
“be in trouble” because it wouldn’t be as good “as the market will demand that it be” or wouldn’t 
be as good as “it has decided it wants to be.”53  What Hammer and Champy insinuated was that a 
corporation without the appropriate degree of ruthlessness in reengineering would be in trouble 
because it would not be as good as its shareholders demand that it should be.  Likewise, many 
telecommunication policy advisors, such as those counseling the European Union, mimicked this 
subtle threat.  Reminiscent of this movement among development policy advisors, advisors to the 
European Council wrote a manifesto similar to Hammer and Champy’s endorsing aggressive 
market-oriented action for all European nations:   
The information revolution prompts profound changes in the way 
we view our societies and also in their organization and structure.  
This presents us with a major challenge: either we grasp the 
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opportunities before us and master the risks, or we bow to them, 
together with all the uncertainties this may entail. The main risk 
lies in the creation of a two-tier society of have and have-
nots…Such a risk in inherent in the process of structural change.54    
Hammer and Champy tried to dismiss that reengineering or restructuring means “downsizing,” 
but it is hard to forget the residual effects of reengineering had on individuals outside of the 
shareholders circle—employees, customers, and the like—because this corporate model favors 
ever-expanding profit over all else, even human livelihood.  When we extrapolate from the effect 
these policies had on corporate employees to the effects neoliberal macroeconomic corporate 
policies had on citizens of an entire nation, we cannot help but see that the cost of increasing the 
rate of revenue or growth in this way also represents an increase in the number of people living 
in poverty.   
Peet raises a similar concern about the insouciance of “liberal economists” who were 
“aware that the free market...did not benefit everyone and that not everyone gained equally,” but 
who still promoted the free market ideal to the world.55  The argument for free trade was instead 
“based on maximizing global wealth and increasing efficiency, not on equity or equal 
distribution.”56  Hammer and Champy admit in their manifesto that in any attempt at 
reengineering, there “eventually comes the sobering moment when the reengineering team has to 
explain what it’s been doing to the rest of the company…that part of the reengineering process 
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can be less fun.”57  Unfortunately, the Bretton Woods institutions also adopted a seemingly 
cavalier attitude toward the vulnerabilities created in the developing world by the adoption of 
neoliberal economic policies.  For the WTO in particular, Kym Anderson, former WTO 
Secretariat, glibly suggests that “occasionally the rules and obligations” of WTO accession 
“upset political sensitivities because some groups within a country may lose a privilege,” such as 
“protection from import competition,” but Anderson asserts that the havoc a nation experiences 
from an external organization tinkering with its economic and political systems is nothing 
compared with the revenue that will be generated for all member countries.58  What Anderson 
and others do not allude to, however, is the potential disaster posed by this form of neoliberalism 
called “globalization,” defined with false naiveté in this case by the interdependence of member 
countries that (willingly or not) lend aid to each other, exchange products, and invest directly in 
one another.  Unanticipated competition from a foreign company in a developing world industry 
could flood and destroy it along with the livelihood of all those who rely on it.  Tragically, the 
insouciance with which members of the business world and the global financial institutions 
dismissed the costs of adopting these policies was common throughout the world during the 
1990s.  
Toward the end of the twentieth century little had changed, either about big business in 
the U.S. or about the governing dynamic of the Bretton Woods institutions.  The West, 
represented by the IMF and World Bank, had increased their financial investment in the national 
economies of the developing world by offering more loans to developing nations.  But more 
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loans did not make developing world borrowers stronger economically.  The developing world 
was caught in a vicious cycle of debt and mounting interest, and many of the weakest countries 
repeatedly defaulted on their loans even as they borrowed more.  And eventually came the 
“sobering” moment when the IMF and World Bank had to explain to debtor countries that they 
would be “reengineered” as a result.  These two institutions would no longer suggest what 
policies would be best for these countries to establish economic growth as they had in the past, 
instead they demanded stringent adherence to Western policy initiatives.  By this time, the World 
Bank had become the greatest source of development funding; when it began to attach 
“conditionality” to loans borrowing countries had no choice but to agree.  Proving 
creditworthiness in advance was one of the primary means of conditionality the Bank demanded, 
meaning that borrowing countries had to offer their economic policies up to the Bank for 
appraisal and adjustment not knowing either what kinds of structural adjustment the Bank would 
require or how restructuring would impact the health of their country.  Typically, the market-
oriented reforms required by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO: tax reductions for corporations, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, reduction of trade barriers and investment liberalization 
continued throughout the 1990s.   
Despite the appearance that the IMF, World Bank, and WTO were carefully sifting 
through the appropriate policies that would foster growth for each particular country, usually the 
prescriptions were the same.  And the outcome of this cookie-cutter approach was that economic 
crises were repeatedly visited upon borrower nations in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast 
Asia.  Referencing figures reported by the Heritage Foundation, Peet reports that: 
forty-eight of eighty-nine less-developed countries that received 
IMF money between 1965 and 1995 are not better off 
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economically than they were before; thirty-two of these forty-eight 
are poorer than before; and fourteen of these thirty-two countries 
have economies that are at least 15 percent smaller than they were 
before their first IMF loan or purchase.59
Peet further emphasizes, “by one account 6 million African, Asian and Latin America children 
are said to die each year from the effects of structural adjustment.”60  Criticism from scholars 
like Peet, the Heritage Foundation, and other organizations critical of the Bretton Woods 
institutions began to mount as the conditionality policies and extreme austerity measures 
fomented violent protests around the world.61  A cut in national subsidies affected social services 
beyond the national industries like petroleum and telecommunication; health care and food 
staples were also at risk, as the elimination of national welfare systems was required in exchange 
for development funding.62  In Nigeria, protests “began in 1988 as a reaction to the elimination 
of state subsidies on petroleum products” and continued for two decades.63  Similar IMF policies 
were also instituted in Indonesia, including a “70 per cent increase in the prices of fuel and 
electricity”; the reaction was “mass unrest and violent riots” beginning in the spring of 1998, 
ending with the “eventual resignation” of President Suharto.64  
After the East Asian crisis, the World Bank posted a Frequently Asked Questions page on 
its website to address the criticisms lodged by governments, NGOS, and others.  One of the 
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questions posted seems to get to heart of the criticism when it asks, “Didn’t the Bank’s actions 
during the Asian financial crisis make things worse?”  The World Bank’s answer, however, 
borders on offensive:  
No, the Bank’s financial support during the Asian financial crisis–-
totaling more than $8 billion—provided the short-term funds that  
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines needed  
to get through the crisis, without even deeper cuts in spending on  
basic social services.65  
Perhaps it was the bird’s eye view of the macroeconomic perspective that predisposed the 
IMF, World Bank, and WTO from not being able to acknowledge the human toll their policies 
could take.  The World Bank’s “explanation” elided the fact that the World Bank’s agency was 
most destructive before the disaster, as one of these actions required was a cut in “spending on 
basic social services.”  Tinkering with a nation’s ability to institute development projects, such as 
the adoption of a telecommunication network that would have improved the quality of life for the 
majority of citizens in a developing nation, had real economic, political, cultural, and medical 
implications for people on the ground.  Based on their practices, however, the Bretton Woods 
institutions did not take into account the impact neoliberal macroeconomic policies had on real, 
individual people; in fact, it is almost as if individual people did not exist for these organizations. 
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2.4 CAN’T KEEP IT PRIVATE: DEVELOPING WORLD COMMUNAL 
TECHNOLOGY  
In the mid-1990s, Bill Gates’ Microsoft campaign, “Where do you want to go today?” 
represented the use-value of new digital media technologies in the Western popular imagination.  
The Personal Computer (and its concomitant software), the Internet, the cell phone, and even the 
still-ubiquitous walk-man (now the iPod) were technologies that could be used to enhance either 
business or leisure activities.  These technologies are highly individualized, and people use them 
to create a unique space for themselves in which to move, physically, culturally, or socially.  
Although Williams was largely referring to television and the automobile in his coining of the 
phrase, privatization clearly could have been extended to newer technologies where music, 
cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum offered pleasurable, private spaces to inhabit; not 
to mention that these technologies also provided businesses with a space in their respective 
markets.66  For most developing nations during the same decade, however, the PC, the Internet, 
satellite broadcast, digital film, and the cell phone were less about creating pleasurable, privately 
profitable spaces, than they were about providing for public needs through the (public or private) 
development of telecommunication networks.   
In the 1990s, even though corporations could finance the networks, satellites, and 
computer hardware, both foreign and local, these technologies also meant the possibility for a 
significant change in developing countries.  In a broad sense, national governments could take 
advantage of this partially private-interest funded new technology like Internet and satellite to 
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gather and consolidate financial and medical networks that would benefit the nation on an 
economy of scale.  But governments could use technology in service of more ideologically 
complex activities, too, by creating media products via satellite, Internet, and film that reinforce 
a particular idea of national identity.  The government could even try to “protect” national 
sovereignty by restricting citizens’ access to externally generated political and cultural content.  
Western pundits and politicians often criticized such activities, but few would have disagreed 
that an increasing emphasis on the global, at the expense of local sensibilities, has eroded the 
character of national identity in many nations where such an idea was still compelling.  This 
makes technology a touchstone in several important ongoing debates like the one about national 
sovereignty, but also in debates about globalization and political autonomy, as well as economic 
policy.  
For the first time, a nation could begin to create networks for facilitating economic 
growth, technological research and development, and a positive reputation in the world market.  
In the 1990s, TradeNet was an electronic system designed to spur international trade; this system 
became a springboard for other practical applications like telemedicine and MediNet, which 
intended to link the “computers of hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and insurance companies.”67  
The national media industries could use technology like satellite and digital filmmaking to court 
film production and post-production from television and film companies overseas, or perhaps 
gain a stake in the international media market for the first time, a profit-turning venture crucial to 
many national industries that were in the red.  Digital production of film or television was not 
only a cost-efficient technology to use after the initial purchase of equipment, but could also 
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enhance production quality as a means to attract local audiences, preventing the need to 
broadcast programming “dumped” onto the industry from other countries.68
According to telecommunications scholar Ben A Petrazzini, since telecommunications in 
the form of Internet, cellular telephones, and satellite broadcasting, had become a “prerequisite 
of any national…growth project in the developing world,” trying to deduce whether there was 
any correlation between comprehensive privatization of national industries and success was 
exigent, especially since privatization was a often a requirement for funding.69  In his own 
attempt in The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries, 
Petrazzini surveyed the privatization attempts made in over 10 countries around the world during 
the 1990s, but concluded that there were no hard and fast political or economic rules to which 
successful nations had adhered, whether it was wholesale privatization, a private-public mix, a 
state-owned endeavor, or a variant of any of these.  Instead, he found that “a closer look at some 
of the countries in which reforms are most advanced reveals few commonalities.”70  Even though 
neoliberal policymakers often viewed state reform “as a homogeneous trend throughout the 
Third World,” in Petrazzini’s estimation the only common denominator of success was the 
existence of national wide public support in each country.71  This makes sense since a significant 
amount of technological activity is non-commercial because its products are not sold on any 
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market.  Instead, the products of technology are used in areas that are of public interest: technical 
training, health, and defense spheres.72
For Petrazzini, certainly the IMF, WTO, and World Bank had several examples to which 
they could refer as wholesale privatization “success stories.”  Malaysia, Chile, Jamaica, and 
Venezuela were able to sell off their national telecommunications enterprises to private 
organizations in order to keep their industries afloat in the 1990s.73  But correlation did not 
necessarily indicate causality, and it bears remembering that Malaysia and Venezuela did not 
escape the economic crises of their respective regions, East Asia and Latin America more 
generally did not either.  It is also important to remember that these same policy prescriptions—
whether attached to offers made by global agencies or offers made by MNCs—were also the 
same ones suggested to Eastern European countries, as well as, to Southeast Asian countries like 
Thailand, and frequently have been cited among the causes for the severe economic crises that 
rocked both of those regions in the same decade and later spread west.   
Given the importance of the local, as opposed to the global, significance of 
telecommunication technologies, development studies scholar David Forsyth was correct in 
asserting that ultimately the “thrust of technological activities should be determined by local 
priorities rather than external ones,” like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank.74  With plenty of 
examples to cull from in Technology Policy for Small Developing Countries, Forsyth questioned 
the viability of importing neoliberal technology policy into developing countries, and 
emphasized that a laissez-faire policy or the unrestrained operation of the market, was “unlikely 
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to result in technological activities receiving an optimal resource allocation, or an optimal use of 
those resources” in these countries toward national goals.75  Neglecting to prioritize such goals in 
favor of those that would better suit a developed country in the West, could eventually 
destabilize, not only the successful adoption of technology but the entire national economy.  And 
for Forsyth, the less developed the country, the more serious the potential devastation.  But 
locating the resources to create the system was the first issue of order for most of these countries, 
and policy initiatives came second.  
A significant amount of seed funding, not to mention continued investment, would be 
necessary from countries that, at the macro level, were already having a great deal of trouble 
keeping their balance of payments settled for the other goods they were importing, as well as 
providing social services for its citizens at the micro level.  Therefore, the promise of the 
resources necessary to a successful technological innovation by the IMF or the World Bank was 
hard for these countries to dismiss out of hand.76  As for the technology itself, it was the one 
Western “innovation” from which developing countries could benefit.  The infrastructures that 
existed in much of the developing world in the early 1990s were often outdated and decrepit 
systems; most of the modern telecommunication technologies were reserved for the powerful—
whether government or private agencies—in any given developing nation.  Indeed there would 
be benefits to countries adopting the new digital technologies and a ready-made policy structure 
after the developed world had already begun to implement them.77  Technologies, like cellular 
telephone, went through several generations before many developing world countries gained 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 6. 
76 Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. 
77 Jussawalla, Meheroo, ed., Global Telecommunications Policies: The Challenge of Change (Westport 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 
 66 
access to them; and the third generation in cellular telephony (3G) was undeniably more useful 
for many of these countries, particularly ones with regional systems agreements.  Not only would 
many of the technological “growing pains” have been experienced by this time, but poorer 
countries that could not afford their own research and development centers could, in essence, 
piggyback onto this ready-made technology and simply adapt it to their own uses.  
However, adopting these new technologies was not necessarily a bed of roses; coming 
“late” to a technology could present a few conundrums.  The least of these was for each country 
to be able to develop national centers to manage and regulate the technology for both the 
present and the future.  For the developing countries that purchased technology from Western 
multinational corporations using IMF and World Bank funds, of particular issue were joint 
ventures where the multinational corporation possessed a greater degree of power and placed 
stipulations on their business agreements like a deregulated environment in exchange.  More 
seriously, in the telecommunication industry or otherwise, applying new technologies often 
resulted in a loss of jobs, which could increase the potential social service burden on countries 
that were already hogtied by neoliberal proscriptions on State welfare.  Choosing either side of 
this dilemma could also place the national economy in jeopardy.  Whether crafted by global 
funding agencies, multinational corporations, or national governments, context-centered 
policies that took into consideration the individual economic, political, and cultural dimension 
of a country, would make it possible to troubleshoot many of these concerns.   
Yet as important as it was to underscore how close the marriage should have been 
between development and a nation-guided technology policy, it was also remarkable that the 
developing world set in relief the extent to which technology could be flexible, depending on the 
policy framework.  And emphasizing this flexibility was significant in that it was the logical step 
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that Western global financial organizations and multinational corporations skipped in the process 
of attempting to manage technological innovation in developing countries to its own ends.  
Adherents of globalization inferred that because media technology like the cell phone, the 
Internet, or software was often “born” first in the Western world, it could not help but embody 
Western values.79  Unfortunately, much political economy of communication scholarship was 
indirectly complicit in reinforcing this notion with its common assertion that technology is a part 
of the ongoing process of ideology transfer from the world power centers to the periphery.80  
Indeed, pointing out that information and communication technologies were legacies of Western 
modernity in its quest for scientific advancement and economic efficiency and growth was 
essential to critiquing the Western imperialist ambitions that characterized the last century.81  
But when we observed those same technologies being used in developing countries (and the 
values they embody to boot), it was easy to see that they were vulnerable to re-appropriation by 
their users in ways the designers of the technologies could not foresee.  In Communication, 
Technology, and Politics in the Information Age, development scholar Gerald Sussman argued 
against these major fallacies of technological determinism.  He maintained that, “technology is 
much more than an apparatus, a tool, a technique, a toy, a package of electronics, or an 
invention.  It is also the embodiment of human decisions made at particular moments in 
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particular political settings.”82  It was undeniable that the well-worn claims made by 
globalization apologists and political economists about the efficacy of neoliberalism were only 
partially valid.  A more realistic understanding of the relationship between technology and 
ideology would have allowed for the existence of multiple belief systems that could govern the 
ways in which technology could be set up, developed, and used.  Of this the developing world 
was already aware. 
And certainly, if it was inconceivable that development was a “universal process 
consisting of a number of stages similar to those that the countries of Western Europe and U.S. 
had experienced,” it should have been equally inconceivable that crafting appropriate technology 
policy would have been universal in character, also.83  Most of the developing world had to 
consider how they would acquire digital technology without also acquiring, not just the 
ideological assumptions about “best” ways to regulate technologies, but also the economic and 
technological policies of its donor.  Fortunately, strategies other than depending on the power 
and resources of the IMF, World Bank, and WTO existed; even many of the poorest countries 
had other options at their disposal.  Among the nations that could not or would not become a 
member of the Bretton Woods Institutions and would not adopt the compulsory policies, many 
had to consider other sources of revenue if they wanted to improve their national 
telecommunication systems.  The regional economic alliance, or the interdependency and 
pooling of resources between neighboring countries, was one of the most viable options that the 
developing world had in its repertoire.  
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2.5 MAKE IT, DON’T TAKE IT: THE BENEFITS OF THE REGIONAL ALLIANCE 
In the introduction to their book, Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global 
Development, Hettne et al. see regionalism as the context in which many developing countries 
began to explore new economic and technological relationships with other countries outside of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions.  At first blush, regionalism in the 1990s seemed to foster a two 
party system on a global scale: the “policy makers” and the “policy takers,” where the 
developed world regional blocs would face off against those of the developing.84  Not satisfied 
with such a reductionist description that merely echoes the globalization myth, though, Hettne, 
et al., defined 1990s regionalism as a strategic political response to the economics of 
globalization.85   The goals of each region differ according to whether each hopes to maximize 
economic growth, start technological relationships with other nations, economic and political 
stabilization, or the “creation or defence of a collective identity.”86  However, regional alliances 
between developing countries in particular, “are organized in order to arrest a process of 
marginalization” by more “core” regions.87
Regional alliances represent the “concerted efforts from a group of countries within a 
geographical region to increase the complementarity and capacity of the total regional economy 
as well as finding the right balance between function and territory.”88  This collectivity is 
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“careful to see to the interests of the region as a whole,” since the arrangement is a countermove 
to the emergence of other economic blocs.89  The collective action already cohering in more 
core regions makes it “necessary for the excluded countries to stick together” in order to 
increase the size, resources, economic capacity, ability to counter disruptions, and strength to 
bargain as a collective.90  Economic and political pressure from nations in “core” regions or 
from global financial institutions makes “‘developmental regionalism’” a more constructive 
means to sustainable (in the sense of ongoing) development, not to mention peace.  In a regional 
alliance that is mostly comprised of developing countries, facilitating import/export trade 
relationships among neighboring nations is often more immediately useful “than the creation of 
free trade.”91  The regional alliance represents a compromise between a nation-centered world 
system and one that appears to be “the West versus the rest.”   
Earlier analyses of regional alliances focused mainly on regionalism as a form of military 
security, but more recent scholarship has found that with respect to the growth of an 
increasingly penetrating and dominating world market that subordinates national economies, the 
concept of “security” needs to be expanded, or even shifted, to address the issue of economic 
development.  Regional alliances in the developing world have assumed more than just a 
defensive posture; they also have embodied an “activist element” in the redistributive powers 
they possess.92  In the same way that nations with close geographical proximity have begun to 
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co-manage the natural resources they may share, such as skies and waterways, 
telecommunication networks could also be a shared entity.  For the creation of new 
communication technology networks in particular, regional alliances make it possible to pool 
resources to finance costs and cover the risks of technological development.  Regional alliances 
may also make possible a more “just and/or egalitarian allocation” of the benefits that result 
from the pooling of resources.93
For some developing nations in the 1990s, sharing the responsibility for the creation of 
telecommunication networks ameliorated the necessity of having to cultivate technology finance 
and transfer relationships, either with Western nations, Western multinationals, or with 
Western-run global financial institutions that would likely use the opportunity to advance their 
own ends, either politically or economically.  Technological standardization agreements among 
member nations of developing country alliances also became a common practice at this time, 
and these agreements made it possible for many nations to begin the process of digitization.  
Interregional trade was another advantage of these arrangements, providing member nations a 
market for both the technologies they develop, and for the media products these technologies 
make possible.  Regardless of their status as nations of the developing or developed world, 
many preferred to consume media with a close linguistic, ethnic, or regional relationship to their 
own; therefore, having a regional outlet for such products could be lucrative.94  And in contrast 
with the world market for communication technologies and media products, regional integration 
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made such exchanges more predictable in these important markets.95  For many scholars of 
regionalism, these benefits make regional alliances perhaps a “more effective public institution 
than each single state in dealing with certain problems associated with global processes, and at 
the same time to represent a level of collective identity that makes it more legitimate than any 
global institution.”96
2.6 DRAWING FROM DIFFERENCE: THE CASE STUDIES OF VIETNAM AND 
SOUTH AFRICA 
But regional economic alliances, Immanuel Wallerstein might remark, do not eliminate 
the influence of multinational corporations altogether.  For example, in both Vietnam and South 
Africa, private finance from foreign investors external to their regions in part made the 
establishment of a regional telecommunication network possible.  Thus their networks, which 
would provide access to satellite broadcast, cellular telephone, and Internet, were devised 
initially to serve commercial purposes.  Yet, looking at the impact that the Southeast Asian and 
Southern African regional alliances could have on their respective telecommunication networks 
at later stages underscores that the decisions of countries within these alliances still carried 
weight in determining how networks could be used into the future in favor of citizens; decisions, 
I will argue, that should be of equal importance to both scholars and policymakers.  For example, 
despite significant commercial or corporate influence in South Africa and (much later) in 
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Vietnam, the national governments of these nations understood new digital technologies to be 
about political and economic survival, as well as fostering national identity and sovereignty; 
therefore, in order to do justice to these histories, what is required is a nuanced approach to an 
analysis of their innovation from analog to digital media that took place in those countries in the 
1990s.  
For Vietnam, the late twentieth century was about rebuilding the economy, public 
infrastructures, national identity, and political culture twenty years after French and U.S. 
occupation had all but decimated the country.  After decades of uncertainty and destruction, the 
Vietnamese government began to stabilize the nation, making the telecommunications 
infrastructure a central plank in their Doi Moi (economic renovation) plan.  Internet, cellular 
telephone, and satellite television were essential to reestablishing the flow of communication 
between North and South Vietnam, in the form of television, films, e-mail, and phone 
conversations in their goal of ideologically reunifying the country.  The South African media 
industry faced choices similar to those in Vietnam in the 1990s.  During the initial post-apartheid 
movements, many in the African National Congress (ANC) declared the State’s responsibility to 
transfer power from white to Black citizens.  Very little in the way of modern media 
technologies existed, except in the more upscale white townships.  In black “Bantustans,” 
landline phones, cable television, computers, or satellite broadcast were rare.  And so the ANC 
also declared the ambition to update the national media system, cellular telephony and Internet in 
particular, in order to promote a free flow of information, establish democracy, and redistribute 
resources to the chronically impoverished, in short to accomplish goals similar to that of the 
VNCP, but with a different ideological veneer.  
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While as developing nation-states Vietnam and South Africa have much in common—
both worked to create national media infrastructures as a means to strengthen their economy, to 
establish a political structure, to stabilize national unity, and perhaps to gain a stake in the 
international media market—the role each played within its own geographical and economic 
region was distinct.  The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was a politically communist country 
with a socialist-market economy that had opened up in deliberate fashion to the rest of the world.  
Despite the Southeast Asian economic crisis in the latter half of the 1990s, Vietnam also steadily 
became one of the fastest growing nations in the Southeast Asian region during the last several 
decades, in part because of its inclusion in the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).  
South Africa was a democracy with an economy that rapidly became market-oriented and 
outwardly directed despite initial ANC intentions to create a state-centered public infrastructure.  
It enjoyed the status of being the largest economy in the region, and benefited from being the 
prime mover in the South African Development Community (SADC).  However, in direct 
contradistinction to their unique characters, in the 1990s, the main global aid and regulatory 
organizations, the IMF, WTO, and World Bank, attempted to pressure both of these nations (and 
others) to adopt cookie-cutter policy initiatives as the price for the fiscal and technological 
support the agencies would provide to these countries to update their media industries.  
Privatization of the national media industries, including telecommunications, film, television, 
and radio; liberalization of the national media markets; a decrease in state regulation of the entire 
system; and an openness to foreign direct investment, were primary among the policy 
suggestions for both countries.  Strikingly, these were also objectives prioritized by multinational 
corporations during this time.  Plenty of evidence exists to demonstrate that the nations which 
head global agencies were also instrumental in making sure the multinational corporations 
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headquartered in their territories were able to increasingly penetrate media technology markets 
abroad, making it difficult to distinguish between these groups.97
As countries that fit Forsyth’s profile of smaller and developing, Vietnam and South 
Africa clearly reaffirm this principle.  In Vietnam, the development of the Internet was a project 
tied closely to their Local Poverty Reduction in Vietnam (LPRV) initiative.  In the late 1990s, 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) set up five Centers for Poverty Reduction (CPRs) 
operating throughout the country.  Each had several computers, Internet and e-mail capability, 
computer and software training, as a means to collect information on small development projects 
in the region.  To promote reticulation among the CPRs, the LPRV also made certain that each 
one was connected to university Internet Service Providers in each area.  Among the goals were 
to reduce poverty in urban areas, to enhance the clean water supply in rural areas, to create a 
system of canals for the irrigation of agriculture, and finally to create a databank on these 
development projects.98  As the projects got going, it was hoped that the network would result in 
the sharing of this data between CPRs and would encourage successful development from local 
areas outward.99
The 1990s in South Africa dealt a double blow of disease and poverty to the well being to 
some of its most vulnerable citizens, and the ANC articulated plans to stamp out diseases like 
tuberculosis using digital communication technologies that were in the works in the 1990s.  One 
                                                 
97 Tomlinson, John, “Cultural Globalization and Cultural Imperialism,” in International Communication 
and Globalization, ed. Ali Mohammadi (London: Sage, 1997). 
98 Boyle, Grant, “ICT Networking in Vietnam: The Limitations of an Information Needs Assessment,” in 
The Digital Challenge: Information Technology in the Development Context, ed. S. and Shirin Madon 
Krishna (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003). 
99 Ibid., 261.  
 76 
plan in particular hoped to use text messaging on cell phones as a way to alert tuberculosis 
patients when it was time to take their medication.  The ANC suggested this was part of a larger 
commitment to provide relief to the overburdened healthcare system, a service the government 
planned to extend to HIV patients as part of a promise to those that had voted the ANC into 
office.100  And for rural parts of South Africa that were still waiting for the ANC to establish 
telephone landline service for Internet and e-mails in the mid-to-late 1990s, many entrepreneurs 
stepped into the void and began developing “digital” courier services during the last decade.  
One such service, for example, provided rural schools with software that was compatible with 
the software of other schools in the area that were equipped with Internet capabilities.  Once the 
software was in place in the rural schools, students at those schools could then type up e-mails or 
requests for Internet searches, which then could be saved on a memory stick and delivered to the 
Internet-capable school for processing and retrieval.101  
The South African “digital” courier service, for example, is definitely not an idea 
inherited from the West; few people would have interest in such a venture given that the 
technology is comparatively more available.  But neither would the “digital” courier service have 
been of much use in Vietnam, where hilly, jungle topography in three-fourths of the rural areas 
would make carrying out the service extremely difficult, thus raising service prices too high for 
an impoverished school.  And as an entrepreneurial effort, such a business would likely not be 
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welcome by the VNCP, particularly without their approval and “participation.”102  So, rather 
than focusing on the history of the technology in question as a method of understanding its 
development, a more relevant analysis would be to consider the history of the receiving country, 
along with its national economic capacity, political structure, cultures, and topography.  
To compare the choices in media technology for both South Africa and Vietnam is to 
reveal how dissimilar technological development within developing countries can be.  In 
Vietnam, very little infrastructural change took place in the media industries between the late 
1950s and the 1980s.  But the mid-to-late 1980s were a Doi Moi, or “renovation,” period for the 
economy, and by extension for the media. The VNCP gradually began to open up its economy to 
others in the Southeast Asian region, and as economic growth occurred, plans were also made to 
upgrade the telecommunications industry from analog to digital: from a minimum of landline 
phones, telex, and broadcast repeaters to undersea optical fiber cable networks with regional 
connections, broadband radio frequencies, and small satellite receivers (often called VSATs), 
among others.  These plans began to be carried out in the 1990s, but not without careful attention 
paid to related economic and technological policies by the watchful eye of the VNCP.  Rather 
than rely on Western multinational corporations or funding agencies like the WTO, World Bank, 
or IMF as they had in the mid-twentieth century, instead the Vietnamese looked to the Asian 
Developing Bank and to business cooperation contracts with other media companies in the 
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region to support innovation.103  Consequently the VNCP chose particular technologies for the 
innovation process based on these business cooperation contracts and based on other less formal 
technology sharing and standardization agreements with other Southeast Asian countries.  Since 
the government chose to retain a state-owned enterprise monopoly model as opposed to a private 
one, development of these network services did not occur overnight; and often Vietnamese 
corporate and government officials were the first to gain access to the Internet, cellular 
telephone, satellite, etc.  Other Vietnamese citizens had to wait years, or sometimes longer, to 
enjoy such services.  While the first Internet activity took place at the Prime Minister’s office in 
1994, many people continue to wait for individual access, and often using such technologies is 
still a communal experience.  Compared to development in Vietnam, the growth of the same 
technologies and services in South Africa in the 1990s is as strikingly uneven. 
For South Africa, the media industry of the 1990s reflected decades of accumulated 
social, economic, and political ravages at the hands of apartheid.  Less than 3 percent of the 
population—usually white—accounted for 65 percent of the total income production, and 
unfortunately, the South African media industry reflected this shocking disparity.104  According 
to South African studies scholar Robert Horwitz, before apartheid ended, most of the 
telecommunication infrastructure was made up of state-owned enterprises whose resources were 
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marshaled to provide service primarily to whites and to business.105  Even though the state 
regulated the entire South African media industry, the country still had a decades-long history of 
allowing foreign direct investment and joint ventures.  By the 1990s, the National Party 
government had already been moving the entire system to a digital telecommunications network 
for over a decade, and had invested in cellular telephony, satellite for both broadcasting and 
telecommunications, as well as, several undersea cables.  While this was exceptional compared 
with the other countries in the developing world, there was also a great racial disparity in terms 
of distribution and access.  Near the end of that decade, even though the ANC had begun to 
dismantle apartheid, only 18 percent of black households had access to telephone service, while 
whites had 82 percent access; cellular telephone and Internet had similar patterns of gross 
inequity, mostly because the majority of users were corporate and academic, positions 
predominantly filled by whites.106  Not until this dismantling began did it become clear how 
deeply endemic discrimination was to telecommunications development in South Africa.  The 
national media industries were constituted of black cheap labor, nepotism, and protectionist trade 
barriers, which mainly benefited whites; the ANC understood privatization and deregulation—to 
allow European and British companies to provide equipment and services—to be a way out of 
this vicious cycle, even if it would govern the kinds of technologies that would be adopted.107  
Thus, an upgrade in the post-apartheid South African media industry in the 1990s was less 
obliged to be about establishing an entirely new digital network than it was about establishing a 
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new set of clientele and about making universal access a “national” goal, activities that could 
improve South Africa’s reputation abroad.  
From the diffusion of innovation paradigm, it would be easy to believe that development 
occurred smoothly across developing countries like Vietnam and South Africa in the economic 
“South” during the last decade; but Vietnam and South Africa underscore that radically different 
approaches to governing new technologies were necessary.  Among the few parallels in the 
character of development in these countries, were the dilemmas both faced, in either accepting 
financial and technical support from external sources along with the ideological baggage, or 
foregoing those resources and forestalling needed renovations to the media industries.  Even if 
we agree that technology is value-neutral, that does not mean that the donor intent or 
involvement—in the form of expectations attached with the technology transfer or in the form of 
training to use the technologies that have been transferred—is necessarily free of ideology, or 
that the donors will even admit that they export technology with their own best interests in 
mind.108  Much in the field of political economy of communication has been written about 
“cultural imperialism,” the nefarious intentions of Western media multinational corporations that 
invade other nation-states with media products and the technologies that are needed to produce 
them in order to create a permanent need and concomitant cultural and technological market 
abroad.  However, the ideological assumptions do not even have to be intentional to have an 
impact.  
Development management scholarship documents more subtle versions of the 
implications Western attitudes can have, even if they are as simple as assuming how a particular 
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media technology will be used, by whom, or even how often.  For example, in his experience 
working on the Local Poverty Reduction Vietnam (LPRV), Grant Boyle concedes that he and his 
fellow Canadians had specific expectations about how the Vietnamese would use the computers 
and the Internet once the CPRs were equipped.  While the Canadian information technology 
workers assumed that the hardware and software would be in great demand, it turned out that 
online collaboration between the various CPRs set up around Vietnam occurred very little.109  
Boyle laments that later he and his colleagues realized that face-to-face relationships are a more 
normal pattern of exchange for Vietnamese, and that both the traditional Confucian culture and 
the single-party communist state has fostered a deference to authority; such deference limits the 
efficacy of group activities like e-mail listservs or discussion groups within the CPRs, especially 
as junior participants are likely to feel sanctioned to collaborate with their superiors.  Boyle 
makes a final note, also, that while “under-use” of the equipment could be attributed to early 
stage of the LPRV plan or the low level of English-language skills, more important were these 
“not-so-obvious social issues involved,” such as local norms and values.110  In hindsight, the 
CPR resources certainly could have been used more efficiently. 
In South Africa, the impact of unintentional ideological imperatives went beyond a 
simple misuse of resources as in Vietnam; they actually supported the oppression of, and 
violence against, a majority of the population.  From the 1970s until the 1990s, many Western 
telecommunications and computer corporations that sold hardware and software to the National 
Party of South Africa, contributed indirectly to the apartheid regime.  IBM, for example, sold the 
National Party hundreds of computers and database software.  Many of these computers were 
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used to create, maintain, and facilitate a nationwide compulsory tabulation system in which all 
black citizens, once they hit 16 years of age, were registered, tracked, and processed according to 
a racially motivated hierarchy.111  The government claimed the tabulation system would simply 
monitor immigration into South Africa from other, more troubled states in the region, but often 
people were tracked so that they could be captured and tortured.  The computerized population 
registry was used to control where blacks worked and lived, and to track and punish any activity 
perceived to be against the National government.  When confronted with the fact that it was the 
apartheid government’s largest supplier of computers, IBM took the technocratic position that it 
could not tell its customers how to use the equipment.  IBM claimed to be unaware of the 
ultimate ends to which the National Party employed the technology—not unlike the punch card 
and card sorting system that IBM sold to the Nazis during the holocaust, but claimed to be 
unaware of the uses to which it was put.  However, since the government accounted for over 
one-third of IBM’s total sales in South Africa in the late 1970s and 1980s, and was IBM’s 
biggest customer, it is obvious that capitalist ideology fueled IBM’s insouciance about the 
oppression of black South Africans.112  Although in the 1990s both Vietnam and South Africa 
began to experience abatement in their struggles—for Vietnam it was the birth of a growing 
economy, and for South Africa it was the death of apartheid—the relationship between ideology 
and technology was no less significant.   
For both Vietnam and South Africa, the regional economic alliances of which they are 
members, the Association of Southeast Nations and the South African Development Community, 
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help provide potential bulwarks against such Western encroachment, but also a means for 
creating more palatable relationships in which funding, policy agreements, technology, and 
training can be exchanged.  For Vietnam, ASEAN was an essential ally, which helped the 
government prevent foreign commercial appropriation of their newly burgeoning media industry.  
In South Africa, the SADC was instrumental to the government in helping to create a media 
system to meet citizens’ needs for community-building media programming.  Ironically, 
however, both ASEAN and the SADC were regionalisms created as a defense mechanism 
against countries that threatened peace and stability in the area: Vietnam, for fear that 
communism would spread to neighboring countries; and South Africa, because other African 
nations wanted to distance themselves from the stain of apartheid.  
Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN in 1994 caused a great stir, particularly in the Western 
world.  The Vietnamese threat was the initial glue that held the alliance together, and after years 
of being a common enemy of ASEAN countries, many in the West assumed this meant the end 
of communist rule in Vietnam.  Vietnam’s membership, however, was more economic than 
political.  Vietnam’s economic Doi Moi had met with some success, and the VNCP also 
recognized that interregional cooperation represented could boost this success exponentially.  
During the period in which Vietnam joined ASEAN, the alliance had been enjoying an 
unprecedented economic growth trend they were hoping to duplicate in the telecommunication 
sector, an industry Vietnam had as yet to cultivate.  ASEAN celebrated Vietnam’s accession by 
allowing the country in immediately on a regional technological agreement eventually named 
after Vietnam’s capital.  The 1994 Hanoi Plan of Action was an official announcement of 
ASEAN’s technological goals, whereby “the design, standardization, inter-connection and inter-
operability” of information technology systems like satellite, Internet, and cellular telephony 
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would be accomplished by the next decade.113  The Association eventually accomplished some 
of these and other goals, in part, by establishing “self-sustained and permanent funds” with both 
the Asian Development Bank, as well as the IMF through monies collected from each member 
country for an ASEAN Science Fund.114  The funds are earmarked for ASEAN member nations 
only, so that each of them may innovate technology, create a technology Research and 
Development (R&D) infrastructure, or use the fund as a form of aid in the event of a systemic 
economic crisis without having to borrow money from Western funding agencies and accept the 
policy implications. 
For the SADC, South Africa was also a longtime common enemy, at least until the end of 
apartheid.  During the decades that the National Party ruled, other African states felt compelled 
to rhetorically denounce National Party activities, even though at times these nations quietly did 
business with South African companies out of the public eye.  Once the ANC had begun to 
wrestle power away from the National Party, however, South Africa was quickly welcomed 
publicly back into the SADC.  As one of Southern Africa’s wealthiest nations, its accession into 
the alliance meant a significant increase in resources, both financial and technological.  Since its 
inclusion, South Africa has also become a leader for the rest of the development community for 
its economic and technological policies.  Therefore, unlike Vietnam, even though South Africa 
was not an original member of the regional alliance, it has since become its most powerful 
member, revitalizing the SADC’s potential on the global stage.115  Although it has taken some 
                                                 
113 ASEAN, 6th ASEAN Summit 15-16 December 1998, Hanoi, Vietnam [Report] (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Secretariat,  2003 [cited May 21, 2005]); available from 
http://www.aseansec.org/5028.htm. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Hettne, Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development. 
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time for the SADC alliance to develop a clear policy framework, in the last years of the 1990s 
the alliance began to draft guidelines for the implementation of new digital media like 
broadband, cellular, and satellite.  Among their goals for an interdependent system of national 
communication networks, the SADC is setting standards for fair competition, universal access 
and service for all, as well as an “aggressive promotion of a more attractive environment for the 
private sector” in telecommunications.116  The SADC accomplished this goal in part by 
quadrupling foreign direct investment, from $691 million to $3061 million, between the early 
and late 1990s.117  So where a significant component of ASEAN strategy is to use regional 
alliance as a protection against the intrusion of unwanted political influence, the SADC is 
predominantly a means of pooling resources from the West and sharing them on an economy of 
scale. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Based on the case studies of Vietnam and South Africa, what this chapter claims is that 
even in the developing world where some commonalities indeed exist, a “best way” does not.  
Modeling Western methods of digital media innovation policymaking is even more politically, 
economically, and socially dangerous, especially for the smaller industries (small relative to 
others on the world market) in developing countries.  As the successes and failures of these two 
countries show, policy to upgrade media technology instead must be case-specific, taking into 
                                                 
116 South African Development Community, South African Development, Homepage (2004 [cited May 
13, 2004]); available from www.sadc.int. 
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consideration the existing infrastructure, political environment, and intentions of any and all 
investors.  As part of the process of making this claim, however, this chapter also makes a 
Wallersteinian conceptual shift in the political economy of communication framework of which 
it is evocative: to make a distinction between what has been described by the West as extreme 
powerlessness in the face of globalization, and what was really simply their economic 
vulnerability as developing nations that were trying to improve their national media systems and 
their global identities.  Traditionally, the field has emphasized the ubiquitous power of agencies 
helmed by the West: the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; but I would urge that the case studies of 
Vietnam and South Africa show us that developing countries have had, and continue to have, 
other options at their disposal.  Regional economic alliances, regional development banks, and 
regional trade areas are among a few of these. 
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3.0  THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA INDUSTRY, ‘BACKWARDS’ AND THEN 
FORWARD 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the largest cities in Vietnam—Hanoi, Saigon, and Hue—it is difficult to tell that a 
formal education in digital media technologies is largely unavailable for most citizens.  Young 
people pack Internet cafés on every corner, they talk on cell phones while navigating their 
motorbikes through the streets, and they eat Vietnamese noodle soup in a small shop with cable 
television they have installed themselves blaring in the background.  Brazilian soap operas, 
HBO, MTVAsia, Thai, Chinese, and other international programs are popular fare, but viewers 
are most loyal to local programming.  Vietnam Television (or VTV), one of the most visible 
stations in Vietnam, has four channels on air and plans for three more by 2010.1  Although VTV 
has purchased the rights to air versions of once-popular U.S. television shows like “The Price is 
Right” and “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire,” the station has used only the original concepts of 
the shows, and has refashioned them to appeal to Vietnamese tastes.  Vietnamese soap operas, 
music videos, local news, documentaries, and VNCP (Vietnamese Communist Party) activities 
still dominate the airwaves.  In Saigon, multiple street blocks are devoted to selling satellite 
dishes, televisions, DVD players, VCRs, and other popular consumer electronics produced by 
                                                 
1 Interview with the head of programming at VTV, July 10, 2005. 
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companies in the Southeast region.  Nokia, for example, has established several large, glittering, 
air-conditioned palaces in both Hanoi and Saigon; and S-Fone, LG, Sony, Panasonic, Mobifone 
and Fuji also have established a presence, with each company occupying several storefronts on 
any Vietnamese city street.  Outside of the dense metropolitan areas, however, it is a different 
story.  Cell phones, Internet, and cable or satellite television are not ubiquitous; yet, even in these 
smaller towns and villages outside the cities, at least one Internet café lights up the dusty main 
street as a popular destination for those who can spend the U.S. equivalent of six cents a minute 
to game, chat, and surf.2  In speaking with top professionals from a wide variety of media 
industries in Vietnam, one gets the impression that 1997, or the “Year of the Internet in 
Vietnam” as they call it, was a significant moment in the history of the Vietnamese national 
media.3  This was probably true for a handful of people.   
For Vietnamese with enough disposable income, time, and experience to spend, surfing 
the Vietnamese Internet became a possibility.  Young people crowd into these spaces, but for 
those looking to conduct surfing outside the purview of the VNCP, strict rules are imposed.  At 
the Internet cafés in Hanoi, Saigon, and Hue I visited during July 2005, typing in phrases like 
“human rights,” “journalists without borders,” and “pornography” resulted in an Internet 
blackout and automatic computer shutdown due to protective software that café owners install.  
In more “private” Ethernet venues, such as those in university dorms for example, fewer controls 
seemed to be imposed yet many sites falling under these categories were unavailable also.  
                                                 
2 Equivalent to 1,000 Vietnamese Dong per minute. According to the International Labour Organization, 
the average hourly minimum wage in Vietnam was US $0.40. See: International Labor Organization, 
International Labor, Homepage (2005 [cited August 21, 2005]); available from www.ilo.org. 
3 These interviews took place during July of 2005. Names will not be used to protect the identity of 
interviewees.  See Appendix A for an explanation of methodology. 
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According to a foreign correspondent working for Deutsche Press Agentur, the Ministry of 
Public Security planned to form an anti-internet crime force at the end of 2003. Since then, 
spending time in prison following a “closed-door” court trial for what the VNCP considers 
“cyber dissidence” is not unheard of.4  Of course, is up to the VNCP to define what dissidence is, 
and thus far it has established vague guidelines that using computers with Internet to gamble 
online, to view pornography, or to store and circulate “harmful information” that opposes the 
government or causes hostility between different ethnic groups is dissent.5  As of 2003, “all 
domestic website content providers must obtain approval and a license from the Ministry of 
Culture and Information” to minimize these activities.6  Ironically, however, in another interview 
I conducted with employees at VietnamNet, the VNCP has given them a green light to sell “soft 
core” pornographic images as screen savers to Vietnamese cellular phone users.7
So for those among Vietnam’s budding entrepreneurs—like some employees at 
organizations like VietnamNet—that have an education and connections to Vietnamese 
Communist Party members, the Internet offered a chance to strive for a stake in the media as 
producers and not just consumers.  For them, the introduction of the Internet into the country 
meant the chance to garner government support to create Internet services from the new 
infrastructure, like an online Vietnamese handcrafts store, or the chance to improve upon an 
already existing venue within the state media industry, such as adding an e-version of a popular 
local Hanoi newspaper like Thanh Nien to the online community.  For the majority of media 
professionals on the lower rungs of the labor ladder with whom I spoke in July of 2005, 1997 
                                                 
4 Interview with Deutsche Press Agentur correspondent, July 23, 2005. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Interview with employees at VietnamNet July 9, 2005. 
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brought to the fore new opportunities, but also new pressures.  In the years that followed the 
public development of the Internet, of all those who hoped to join the “digital revolution” in 
Vietnam, only the following Vietnamese were able to acquire jobs in the new IT sector: those 
lucky enough to acquire (or pay for) a space in one of the few capable national university IT 
programs; those able to obtain an education in a foreign country; or those who possessed the 
wherewithal and capital to purchase and then train themselves to use the new technology.  
Perhaps calling it a “revolution” was a bit premature.   
Not ironically, the most common lament during interviews with nearly a dozen 
Vietnamese (as well as Cuban and Australian) media professionals who work at 
telecommunications, cellular phone, broadcast television, and Internet companies in Vietnam, 
was that newly minted Vietnamese college graduates entering these industries often were 
comfortable adapting consumer electronics into their lives, but they did not know the first thing 
about working with the new technology in their intended field.  And since a great majority of the 
Vietnamese population was under 30, most employees at these companies needed to be trained.  
During these interviews, I heard a variety of explanations as to why IT training had been so 
limited in Vietnam.  Some suggested that remnants of earlier forms of Vietnamese Communism 
were still endemic to the institution of academia: doctoral degrees and other top academic 
positions in the national universities were for sale to the highest bidder, and those who did not 
want to bargain for a position ended up finding work outside the academy or they left the 
country.  Consequently, the quality of IT expertise, teaching, and research at some national 
universities was questionable.8  Others suggested that the tradition of giving journalists 
                                                 
8 Interview with a faculty of the Foreign Communications Institute For Journalism and Communications, 
Hanoi, July 11, 2005. 
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“bonuses,” “gifts,” or kickbacks led to a stagnant industry where professionals were rewarded for 
toeing the party line, but not for pursuing new technological arenas like e-journalism, which 
might have caught on with those who aspired to join the industry in the future.9  Yet others 
surmised that the Vietnamese Communist Party was more interested in cultivating an 
international reputation for being a newly “wired” country than it was in providing citizens 
training, because citizens might use their training to manipulate cell phones, computers, satellite 
dishes, the Internet, as well as new software to reach information sources outside of the VNCP’s 
purview, like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.  Even though I spoke with nearly a 
dozen professionals on these subjects, finding definitive answers to such mysteries was a nearly 
impossible task in Vietnam.   
The lack of technology training in Vietnam could have been due to the lack of resources, 
namely time and money, or it could have been a deliberate government strategy to control access 
to the creation of national media products.  More likely, it was a combination of these 
exigencies, coupled with the influence of Southeast Asian business.  The Vietnamese Communist 
party had imitated capitalist economic strategies in so far as they had allowed commercial 
entities the privilege of laying the groundwork for a viable media infrastructure and even 
profiting from it for a short time before it became VNCP property.  One of the consequences of 
this decision, though, was that the Vietnamese who gained access to the technology were not its 
managers or gatekeepers; they were relinquished only the role of consumer in relation to cell 
phones, Internet, and satellite television.  The end result was that the Department of Vietnam 
Posts and Telecommunications (VNPT) did well to establish the basic media infrastructure, but 
training individuals to actively manage it was another story.  In beheading the hydra of 
                                                 
9 Interview with Deutsche Press Agentur correspondent, July 23, 2005. 
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technological need, several more heads sprouted forth: the VNCP now not only had to manage 
the economic obligations of technological innovation, but also negotiate technology’s impact on 
the Communist ethos by employing even more of it to survey and censor the steady trickling in 
of Western capitalist culture. 
As part of the bargain, many of the corporations that employed my interviewees often 
simply bore the burden themselves, rather than holding the government accountable for the 
practices that contributed to the training deficit in Vietnam.  For example, telecommunications 
giant FPT (Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology) created its own university as a 
means to train its employees and to prevent “brain drain” out of Vietnam.  But it is important to 
remember that the concept of a “corporate” university did not have the same valence in Vietnam 
as it did in the West.  Media corporations like FPT, VTV, VNExpress, etc. were not private; 
instead, they began as wholly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have recently have become 
semi-independent: a mix of public and private.  Protected under the umbrella of the VASC (or 
Value Added Services Corporation), which was itself an offspring of the VNPT, these companies 
still received support indirectly from the VNCP in the form of national technological 
infrastructural development (such as the launch of the Vietnamese satellite, VINASAT).10  And 
companies like FPT also used more informal “training” strategies, such as providing less 
expensive computers and volunteering to establish ADSL11 in some poorer areas of the country 
in order to get people in those areas online (not to mention getting them hooked on using their 
Internet services).  Other, smaller organizations without the resources to contemplate starting 
                                                 
10 Interview with Vice President of FPT (Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology) July 25, 
2005, and the head of programming at VTV, July 10, 2005. 
11 ADSL, or Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line, is an Internet connection that provides a higher speed 
for incoming information and slower speed for outgoing information. 
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their own universities, made training new employees part of their business plan.  For VNExpress, 
a sister company of FPT and one of the most popular online news websites in Vietnam, four 
months were set aside before the first online edition appeared in 2001 to train the twenty-two 
employees how to write and submit e-news stories, as well as how to use the desktop publishing 
software VNExpress developed in-house.12  VTV also developed its own in-house training 
program to educate new hires about the company’s self-produced intranet system, as well as 
digital production and post-production for program content, as have many other successful 
businesses in the Vietnamese media industry.   
That is not to say that Vietnam has not had state of the art university training in IT; some 
universities like the Institute of Information Technology (IOIT) in Hanoi provided such training, 
but not at the capacity the digital media industries needed.13  In order to succeed, then, 
Vietnamese companies understood they had to accept the onus to provide such an education, and 
were successful in doing so even if progress was slow.  Like national media industries in the 
West, Vietnamese companies provided their own support for daily operating expenses through 
advertising.14  However, in stark contrast to the West, each media company in the Vietnamese 
industry was ultimately Party property, and as such, the VNCP traditionally supported its 
industry members by allowing national businesses to establish the basic infrastructure the 
country would need to develop and innovate.  Collectively, the VNCP and the Vietnamese media 
                                                 
12 Interview with manager of operations at VNExpress, July 9, 2005. 
13 Institute of Information Technology, Institute of Information, Homepage (National Center for Science 
and Technology,  2005 [cited May 17, 2005]); available from 
http://www.netnam.vn/unescocourse/ioit99/. 
14 Advertising on network television in Vietnam is currently modest in compared with the West, 
averaging about 5 percent of total network programming time; interview with the head of programming at 
VTV, July 10, 2006. 
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companies embraced new technologies and worked hard to acquire a share. In Imagined 
Communities, Anderson theorizes about the power of nationalism to command a “profound 
social legitimacy” that can unite racially, ethnically, or religiously disparate individuals, at least 
rhetorically.15  I would take this Anderson’s point further to argue that the concept of a nation 
can also unite people into political economic unity.  Regardless of the rumble of disagreement 
and dissent Vietnamese media businesses might have felt, and professionals working in the 
Vietnamese media industries would liked to have expressed toward the government (even still), 
the national government marshaled these groups and individuals toward improving their 
struggling national industries in television and telephony.  Perhaps it was this collective 
Vietnamese spirit that allowed their national media industry to join the “digital age” faster than 
the West would have predicted. 
Since the moment the West had hooked Vietnam into the “orbit of the world-economy in 
such a way that it virtually can no longer escape,” as Wallerstein put it, it seems as if the West 
might wish to throw the peripheral nation back.16  Despite massive Western efforts toward 
getting Vietnam to behave “properly” as a desperate nation that it is grateful to be included into 
the global economy; instead, Vietnam has consistently been an example of the crisis that is 
inherent in the capitalist world-economy.  For Wallerstein, there are two main crises that typify 
capitalism.  One, where the resources of the system’s privileged groups are eventually drained so 
that it is difficult to either remedy the social ills that follow from a system of unequal exchange, 
or to force others to become its underprivileged counterparts.  Two, where oppositional groups 
                                                 
15 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 4.  
16 Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World-System Iii, the Second Era of Great Expansion of the 
Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1974). 131.  
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must be placated, but with each placation, the costs rise ever higher so that eventually they are 
simply too costly.17  At different stages of its involvement in the world-system, Vietnam has 
represented both the former and the latter.  The former in the form of French occupation and the 
U.S. engagement in war with Vietnam; and the latter, since the U.S. has tried to “remedy” its 
decimation of Vietnam since the end of the War. 
3.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WARS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE MEDIA 
“Vietnam: It’s a Country, Not a War”; this claim appeared on now unavailable media-
oriented Vietnamese website in large, bold type above its listing of the trading services it offered 
to clients.  Such a proclamation brilliantly underscored the Western perception of Vietnam as a 
war-torn, mid-twentieth century country struggling toward civilization, a perception that echoed 
the racism inherent in the developmentalist paradigm.  Certainly the Vietnam of the mid-to-late 
twentieth century labored toward post-war and post-Soviet bloc recovery; and the Vietnam of the 
late twentieth century faced the prohibitive challenge of updating national industries, especially 
the media industry.  During the 1990s, however, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was in the 
process of building the infrastructure necessary to integrate digital technology into its national 
media industry, from broadband to satellite broadcast.  Their example in upgrading not only 
debunked Western imperialist assumptions about the capabilities of developing nations, it also 
struck at the heart of the dialectical way in which the West and North described themselves in 
relation to the rest of the world.  The Vietnamese ambition to diffuse technologies like the 
                                                 
17 Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism. 
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Internet, cellular phones, satellite broadcasting, and digital filmmaking throughout the country 
certainly put an end to the assumption that Vietnam is a nation of missed opportunities.  
Unfortunately, before it was able to realize this goal of a modern communications system 
that could serve the needs of the country and its citizens, disappointment and delay characterized 
the Vietnamese media industry.  In Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system hierarchy, Vietnam 
was a peripheral country, and thus, its national industries were subject to the influence and 
objectives of the world economy.18  In the mid-to-late twentieth century, the seemingly “limited” 
and “insignificant” Vietnamese media found themselves to be pawns in East versus West world 
politics and, as a result, the Vietnamese rarely had autonomy over their own media industries.  
Vietnam experienced over thirty years of nearly uninterrupted colonialism, occupation, and 
warfare between France, Japan, and the United States, and it was no wonder that few of the 
media outlets in the Vietnamese industry were created or harnessed for the benefit of Vietnamese 
citizens.  For France and the U.S. in particular, establishing and controlling different media 
infrastructures in Vietnam was essential for instituting and maintaining an ideological 
influence.19  Consequently, during the period of French colonialism—from the mid-1940s until 
the 1960s—the number of newspapers published in the country bounced like a rubber ball, with 
135 at the height of the industry and 64 at its nadir.  Vietnamese newspapers also reflected the 
North-South division imposed by the French along the 17th parallel: those in the north were 
agents of the Communist press, but in the south news was the organ of the colonial authority, 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 34. 
19 Englund, Karl H., “External Assistance in the Context of Vietnam's Development Effort,” in Postwar 
Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development, ed. David G. Marr and Christine P. White (Ithaca, New 
York: Southeast Asia Program, 1988). 225. 
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whose primary goal was to prevent influence from northern Communists.20  Basic radio and 
telegraph systems existed in Vietnam during this period, but were no more available to the 
majority of Vietnamese citizens for their own use than were newspapers, since the radio and 
telegraph networks were established by the French.  The same was true of telephone system and 
film industry, while televisions were rare or simply non-existent.  Soon after the French 
relinquished Vietnam as a colony and the VNCP gained control of Southern Vietnam, Vietnam’s 
Communist allies, including the Soviet Union, Germany, and (one-time enemy) Japan, began 
assisting the Vietnamese in upgrading their telecommunications network to improve the 
availability of broadcast and telephony technologies.  Consequently, the U.S. government and 
U.S. corporations made Vietnamese telecommunications and broadcast infrastructures parts of 
their own political and economic strategy against its Cold War enemies.   
Instantiating U.S. interest in the future of the Vietnamese media infrastructure, the Tudor 
Engineering Company of Washington, D.C. outlined an $8,000,000 million plan for a 
comprehensive telecommunications system for Vietnam, as well as, neighboring Thailand, Laos, 
and Cambodia.21  In its initial assessment of the existing infrastructure, the Tudor report found 
that there were approximately 13,000 telephones for the whole of Vietnam in 1957.  In Ho Chi 
Minh City, or Saigon, there were believed to have been 2,240 orders for service that could not be 
filled, along with “an estimated unexpressed demand for 4,480 more telephones.”22  Tudor’s 
                                                 
20  Panol, Zeny Sarabia and Yen Do, “Vietnam,” in Handbook of the Media in Asia, ed. Shelton A. 
Gunaratne, Ed. (New Dehli: Sage, 2000). 467.  
21 Tudor Engineering Company, “Report on Telecommunications Systems for Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, 
Including Possibilities in Cambodia,”  (Washington, D.C.: April 1958). 
22 Ibid., 32. 
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“answer” to Vietnam’s “needs” was a network of underground cable lines, as well as VHF, UHF, 
microwave, and broadband radio relay, which would add to the overhead telephone lines and 
high frequency radio system already in place throughout the country.  This new system would 
carry voice conversations, telegraph messages, facsimile, and radio programs, and the proposed 
broadband would have the capacity of 600 voice channels per band.  The Tudor company 
claimed the broadband radio system was meant to facilitate communications for the national 
military, police, emergency units, civil aeronautics, and weather systems, as well as, the national 
radio program Radio VietNam, but likely it also imagined these uses to be advantageous to the 
United States government.  In an awkward explanatory moment in what is supposedly just an 
engineering report, the Tudor company justified its dominance in the development of Vietnam’s 
new media infrastructure by claiming that, “you cannot expect as high a degree of efficiency 
from Orientals as is expected from Americans.  In other words, the Oriental has a comparable 
degree of intelligence, but his living habits limit his ability even when the proper desire and 
knowledge are acquired.”23  With bald imperialist ambitions and a seeming lack of practical 
knowledge of post-colonial Vietnamese, as well as a deliberate disinterest in the objectives the 
Vietnamese might have for their own media industries, the Tudor company precociously asserted 
its own ideology in light of what it falsely claimed was “the little knowledge of the [Vietnamese] 
people concerning ‘good’ telecommunications,” demonstrating the pervasiveness of 
developmentalist attitudes.24  In hindsight of the U.S.-Vietnam War, the plans of a company like 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 95. 
24 Ibid., 92 
25 The Vietnamese refer to the Vietnam War as the U.S. War. 
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Tudor appear clearly contrived to meet the goals of the U.S. government, and not the needs of 
Southeast Asians.  But such U.S. prejudices did not stop the Vietnamese from using the system 
during the U.S.-Vietnam War;25 for Ho Chi Minh26 in particular, broadband radio was the most 
common means for disseminating nationalism.  He frequently used it to broadcast “news 
bulletins on the Declaration of Independence and other public affairs in Vietnamese and four 
other languages: English, French, Cantonese, and Esperanto.”27  
Compared with radio and telephone, television came relatively late to Vietnam, and was 
also used by the U.S. to foster the U.S. brand of imperialism.  In 1966, U.S. Ambassador Henry 
Cabot Lodge and South Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Ky introduced the first television 
broadcast in Vietnam, a 30-minute segment which consisted of news, a comedy skit, and two 
short films that were broadcast to South Vietnamese and to the increasing number of U.S. 
soldiers.28  The broadcasts were done “on board a US Navy Super Constellation,” and were used 
to rally the Southern Vietnamese against the Northern in the War.29  South Vietnamese 
Television, or THVN was born of this complicated relationship between the Southern 
Vietnamese and the United States, and THVN broadcast entertainment, public affairs, news, and 
                                                 
26  For more on Ho Chi Minh see Minh, Ho Chi, On Revolution; Selected Writings, 1920-66, ed. 
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27  Panol, “Vietnam.” 469. 
28 Ibid., 471. 
29  Ibid. 
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commentary to Saigon.  Later that same year, the United States continued to assert their control 
over broadcast development in South and Central Vietnam by providing equipment, training, and  
receivers to add to the land, buildings, staff, and operating budget provided by the South 
Vietnamese for the first actual ground stations in Saigon and Hue; eventually THVN could reach 
a potential 75 percent of the South Vietnamese viewership.  While THVN survived the onslaught 
from the North, a station built near Hanoi by Northern Vietnamese with the help of East 
Germany was not so lucky: immediately after its first broadcast on September 7, 1970, US 
artillery barrages forced THVN “to evacuate its equipment to the countryside and remain at an 
experimental stage until the end of US bombing.”30 It was not until the mid-1970s that the 
Northern Vietnamese station was able to continue broadcasting “two nights a week a mix of 
educational, health, and children-oriented programs.”31
Once the U.S. pulled out of Vietnam and the Communists defeated South Vietnam, the 
main goal of the VNCP was no longer just to survive, but to seamlessly reunify North and South.  
The media infrastructure was a significant part of this reunification process, and the VNCP 
considered South Vietnamese media outlets to be part of VNCP “national” property.  In order to 
maintain the “purity” of the Communist ideal as it would manifest itself in the media, the Party 
largely refused the economic offerings and also the policy prescriptions of major Western 
economic agencies.  Instead the VNCP struggled for years to update its media industry 
technology within its own limited means.  Twenty years into the reunification process, the 
Vietnamese media wore a different face than it had earlier in the century.  The Party had 
absorbed THVN into its network, to make three national television channels; it also owned 288 
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FM radio stations, along with 8,365 radio-relay stations for around 73 million people over 
325,000 square miles.32  They also had begun to strike agreements with other countries in their 
region to gain access to satellite technology so the television industry could broadcast between 
North and South and obtain broadcast signals from foreign-operated satellite channels like CNN 
and Hong Kong’s STAR TV, to sell to the limited number of Vietnamese who could get 
approval to own a satellite dish or could afford cable television.33  More impressively, in 1994 
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet sent the first e-mail out of Vietnam to Sweden in 1994 using an 
Internet hub set up between the Institute of Information Technology (IOIT) in Hanoi and the 
Australian National University, as part of the Party’s goal to push the nation’s media 
infrastructure forward in a way the Vietnamese had not been able to do since the late 1950s. 
 Vietnam had begun to accomplish their technological goals, with only modest support 
from Western agencies or corporations.  Of course, the Western response to this was to 
characterize Vietnamese technological development as strikingly uneven and inadequate.  From 
a Western neoliberal perspective, the Vietnamese government was hopelessly backward and 
dysfunctional in updating its national media.  During the 1990s, the number of phone lines for 
the 71 million Vietnamese citizens at the time was 350,000, a number that seems strikingly low 
compared with that of Western nations.34  As for computers, the number of these was .30 for one 
hundred persons.35  However, in his discussion of the rhetoric of the “New Economy,” economic 
analyst Doug Henwood points out that such figures should be contexualized to avoid fetishizing 
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high-tech development in favor of foreclosing “any serious discussion of the broader political 
and cultural issues.”36  Thus, the number of computers and telephones per 100 persons becomes 
much more relevant when held up against other human development measuring tools, like 
literacy rates.  So although Vietnam appears to have a strikingly low communication technology 
distribution during this decade, according to figures gathered by the World Education Forum, 
UNESCO, and the United Nations Development Program, Vietnamese literacy rates for the same 
period hovered consistently in the ninetieth percentile, comparable to Western percentages.37  
Coupling figures for communication technologies with that of literacy rates reveals not 
Vietnam’s lack of capacity, but its priorities.  Therefore, the assumption was that the Party had 
begun to develop a digital telecommunications infrastructure even before it provided for the 
basic needs of the majority of its citizens was incorrect.  More likely, the West considered the 
VNCP dysfunctional because, while it would accept some Western funds in reparation for the 
US war against Vietnam, it did not feel compelled to accept a Western policy agenda.  Thus, it 
seemed the VNCP had deliberately made the process of upgrading their media infrastructure 
more difficult because it refused Western imperatives to privatize, deregulate, and accept foreign 
direct investment from these Western-oriented agencies.  Perhaps the Vietnamese government 
refused to adopt Western policies as a reactionary move to keep its citizens from accessing 
information via an anticipated influx of Western media, as many neoliberal scholars claim.  Or 
maybe the VNCP refused the offerings because, for the first time in decades it could.  In the 
1950s and 1960s Vietnam had had little choice in matters of national financial and policymaking 
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decisions; it was one of France’s postcolonial nations and later became a location for the Cold 
War strategy of the U.S.  In the aftermath of colonialism and occupation, when the country could 
regain control, the options for securing funding were still governed by Cold War politics.  
Vietnam joined the IMF, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but as a political hot potato, the country received little support.  Vietnam then joined the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1978 and could easily secure funding from the 
CMEA, but membership in the Council also placed Vietnam squarely behind the Iron Curtain out 
of the West’s purview, at least until the CMEA collapsed in 1991. 
However, the question still remains: how did Vietnam establish a digital 
telecommunications network to develop Internet, cellular telephones, satellite broadcast, and 
cable networks without significant support from the West?  The answer lies with more palatable 
economic alternatives available from its own Southeast Asian community in the form of regional 
economic alliances like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional trade 
agreements like the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), and financing from regional 
sources like the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  Rather than being compelled to emulate the 
Western method of commercially sponsored media, these more politically neutral regional 
alliances provided funds while allowing Vietnam to maintain a largely state-run media system.  
Thus, as a case study what Vietnam illustrates is a significant set of points about the 
pressures developing nations have traditionally faced and what choices they were able to make in 
response.  First, a regionally based economic relationship helped countries like Vietnam navigate 
between political autonomy and the need for technological transfer and training by offering 
greater security from the ideological imperatives of Western-style capitalism.  And second that 
the siren song of Western economic aid became less enticing when more politically benign 
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neighbors offered the succor necessary to upgrade media technology.  The efficacy of regional 
relationships became especially clear when compared with membership in global organizations 
like the WTO, whose requirements go beyond just abiding by trade regulations, to demanding 
adherence to a neoliberal political agenda.  Further, what may have seemed like Vietnam’s 
chronic hesitancy to modernize their media infrastructure actually might have contributed to their 
success in upgrading their media industry from analog to digital.  
3.3 STEMMING WESTERN “FLOW” INTO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
VIETNAM 
Nearly a decade before the U.S.-Vietnam war began, the West, lead by the United States, 
offered the sub-Mekong delta region a significant amount of development aid, as well as 
numerous recommendations for rebuilding a wide range of necessary public infrastructures, 
including the telecommunications industry.  Such activities could be interpreted several ways: 
benevolently, as a humanitarian response to the needs of grave poverty and devastation, or 
otherwise, as an exploitation of those needs toward political ends.  The West often has faced 
charges of exploiting developing countries.  For example, the international component of the 
U.S. Marshall Plan—the goal to maintain the “flow of information” about the benefits of 
democracy and capitalism from the U.S. to the rest of the world via print, broadcast, and 
cinema—also has been described in these terms.38  Without a doubt, in 1958 the U.S. believed 
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plans for new phone lines and broadcast television repeaters outlined in the report by Tudor 
Engineering would have been conducive to inaugurating this “flow” into Vietnam.  But when 
U.S.-Vietnam War began, it became obvious the Vietnamese would be skeptical about the 
“assistance” offered by the West. 
Although Vietnam strove to mobilize its resources after the War, it was not until 1984 
that the Vietnamese Communist Party attempted to infuse the country with a new political and 
economic spirit, its “Doi Moi” (meaning reform) policy.  Implemented by the Sixth Party 
Congress, Doi Moi represented a shift away from the command economy model toward the 
allowance of a limited market system as a practical response to severe resource shortages once 
aid from the Russian-bloc sponsored CMEA finally ran out.  Besides allowing semi-private 
agriculture in the north, further reform measures in 1986 sanctioned “private and joint state-
private firms, including 100 percent foreign owned ones as specified in the foreign investment 
law of 1987,” as well as the maintenance of low labor costs to attract foreign direct investment.39  
Since the late 1980s, the Vietnamese economy expanded beyond the state to include household, 
cooperative, joint state-private, and private sectors.  It is perhaps this policy reform that 
prompted a measure of preemptive hypothesizing about what was thought to be a momentous 
change in the political trajectory of Vietnam: the demise of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VNCP).  But the government’s intention to create macroeconomic stability represented by Doi 
Moi in no way reflected a significant political shift away from Party power and ethos.  Despite a 
shift toward market socialism, Doi Moi was a policy that would be tightly controlled by the 
centralized government, particularly at the level of individual citizens.  And more relevantly to 
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my point, none of these changes applied to the state-owned Vietnamese media industry.  It was 
not until 1994 that a fundamental shift in the political economy of Vietnamese media was even 
recognizable.     
The most obvious change was the Clinton administration’s removal of the U.S. embargo 
that had been in place for 15 years; indubitably, this granted Vietnam access to U.S. media 
products and technology, if they chose to indulge, which they often did not.  Perhaps more 
crucial moment took place during April of 1994 when Prime Minister Kiet exchanged the first e-
mail from Vietnam with Carl Bildt, the Prime Minister of Sweden.  According to its 1994 report, 
“Electronic and Information Technology in Vietnam,” the United Nations Development Program 
asserted that the exchange between Vietnam and Sweden was symbolically significant for the 
“developing” world as it moved into the so-called “digital age.”40  This was certainly true.  
However, the intentions that animate the relationship between Vietnam, Sweden, and more 
importantly Australia, should not be overlooked.  The relationship also signified that nations 
spontaneously could pull together of their own accord at any time for a technological, political, 
or economic alliance that was designed to suit only the needs of the parties involved, and was 
relatively autonomous of agencies like the IMF and the World Bank.  Therefore, the methods by 
which the Vietnamese Directorate-General of Post and Telecommunications, as well as the 
Ministry of Science and Technology chose to put the country on the map of media technology in 
1994 are key to understanding how, as a “developing” country, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
fostered its ambition to update its media technology.  The Vietnamese government, or the State, 
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and not a multinational corporation, was the prime mover in establishing Vietnam’s 
technological presence on the global stage.  This instance clearly contradicts one of the rhetorical 
contortions of the Western globalization myth, that multinational corporate capital alongside 
agencies like the IMF, WTO, and World Bank were the only viable sponsors of technological 
development. 
3.4 THE COMPULSION TO CAPITALISM 
Vietnam’s measured development of its national media infrastructure demonstrated that 
the Vietnamese government understood that at its core, the media was an industry, and in some 
ways was just like the coal, rubber, or rice industries, in that it required protection from foreign 
interests.  Yet, for the VNCP, the media industry was (and is) an industry like no other.  For 
decades, the national media system remained one of the most effective ways the VNCP had at its 
disposal for disseminating its ideology; opening this industry to an influx of foreign products put 
Party power at great risk.  But in 1998, economist and former GATT Secretariat Kym Anderson, 
exhorted Vietnam to eliminate protectionism and commit itself to becoming “more open” in 
order to gain access to organizations like the WTO.41  In his book, Vietnam’s Transforming 
Economy and WTO Accession, Anderson ignored the politically charged nature of WTO 
accession to a developing country like Vietnam, which would require it to dispose of its status as 
a “‘non-market economy.’”42  Echoing the conventional wisdom of the WTO, IMF, and World 
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Bank, Anderson claimed that any economy can “grow faster the more open they are to 
international trade and investment” through a process of “deregulating foreign financial 
investment, encouraging the phasing down of tariff rates, freeing up of trade in services, 
reducing state support for national enterprises, and enforcing WTO rules uniformly and 
predictably.”43  Doing so, he proposed, might result in an increase in trade with both the U.S. 
and the European Union.  Not doing so, Anderson admitted, might raise the ire of the WTO and 
might mean that the “US or EU could continue to apply selective safeguards and impose 
punitive…duties against” Vietnam.44  As United Nations University policy analyst Grzegorz 
Kolodko pointed out in his 2000 text From Shock to Therapy, the WTO, IMF, and Bretton 
Woods institutions have made their “financial involvement contingent upon the implementation 
of specific fiscal and monetary policies.”45  For Vietnam in particular, the cost of sacrificing its 
continued goal of equitable sustainability in a socialist fashion could not be ignored. 
Furthermore, WTO membership was dangerous in the way it indiscriminately suggested 
policy initiatives to nations across a wide spectrum of political and economic milieu.  Such 
policies deliberately ignored the obvious: that more permeable markets potentially increased the 
possibility for excessively speculatory foreign investment, and that not all nations embraced the 
neoliberal ethos of freewheeling and rapid change to a supposed “free-market” capitalism 
because such a system retreated as fast as it rushed in, leaving destruction in its wake.  This risk 
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applied equally to foreign direct investment in a national media industry like Vietnam’s.  
Kolodko referenced the disasters that rocked the global economy in the 1990s—the pandemic of 
Eastern European reform, as well as the Thai bath crisis, which was due in part to the increased 
permeability of Thailand’s economy—as indicative of such ideological “blind spots” in WTO, 
IMF, and World Bank policy.  For example, 3,000 Thai journalists alone lost their jobs in 1997 
following the Southeast Asian crisis.46  For a small country in the Southeast Asian region, such a 
loss was no niggling problem, since it represented the loss of nearly a third of the labor market 
for this industry.  As such relying on speculative capital put a significant burden on the national 
media industry, not to mention the on the national economy.  Therefore, those who advised 
countries like Vietnam to join the WTO also falsely suggested that the opportunity for gaining a 
stake in the world trading market more than outweighed the potential risks involved from making 
borders, markets, and industries (including its national media and telecommunications industries) 
more permeable to other countries, regardless of national politics or interests.  For Kolodko, Asia 
could not afford to be rash about its political and economic decisions:      
The benefits brought by short-term international lenders [and 
policymakers] are questionable: they do not provide new 
technology; they do not improve the management of domestic 
institutions, and they do not offer reliable finance…The Asian saga 
proves, once again, that liberalization and inadequately regulated 
and capitalized financial systems is a recipe for disaster.47
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However, global lending and trade regulation agencies or even foreign direct investors were not 
compelled to consider the risks before establishing relationships with the developing world.  
Consequently, the responsibility for assessing and troubleshooting these risks fell on the 
shoulders of developing world recipients even though they often did not have the resources to 
develop the requisite administrative bodies.  
Almost in response to objections raised by external parties like Kolodko, Anderson 
maintained that the WTO only has four “simple” key objectives that any country can “easily” 
follow without having to think twice: “to set and enforce rules for international trade, to provide 
a forum to negotiate and monitor trade liberalization, to resolve trade disputes, and to improve 
policy transparency.”48  As if dismissing any valid concerns about these objectives, Anderson 
asserted that to “become a WTO member is to join a club,” and “like all clubs, the WTO 
bestowed benefits on members but there were some costs; it offered rights but with them come 
obligations; it provided new opportunities but also some challenges.”49  While admitting that, 
“occasionally the rules and obligations” are burdensome, Anderson explained, “evidently the net 
benefits are overwhelmingly positive, since most countries are or have applied to become 
members.”50  Not only was this a logical non sequitur, but also what many WTO proponents 
described as “objectives” or “costs” could easily be interpreted as a high stakes risk by countries 
like Vietnam.  As mentioned earlier, the VNCP might have seen opening up the media industry 
to foreign trade as a political problem for Party power, but also an economic one because it 
would open up the national media industry to foreign competition. 
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In The Political Economy of Global Communication, Peter Wilkin observed that for 
countries like Vietnam, the intense pressure to “adopt the range of neoliberal policies that 
corporate interests would like to see” characterized the 1990s.51  And since the IMF, WTO, and 
World Bank organizations were the canals through which a significant amount of this global 
economic flow snaked, nations like Vietnam ignored the policy prescriptions of these economic 
behemoths at a dear price, since failure to adopt these policies often resulted in denial of 
membership, resources, and an international outlet for their own exportable products by bodies 
like the IMF and the World Trade Organization.  Even so, while many East Asian media 
industries faced economic crisis and agreed to WTO, IMF, and World Bank measures in the 
1990s, Vietnam defied this regulatory environment by the elephantine pace of its reforms.  
Ignoring the Western market model promoting immediate and comprehensive marketization of 
national industries such as telecommunications and media programming as a means to fund 
technological innovation, Vietnam instead patiently worked to update media industry technology 
on its own terms.  Vietnam consequently received nothing from these organizations for its 
telecommunications infrastructure.  Thereby, it sacrificed rapid innovation of the media industry 
to the goal of a politically autonomous, state regulated industry.  In the face of such daunting 
challenges, the decision to resist was no mean feat.  Countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela 
received funding from the IMF in the billions of dollars in part for agreeing to privatize their 
telecommunication infrastructure, while Vietnam only received several million dollars.  
Therefore, Vietnam embodied a confusing contradiction for the Western policymaker: that what 
seemed to be “necessary from the economic viewpoint” turned out to be “impossible from the 
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political perspective.”52  Vietnam was politically a Communist country with a market-socialist 
economy; it is also in great need of economic resources, but indiscriminately accepting them 
from Western agencies was against VNCP goals during this time.  Thus by Kolodko’s 
assessment, it was a Western “nightmare” because it undermined the assumption that free market 
capitalism and democracy were the key ingredients to a successful development process.  
Vietnam revealed that a one-size policy does not fit all. 
In fact for decades, Vietnam defied what New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman 
called the “golden straitjacket” of the international market, or the sweeping global compulsion to 
restructure national interests toward global trade organizations and the ubiquitous multinational 
corporation.53  Therefore, to many in the West, Vietnam’s entry into the ASEAN regional 
economic alliance in 1994 seemed unconventional, if not proof that the last of the Communist 
“strongholds” was buckling under the pressures of globalization.  Since several of the 
organization’s other members like Thailand and Singapore had already decided to privatize in 
order to obtain foreign direct investment, Western scholars assumed that following fast on the 
footsteps of the decision to join ASEAN would be Vietnam’s own unbridled enthusiasm for 
deregulating and privatizing in the WTO fashion.  Indeed, Vietnam’s economic cooperation with 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand signaled a shift in Vietnamese policy objectives; however, this 
metamorphosis had less to do with changing the national political culture and more to do with 
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protecting the technological culture of the national media industry that the VNCP wished to 
establish. 
3.5 THE “ASEAN WAY”54
 
Formed in 1967, ASEAN did not operate like other prototypical alliances such as the 
European Union whose formation initially hinged upon security issues, and later evolved into 
more explicit concerns about becoming a “global power.”55  Nor did it function so similarly to 
other fourth generation alliances, like NAFTA, which acted primarily as free trading blocs.  
Instead, according to the Association, the “ASEAN way” was to promote regional relationships, 
including economic, technological, and cultural alliances between member countries, particularly 
in response to the pervasive pressure of global economic and trade organizations.56
In the wake of a growing U.S. imperialism in Southeast Asia, ASEAN composed the 
1967 Bangkok Declaration proclaiming the founding members’ determination “to ensure their 
stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve 
their national identities in accordance with the ideas and aspirations of their peoples.”57  
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Ironically, in earlier decades, Vietnam was considered an “external influence” by ASEAN for its 
aggressive attitude towards Cambodia, among other reasons.  By the opening of the twenty-first 
century, Vietnam had acquired membership and the ASEAN region had a population of about 
500 million, a combined annual gross domestic product of US $737 billion, and a total annual 
trade activity of US $720 billion.58  The world market began to claim ASEAN nations were 
economic “tigers.”  During such “boom” years before the late 1990s, ASEAN nations took 
advantage by setting up a telecommunications backbone network set up between several of its 
members and Hong Kong, as well as other networks connecting five ASEAN nations with 
mainland China.  On one hand, as a collectivity ASEAN had vast resources at its disposal, 
primary amongst them human.  On the other hand, they were also a potentially volatile 
agglomeration of ten countries whose political systems ranged from multi-party democracy to 
military regime, and whose economic disparity was striking.  The Singaporean per capita 
income, for example, towered over Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam by 83 percent, and ASEAN’s 
military regime, Myanmar, was often cited for significant human rights violations.  In the last 
several decades, criticism of ASEAN was on the increase in the international media for ignoring 
these human rights violations and for not securing stability, security, or rights for ‘their peoples,’ 
especially in Vietnam and Myanmar.59  ASEAN’s perennial response was that “non-interference 
in the internal affairs of one another,” was the way in which the Association chose to manage 
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such regionally complex issues.60  In its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN 
Secretariat went on to explain that the “reason [for this vision] is clear. National sovereignty and 
its handmaiden, the principle of non-interference, are the only conceptual bulwarks protecting 
the small and the weak from domination by the powerful.  In the absence of a supranational 
government, it is indispensable to any sort of international order.”61  It was difficult to ascertain 
whether this rhetoric referred to the relationship between larger and smaller countries within 
ASEAN, or whether it referred to the relationship between ASEAN and other Western agencies.  
One thing is clear: the Association was reluctant to take orders from the West, at least 
rhetorically.  
As it expanded from its original six members to include the sub-Mekong countries like 
Vietnam, ASEAN’s focus changed little in the 1990s, and it publicly maintained that it remained 
intent on implementing regional programs to reticulate communication, transportation, and 
industrial development, with a modest increase in regional trade.62  According to data gathered 
by the IMF at the beginning of the twenty-first century, ASEAN had more than doubled its share 
of world output to reach almost six percent since 1975.  Over the next twenty years, ASEAN was 
expected to increase its share of world trade “three and a half times to about eight percent.”63  
Per capita (per person) purchasing power “will have increased from less than $1,000 to almost 
                                                 
 
61 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation, 112. 
62 Hicklin, John, David Robinson, and Anoop Singh, eds, Macroeconomic Issues Facing ASEAN 
Countries (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997), pp. 25. 
63 Ibid. 
64 ASEAN Homepage. 
 
 116 
$10,000 in just one generation” for those living in ASEAN countries.64  But other than citing a 
general improvement in purely rational economic terms, it is difficult to find evidence about how 
this translates into experience on the ground for either individual ASEAN nations, or even 
individuals living in them.  What this rhetoric does tell us is how ASEAN wished to be perceived 
by potential economic partners.  During the late 1990s in particular, ASEAN attempted to 
broadcast its intentions to the rest of the world market that it was going to facilitate this trend in 
the telecommunication sector by forging an agreement among member countries called the 
Hanoi Plan of Action in which “the design, standardization, inter-connection and inter-
operability” of information technology systems like satellite, Internet, and cellular telephony 
would be accomplished by the next decade.65  The goal for the year 2020 was to maximize the 
opportunity cost of developing digital technologies for member countries by being able to share 
technologies and networks across political and geographical borders; nations would agree on a 
particular technological innovation before implementing them on their own.  The Global System 
for Mobile Communication, or GSM cellular telephone network, common across Southeast Asia 
was a good example of such an agreement.  The Association tried to accomplish these and other 
goals in part by depositing “self-sustained and permanent funds” with both the Asian 
Development Bank, as well as the IMF through monies collected from each member country for 
an ASEAN Science Fund.66  The funds were earmarked for ASEAN member nations only, so 
that each of them could innovate technology, create a technology Research and Development 
(R&D) infrastructure, or use the fund as a form of aid in the event of a systemic economic crisis. 
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On the whole, Vietnam benefited from greater integration into the ASEAN region.  The 
year Vietnam joined ASEAN its communication technology was a mere 0.5 percent—defined as 
only 350,000 telephone lines in mainly urban areas for an astounding 71 million people around 
the country to use.67  But by 1995, the Vietnamese Directorate General of Posts and 
Telecommunications began establishing links with its neighbors as part of its master plan, ITP-
2000.  Soon after, it had overseen the installment of optical fiber links for use in video, audio, 
data, Ethernet, Serial Direct Interface for digital broadcasting, and HDTV transmission between 
many of its main cities; the establishment of a nationwide paging service with Thailand’s 
Shinawatra company; the signing of a joint-venture with Singapore Telecom International to 
develop third generation cellular systems with “roaming” capability; and the development of a 
public Internet data network hubbing through the Computing Unit of the Australia National 
University.68  At the close of the past century, the number of phone lines in Vietnam—including 
both fixed lines and cellular (or mobile)—rose to five percent from its 1994 figure, even with the 
significant drop in regional, foreign, and direct investment in Southeast Asia during the Thai bath 
crisis.69  And it bears remembering that these improvements were made not under a privatization 
scheme, but under government directives. 
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3.6 TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN VIETNAM: ‘A PASSION FOR 
MODERNITY’70 
Thus, if conventional wisdom suggests mimicking is the sincerest form of flattery, the 
Vietnamese policy of technology development was paying something other than a compliment to 
the “developed” world.  Pro-neoliberal scholars have grudgingly acknowledged Vietnam’s 
success in innovating its media industry, and when they did so, they often attributed the 
possibility for this kind of success exclusively to a market openness of global proportions.  The 
Vietnamese government, however, did not allow foreign corporations headquartered outside of 
their region a dominant stake in their national media industry; and so their success in upgrading 
their media technology could only be attributed to the openness they established with other 
ASEAN nations involved in the innovation process.  Although not a definitive example, as a case 
study Vietnam undermined such specious neoliberal logic, that developing nations depended on 
the developed of the West for new technologies, and that as these developing nations adapted 
them, inevitably they did so in a linear fashion mimicking those supposedly in the “vanguard.” 
Vietnam also reminded us why it is important to contemplate the concept of technology within 
the context of globalization: such claims occupied a broader territory of technology philosophy 
and debate about its status as an agent of social, economic, political, or environmental change.   
While it was impossible to ignore the obvious, that much of recent digital technology was 
born in nations that dominated global trade and finance organizations like the WTO, IMF, etc., it 
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was not necessarily the case that these newer forms of technology were adopted into every 
national “family” in the same way.  That is not to say that Vietnam did not flirt with technology 
transfer or foreign direct investment from investors outside its hemisphere in experimenting with 
new digital technologies.  Many Western companies—Telstra telecommunications (Australian 
Post and Telecom), IBM, Apple, Compaq, Hewlett-Packard, UNISYS, and Bull (France) among 
them—were given a chance to demonstrate their products for the Technology Promotion 
Department of the Ministry for Science, Technology, and Environment.71  Often, however, these 
temporary collaborations fostered the transfer of technical knowledge, but did not result in many 
deals or commitments from Vietnam in either the 1980s or early 1990s.  By far, Vietnamese and 
other East Asian telecommunication companies dominated when it came to capturing visibility in 
the 1990s Vietnamese media industry, and even the East Asian companies that did manage to 
gain a stake were reluctant to advertise their presence as a foreign agent to the general public, 
given domestic brand loyalty.72  Perhaps what Vietnam affirmed, then, was that a third 
perspective existed, that the technology was a mélange of both neutrality and ideology: that a 
national media industry like Vietnam most definitely relied on technology and knowledge shot 
through with capitalist imperatives, but Internet capability, cellular telephony, digital film, and 
satellite broadcast, were as mutable as any other tools.  Significantly, this point made clear what 
neoliberal rhetoric rendered opaque: that the example of Vietnam quietly threw a wrench in the 
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machinery of globalization debate about “best ways” of creating, employing, and sharing 
technology.   
According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Microsoft was 
reluctant to consider approaching Vietnam during the 1990s with the possibility of marketing its 
products since “vast numbers of illegally copies versions of Microsoft personal (PC) application 
programs (such as Word, Excel, and FoxPro) and operating software (such as DOS and 
Windows)” was in use all over Vietnam at the time.73  Although the UNDP suggested this kind 
of co-optation was possible because the government did not have strong intellectual property 
rights legislation in place, seen from a different perspective, this “lack” was evidence that the 
government was not as interested as Microsoft in defending the capitalist notion of private 
property.  Therefore, while Microsoft Windows operating system can be equated (and frequently 
is) with the further calibration and de-skilling of labor and thus as a minion of capitalist 
expansion, once the technical knowledge is duplicated and publicly available, it also becomes 
ripe for picking by anyone, including those who believe that ideas are free and not “private” 
property.    
Historically, appraisals of Vietnamese industrial applications of media technology were 
that they were “foreign,” “obscure,” and “repressive” when compared with the better-known 
Western media industries.  In his analysis of Vietnamese media during the “Post-1975” period of 
change and beyond, David G. Marr was not shy about describing the strength of the Communist 
Party’s censorship of those interested in broadcasting radio programs; publishing books, 
magazines, journals, or newspapers; and creating other mass media, perceived by the 
government as outside of party doctrine.  In his article, “A Passion for Modernity: Intellectuals 
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and the Media,” Marr detailed that until at least the late 1980s, not only did the government 
persecute literary critics for publishing their iconoclasm, but that even musicians and radio 
broadcasters were either warned, fired, or arrested for not obediently airing politically correct 
“red” programming.74  But tracking those speaking out against Party activities could easily be 
accomplished in the mid-twentieth century: until the late 1990s, very few people or even 
organizations possessed printing presses, copying machines, or even fax machines, and often 
copying machines of the period, “required special imported paper that was seldom available” and 
had to be ordered through official channels.75  Certainly recording studios, record production, 
and broadcast stations were Party property, and television programming strictly served the 
purpose of promoting Vietnamese unity; a one-way medium, television was not a forum that 
solicited opinion.  As for IT, in the form of computers and the Internet, in 1995 a mere 0.41 
computers were available for every 1,000 persons.76  No doubt computers were rare, but they 
were also costly, as the fees to import such technology were excessive; thus, as with the first e-
mail sent from Vietnam in 1994, most of the media technology of the twentieth century was 
reserved for government use.  Those with controversial ideas to communicate were not 
necessarily those with the technology necessary to disseminate them. 
But in the 1990s, following Doi Moi under General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh, some 
official controls relaxed a little, allowing an increase in political debate that, while frowned 
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upon, was not adjudicated against.  Very few of those working in the mass media, print, and 
broadcast journalism were imprisoned, and those that had been fired in the past “found that the 
market now offered other work opportunities.”77  Journalists were allowed greater access to 
foreign news sources and professional journalism had, exploded to “[a]lmost nine thousand 
persons [who] possessed official journalist accreditation and worked for 712 different media 
units (including television and radio).”78  Even so, Marr cautions against assuming party politics 
were the primary reason for a change in mass media in the 1990s; it was instead, he asserts, a 
concern for the “rampant inflation” that was making a “mockery of the entire state allocation 
system,” which forced both private and state forms of mass media industry to funnel their 
energies into moneymaking, rather than either mandating or avoiding state law.79  So for 
example, the State was forced to allow the “growth of a modest English-language press” because 
of its “perceived need” not only to “influence foreign residents,” but also to “attract foreign 
investments, and trade.”80  In other media industries like book publishing, for instance, 
translations of popular editions of fiction and nonfiction from English, French, and Spanish 
authors were available again for the first time in decades, so much so that they represented a 50 
percent increase in published titles.81  
Likewise, the Vietnamese broadcast programming and equipment industries were also in 
a revival period in the 1990s, as state stores offered an increasing number of imported color TV 
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sets, and small private shop fronts sold less expensive versions of locally fabricated sets, making 
television fare available to greater numbers of the population.82  Riding on the coattails of the 
increase in electronic receiver production, Mexican, Brazilian, and Australian embassies along 
with private corporations provided the State television network, Vietnam Television (VTV), 
“with scores of free-to-air programs, in hopes of gaining an early edge over their foreign 
competitors.”83  The programming produced abroad—including soap operas, news programs, 
advertising, etc.—featured an “expensively produced, artistically slick, technically advanced” 
look, and began to earn VTV substantial ad revenue until the government worried “that it was 
losing control” of national television to commercial prerogatives.84  And although young people 
seemed fascinated by the production value of the content, tellingly, many adults complained 
about the intrusion of advertising.  The Party responded by reigning in local stations to limit 
advertising time to less than five percent of overall programming, by redirecting advertising 
revenues toward local broadcast production, and by more carefully scrutinizing foreign program 
content and ads promoting products like CD players, condoms, soft drinks, cosmetics, and 
motorbikes.  Foreign programmers responded to the ensuing “glacial pace of contract 
negotiations,” now an extra step necessary to complete before reaching audiences, by terminating 
broadcast donations.85  Fortunately, local programmers had not been sitting on their hands in the 
wake of foreign competition, and had begun to produce content that “managed to gain a large, 
devoted audience” interested in locally-flavored dramatic serials, live coverage from around 
Vietnam on national holidays, game shows, and quiz shows, among others, which are still 
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pervasive formats on the national networks today.86  And while “television daily news and 
current affairs programs remain[ed] subject to particular party surveillance,” programming had 
“come a long way since the days of talking heads merely reading newspaper articles or quoting 
provincial hog statistics.”87
For the film industry, however, prospects in the 1990s were markedly different, if not 
underwhelming.  Just as Vietnamese filmmakers, like broadcast and print media, had begun to 
enjoy an unprecedented freedom of new cinematography techniques and newly permissible 
subjects under relaxed government regulations, the government began a series of cutbacks for the 
national film industry.  A significant amount of production fell on the shoulders of “a few 
creative artists who managed to acquire video cameras and associated audio equipment” and who 
chose to “concentrate on whatever could be accomplished cheaply and sold on the open 
market.”88  According to Marr’s research, “the total 1997 allocation” for filmmaking “amounted 
to only 0.3 percent of the amount spent by Hollywood on just one film—Titanic,” and one-
quarter “of that 1997 allocation was earmarked for one film about Ho Chi Minh, which drew 
lukewarm reviews and limited theater audiences.”89  A catch-22, less film production also meant 
a shrinking audience, and consequently, a correspondent withdrawal of what little funds 
remained.  Toward the close of the decade, the government began to close a third of all cinema 
houses, until only 50 houses across the country remained; and only one of which could be 
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described as state of the art.90  Yet, at the time of my own observation of the Trung Tam Chieu 
Phim Quoc Gia or National Cinema Center houses I observed sprinkled throughout Hanoi only a 
half-decade later in July 2005, it was hard not to compare it with the convention of Western 
theaters, and to find the Western variety lacking against the massive, fully-digitized, convention 
center style of the Vietnamese National Center.   At the same time, theater going did not seem to 
be a popular activity (even though it seemed important from a Western perspective that these 
houses provided air-conditioning during the heat).  More remarkable, I was struck by the film 
announcement boards whenever I passed by them in either Saigon or Hanoi: there was a notable 
absence of Hollywood films; titles were predominantly Vietnamese, with one or two French and 
Chinese.  Thus, the gears of change in the economic, political, and social culture of Vietnamese 
government continued to quietly grind, albeit unevenly, but in interesting ways.     
Perhaps the differences between the development and patronage of broadcast and print, 
when compared with film, could be attributed to the burgeoning interest in developing 
technologies with a greater common use value.  For example, broadcast, electronic versions of 
print, and telephony shared much of the hardware and software necessary for their innovation 
and use, such as optical fiber links, HDTV signal transmission, satellites, computers, and 
monitors.  However, digital filmmaking required non-linear editing for production and special 
screens for exhibition, equipment that did not necessarily dovetail with the technologies listed 
above or even with traditional filmmaking itself.  Also significantly, in becoming a member of 
ASEAN, Vietnam automatically agreed to abide by ASEAN Vision 2020.  In signing this 
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contract, Vietnam consented to work cohesively with other member countries to create shared 
seed funding, infrastructural networks, regulations for standardization, and mutually beneficial 
trade policy for all new technologies by the second decade of the millennium.91  For Vietnam, 
and other members of ASEAN with an exigency to develop a basic telecommunication system to 
support Internet, cable, satellite, and cellular, the Vision 2020 goals were more compatible with 
print (electronic versions), broadcast, and telephony.  In 1993, Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet 
signed off on the Vietnamese manifestation of this agreement, Government Resolution No. 49, 
which was the holistic vision of the future of digital technology development in Vietnam.92
Presciently, Vietnam had already been developing university support and educational 
facilities on its own significantly before 1994.  Marr remarked that “[c]omputers had attracted 
the attention of Vietnamese scientists from the 1960s, and the Vietnamese press was already 
linking national computer literacy to modernity in the 1980s.”93  During that time, Vietnam had 
been developing communication technology training programs at the Hanoi University of 
Technology, Hanoi Polytechnic, the National University in Hanoi, Lotus College of Information 
Technology and Management in Ho Chi Minh City, as well as the National Centre for Natural 
Sciences and Technology’s Institute of Information Technology (IOIT), Ton Duc Thang 
University of Technology, and the Ho Chi Minh University of Technology, each also in Ho Chi 
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Minh City.  The most remarkable instance, though, was the IOIT.  Hosting one of the five 
Internet Service Providers in the country since the 1990s, the IOIT also housed its own research 
and development program working in theory and application of software engineering, including 
technology transfer, information storage and management systems, internet protocols, and 
computer aided educational systems.  Also operating through the school was the VAREnet 
system, Vietnam’s Academic, Research, and Educational data communications network, an 
arrangement of “highly-qualified groups of experts drawn from different ministries, agencies and 
consulting firms,” along with NetNam, a public ISP.94  Astoundingly, the Vietnamese 
government fomented this technological ambition in 1996 by lifting restrictions to permit a 
twenty-four-hour dedicated phone line.  After it was lifted, the number of email users exploded.  
Public locales for Internet use spread from the universities to Internet cafes and shops where 
people could participate in chat rooms, explore websites, play online games, etc.  And in early 
2000, “Vietnam was said to possess 60,000 computer sites liked to five state-owned Internet 
service providers” on a 100 percent digitalized domestic communication network.95  Coupled 
with the 157,000 cellular phone subscribers, tireless the government would have to have been to 
monitor this unprecedented exchange of information in the late 1990s.  
In terms of broadcast media in the form of satellite, cable, and television, technological 
innovation also culminated in an information exchange explosion.  Described as “signal 
spillover,” or the potential for citizens with satellite dishes to receive unauthorized transmissions 
from outside the local broadcast networks, like access to the Internet, new broadcast technologies 
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presented a regulatory conundrum for the Vietnamese government: how to unleash new 
technology like satellite television while controlling its ambit.  Preventing signal spillover should 
have been an easy task since satellite dish ownership required permission from the Ministry of 
Culture, and was primarily intended for hotels; still in 1999 there were some 20,000 satellite 
dishes in the four largest cities in the country, figures above official government estimates.96  But 
rather than attempting to restrain satellite through limiting public access, the government’s 
answer to the spillover was to increase production of local programming, and to even further 
update broadcast technology by owning its own satellite, VinaSat-1, by 2003.  In part, it seemed 
the government hoped to stem the tide of unsupervised foreign programming beamed in from 
regionally owned satellites, AsiaSat-2, Thaicom-3, IntelSat, and Intersputnik, and also from 
cable systems, T-V-H, a cable link with Thailand and SMW-3, that links Vietnam with 34 other 
countries.  But as the example of the Internet, and the insouciance with which citizens acquire 
satellite dishes, as well as other media technology highlights, the government vigilance Vinasat-1 
supposedly represents might just have been a paper tiger.  For Peter Lovelock and Susan 
Schoenfeld, “[u]ntil computer, telecommunications and television technologies began rubbing 
shoulders it was normal…for government to regulate telecommunications directly through 
controls over prices and profits, and to regulate television by supervising programming 
standards.”97  But in the late 1990s, as technology became increasingly intimate with 
programming, and was used as much by individuals as public agencies, the government decided 
to regulate with further innovation rather than by traditional restrictions.  This trend has 
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continued at present, the use of an Internet police squad being one of the methods that has 
become public. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
A complicated system, the Vietnamese media is sometimes correctly described as an 
industry managed with an authoritarian hand because of the restrictions it imposes.  Censorship 
was still a reality in Vietnam in the 1990s and has become even more so in the last five years, 
even with complex new digital technologies like satellite and Internet.  Not only did the VNCP 
attempt to keep track of satellite dish ownership, but the rumored Internet security that manages 
the firewalls necessary to keep people from reaching “incendiary” websites and from sending 
and receiving e-mails deemed problematic, among other things.98  Yet, the VNCP and its 
concomitant commercial media institutions also continued to eagerly embrace technological 
innovation that, intentionally or unintentionally, allowed citizens to increase their exposure to a 
plethora of alternative information sources that could provide varied political and cultural debate.  
As technology philosopher Bruno Latour would have pointed out, however, the technology itself 
was never the primary determining factor that limited peoples’ access to information in the first 
place.99  Instead, it was the social, political, and cultural milieu in which the technology existed 
that would make VNCP proscription possible.  Yet, even as the Vietnamese government adopted 
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more sophisticated technology to carefully control access, self-trained and technology savvy 
citizens continued to find ways around such government restrictions. 
More importantly than simply censorship, however, this conflicting agenda between the 
government and its citizens is not just demonstrative of the importance of contextualization for 
the development of technology.  The technologies Vietnam adopted—satellite, Internet, cellular 
phone, and digital filmmaking—were also flashpoints for the issues that, as a developing nation, 
Vietnam faces in trying to maintain a national media system with characteristics of both public 
and private industry.  The VNCP has traditionally regulated the national system; still in order to 
obtain many of these newer technologies, the VNCP also chose to allow foreign multinational 
media firms like LG, Mobifone, and Nokia to sell their wares within the country especially if 
these companies would assist in setting up the telecommunication infrastructure during their 
tenure in the country.  In return, the VNCP had to exchange a modicum of their control of the 
media in order to achieve their goal of becoming “wired,” at least until the business cooperation 
contract was terminated.  As a consequence, the influence of foreign companies in Vietnam 
threatened the VNCP’s ambition to limit commercialization and keep the Communist integrity of 
its national media products and services.   
Like many other developing nations, Vietnam certainly understood the risk Western 
corporate practices posed, especially with the incessant deregulation and consolidation of 
ownership in the Western industries and multinational media corporations.100   The tale of the 
commercially oriented Western media’s failure to provide for its citizens the information 
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necessary to maintain the integrity of its own political structure is well told by others studying 
the political economy of communication.  However, much less ink has been spilt in documenting 
the stories of iconoclastic national media industries like the one in Vietnam, which in the 
regional economic alliance ASEAN, was able to discover an alternative to neoliberal 
privatization.  This chapter, therefore, represents the beginning of such an ambition: to make 
clear that there are stories from developing world media industries like Vietnam where choices 
were made that could reveal the aporias inherent in capitalist globalization. 
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4.0  SOUTH AFRICA’S MEDIA INDUSTRIES: FREEDOM IS ANOTHER WORD 
FOR NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE1 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Much like the story of the Vietnamese media industry, the tale of the South African 
national media is one of struggles.  Struggles took place between colonials and the colonized, 
between censorship and freedom, between a private and public-oriented media infrastructure, 
and between the demands of the global political economy and local needs.  Also like Vietnam, 
South Africa’s struggles reflect the crises that plague the capitalist system as Wallerstein 
describes.  With its vast resources in diamonds, gold, and other precious minerals, the dominant 
Western economies could not resist pulling Southern Africa into their fold.  The capitalist system 
hungered after South Africa enough to exert a great deal of economic and political effort at 
keeping South Africa out of communist hands, as it did Vietnam during the Cold War.  But the 
West soon found that trying to cover up the contradictions that surfaced in South Africa under 
the capitalist system could indeed be expensive.  First in the form of groups, namely those native 
to the geography that resented being pulled into a system of unequal exchange so much that they 
responded by striking as well as striking back with violence; and second in the form of South 
Africa’s apartheid policies that represented a political embarrassment of global proportions.  And 
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as Wallerstein’s theory would predict, with each rebellion of South Africa’s coopted groups, the 
stakes became higher for capitalism to quell them.  And as with Vietnam, when it became 
apparent that supporting South Africa’s peripheralization within the system was ultimately too 
expensive—in South Africa it took the form of chronic and extensive aid packages—capitalism 
tried to cut South Africa loose.  It has had little luck in doing so. 
Yet, South Africa is distinct from Vietnam in some important ways.  The issue of ethnic 
and racial groups is not absent in Vietnam, but Vietnamese nationalism has been successful in an 
Andersonian sense.  At least for now, the VNCP has been able to create an implicit agreement 
among the majority that to behave as a collective is in their best interests; perhaps Vietnam’s 
successful expulsion of various imperialist invasions fostered the acquiescence of its various 
interest groups to the “Vietnamese nation” that the VNCP imagined.  The case is obviously quite 
different in South Africa.  Racial tensions—most generally between black and white—the seeds 
of which were planted in the eighteenth century by Dutch and English colonialists, have almost 
prevented South Africa from making it to the twenty-first century intact. 
What this pervasive conflict has meant for the South African national media system is a 
great disparity in provisions for black and white that tarnishes South Africa’s reputation on the 
global market as an attractive investment opportunity.  South Africans outside the ambit of 
privilege that many whites and a handful of “Black elites” enjoy, incorporate new 
communication technologies into their lives in ways that clearly reflect the national political 
economic legacy of the nation.2  For the majority of poor South Africans, cell phone, satellite 
radio and television, and Internet, when accessible at all, are communal experiences.  People 
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gather around the television or satellite radio in small roadside bars, restaurants, hotels, or in 
people’s homes to watch local programming like Egoli: The Place of Gold and the Village 
Headmaster, alongside U.S. programming, like The Cosby Show, A Different World, Scooby 
Doo, and CNN.3  Several people often share one cell phone at a time with each user owning his 
or her own SIM card, to use the cell phone text feature rather than calling because it is cheaper.  
If cellular is not an option, they travel with prepaid cards to “mom and pop” community call 
centers located in both urban and rural areas.  Cyber cafés or community centers are often 
bustling with people who do not have Internet access at home or at work.4  Schools lucky 
enough to enjoy a computer and ISP, particularly in rural areas, are frequented by digital courier 
services that travel by bike with flash drives to deliver Internet searches and email responses to 
those who cannot gain access to the school directly.  Consequently, new communication 
technologies like cellular phone, satellite radio and television, and Internet are indeed within 
reach, but often only those in the economic elite use them in a way that would be familiar to 
most Westerners.  Such a situation could be seen as time bomb of potential opposition and 
unrest, but also a political atmosphere that is a deterrent to foreign capital investment. 
As in Vietnam, there are numerous reasons why there are so many inequities in South 
Africa’s uses and availability of digital communication technologies.  To start, it is due not only 
to a lack of access to the technologies themselves, but also because the provision of electricity, a 
basic utility needed to run many of them, can never be taken for granted in impoverished 
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townships.  As late as 1993, South Africa produced 50 percent of the electricity consumed in 
Africa, and yet 60 percent of the poorest Black South Africans had no access to it.5 Second of 
all, technology training among blacks and whites varies greatly.  To blame for both of these 
problems is the legacy of unequal access at all levels left over from apartheid.  South Africa 
boasts numerous universities reputed to be well heeled in technology training, but it is to this 
level that most black South Africans cannot reach.6
The choices the African National Congress (ANC) made for how new communication 
technologies would be deployed in post-apartheid South African society embodied the struggles 
that the South African national media industry underwent in the 1990s as the nation moved to a 
more democratic, but market-influenced government.  Early in the decade as the ANC prepared 
to take over from the National Party (NP),the needs of millions of impoverished Black citizens 
suddenly came into focus.  Many still needed a public water and sanitation infrastructure and an 
electrical grid, not to mention the housing to which these infrastructures would connect. The 
ANC would have to be technologically, as well as politically, innovative in answering these 
needs considering the national economy had been handicapped for nearly a half-century.  The 
National Party still yielded significant (if informal) economic power in South Africa, and so the 
riddle to be solved was how to “kill two birds with one stone”; in other words, how to adopt a 
digital telecommunications network that would at once satisfy the corporate sponsor’s need for a 
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modern system, but still be mobilized for the rest of society, which largely comprised the ANC’s 
power base. 
Naturally, the transition to ANC power was not a smooth one.  Although NP power was 
waning in the 1990s, Afrikaners still had a significant stake in the private sector of society as 
owners of many viable South African parastatals (state-owned industries).  This economic power 
induced the ANC to put several of its more socialist-inspired goals on hold, perhaps to minimize 
the violence and rancor of the transition from apartheid to democracy.  The direction the 
development of the national media industry would take was among the goals on which the ANC 
was forced to concede, at least temporarily.  Rather than prioritize universal service for Black 
townships, progress was made in the white, urban areas where Afrikaner business interests still 
ruled: the South African Posts and Telecommunications authority ordered state of the art fiber 
optic cable, cellular transmission towers, and broadband capability to be installed to facilitate 
business transactions.  E-commerce, financial transfers via the Internet or cell phone, and other 
modern telecommunications capabilities now characterized these Afrikaner-dominated 
townships; but as they were often situated next to those inhabited by Blacks, which often did not 
even offer landline phone or television repeaters, the contrast was stark.  Little had changed since 
the late 1970s when in Black townships there were only 3.3 telephones for every one hundred 
persons, while for whites there were 72 telephones for every 100 persons.7
The ANC decision to move away from a socialist program promising Black South 
Africans reparations, including access to water, electricity, housing, and education, to a starkly 
different plan that required cutbacks in social services, forced the newly-minted government into 
a semi-permanent practice of crisis management.  Being wedged between the campaign promises 
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that foisted them into the power and their obligations to the neoliberal financial sphere, meant 
that the South African political economy became dominated by “speculative movements of 
capital” that constantly threatened to overheat at the slightest indication of  political unrest.8  But 
the national media system in particular was significant to Black South Africa as symbolic of 
larger structural dissatisfaction.  As P. Eric Louw’s work on South African media policy debates 
of the 1990s shows, Black South Africa was prepared to demonstrate their opposition to 
privatization of the national industry.9  The ANC had first hand experience with the significance 
of media to disenfranchised South Africans.  Being itself a disenfranchised movement 
representing the rights of Black South Africans, the NP had banned the ANC for decades; thus, 
the ANC had virtually no access to the national media to champion their own cause.  
Accordingly, “universal access” for all South Africans became a touchstone issue in the ANC 
movement for power.  South African broadcast was not only a channel for transmitting political 
messages to their target audience; ideally, the national media system could also be harnessed as 
an example that South Africa was a progressive nation.  But the NP legacy was only one obstacle 
to universal access the ANC faced.  Many of the places in which poor Black South Africans 
lived were not even equipped with the infrastructure necessary—power lines, transmission 
towers, etc.—to receive such potentially valuable broadcasts.  In a report on South Africa’s 
development strategy, Daniel Moagi, General Manager of Human Resources at the Department 
of Science and Technology in South Africa, clarified just how overwhelming the ANC’s task 
was to remedy this situation once in power: it had to cope immediately with “the needs of 40 
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million people as opposed to a mere 5-6 million” people.10  During its nearly 60 years in power, 
the Afrikaner NP had not only neglected the needs of Black South Africans, but had deliberately 
corralled them as impoverished laborers and less-than-marginal citizens in the less desirable 
areas of the country.  Making improvements in these areas would be a generations-long effort.     
Besides offering basic provisions like the electricity needed to run the system, the ANC 
realized that to be able to harness the national industries for themselves, Black South Africans 
would need an education toward taking its reins.  As of 1995, 28 percent of adults were 
functionally illiterate and 11 percent of adults “were estimated to be totally illiterate” (i.e. no 
education at all); and the vast majority of illiterate people were from Black townships.11  
Predictably exacerbating the situation was that most Black South Africans were nearly kept out 
of higher education altogether.  Technical universities and technikons12 did exist in South Africa 
and they produced the majority of graduates with an ability to create new technologies, innovate 
existing technologies, or create policies to sustain them.  However, Black students were “almost 
completely absent in courses” in telecommunication-related fields.13  In 1994, a mere 18 percent 
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of African students were enrolled in general engineering programs, and only seven percent in 
“cutting edge” programs like computer science.14  
Even in the late 1990s, these schools were still racially segregated, either being “African” 
(Black) educational institutions or predominantly “white.”  Without foundational training for 
media technology, most citizens might have known how to adapt to technology as consumers, 
but not necessarily as producers and regulators.  They were, therefore, largely exempt from being 
able to decide which new media technologies were developed, for whom they were developed, 
and what path development took.  The ANC’s intial decision had not been to try to immediately 
try to increase the number of Black students in technical universities.  Instead, it was to establish 
call centers, paging and cellular phone service, satellites with large regional “footprints,” and the 
production of inexpensive battery-powered radios, services that the impoverished might use.  But 
given the commercial character that governs these technologies and the communal experience 
that dominates the use of them, it is hard to measure just how many disadvantaged South 
Africans could become intimate with such technologies when even their access to using it was 
limited.   
Very few development funding options existed for the ANC to be able to immediately 
improve shortcomings in higher education or universal access; the NP had made South Africa an 
international pariah.  Many of the conditioning factors that affected the development of universal 
access were the result of apartheid and the international community’s response to it.  But as 
economic analyst Helen Marais’ observes in her book, South Africa: Limits to Change, the 
influence of the global financial institutions did much to reinforce South African disparity, rather 
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than improve it.15  Economic sanctions imposed by several Western nations and the World Bank 
and the IMF had been in place against South Africa for decades by the time the ANC took over.  
Moreover, the national history of civil strife and poor economic policies made the nation a 
significant investment risk; thus, foreign investment was almost non-existent.  Ironically, these 
factors made other alternatives—like the regional initiatives of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the African Development Bank—appear much more 
palatable to the ANC in protecting its goal of universal media access for all citizens.16  
4.2 SOUTH AFRICA MEDIA HISTORY: ARSENAL OF OPPRESSION OR LIFELINE? 
In 2002, Africa supposedly ceased to be the “most isolated” continent on the planet.  
With a “ring of laser light” made up of a fiber optic telecommunication cable now hemming the 
African coastline, capable of handling vast amounts of data quickly, the international media 
predicted that Africa was on the verge of an economic, political, and technological 
“Renaissance.”17  As one of the richest countries on the continent, South Africa would likely be 
at the vanguard of this revival.  This claim was troubling on several levels, foremost because of 
its description of Africa as a previously “isolated” continent.  Given that for hundreds of years 
the United Kingdom and Europe had been invasive, exploitative agents that permanently altered 
                                                 
15 Marais, Helen, South Africa, Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition (London: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1998). 100-131. 
16 Ibid., 146-176. 
17 Whitehouse, David, Circe of Light Is Africa's Net Gain (BBCNews,  1999 [cited December 17, 2005]); 
available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/376016.stm. 
 142 
its socioeconomic and political make-up, Africa has hardly been “isolated.”  Second, the notion 
that South Africa has only recently entered a “Renaissance” smacks of a Western dismissal of 
South Africa’s triumph over apartheid, as well as many of its achievements in reversing 
apartheid’s destruction.  In his article, “The ANC Perspective: Meeting Expectations” John 
Hamill describes that representing the needs of South Africa’s Black, “coloured,” and white 
populations has been nearly impossible, with need far outstripping available resources.18  
According to South African scholar Shula Marks, the historical inequalities of the nation 
unfortunately did not disappear overnight just because South Africa elected “a Black president, a 
Black cabinet, Black members of parliament,” or even though there was a swelling of “Blacks in 
the lower ranks of the middle class.”19  The old divisions between “white affluence and Black 
poverty remain and are paralleled by an equally stark divide between rural and urban incomes.”20   
As Ruth and Keyan Tomaselli note in their comprehensive research on South Africa, the 
print media in South Africa that was the first medium to mirror these complex racial and national 
tensions that have historically plagued South African media.21  Black South Africans were 
interested in publishing their own newspapers at least as early as the mid-1800s, when they were 
inspired by missionaries promoting literacy and education among the native population as a part 
of their Christian proselytizing.  Umshumayeli Wendaba (Publisher of the News), printed at the 
Wesleyan Mission Society in Grahamstown from 1837 to 1841, was one of the first South 
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African newspapers to hire Black South Africans as editors.22  At the same time, John Tengo 
Jabavu, one of the most assertive Black missionary editors, believed that a Black press would be 
best served by being independent from all outside influence, and he resigned his editorship of a 
missionary-owned newspaper Isigidimi samaXhosa to start his own paper, Imvo Zabantsundu 
(African Opinion), which was the first to be written, owned and controlled by Black editors.   
Two other distinct presses developed at the same time to address the needs of the other two main 
groups in South Africa: English industrialists and Dutch farmers.  The more economically 
powerful of these industries was linked with the pervasive mining industry established by the 
English and were mostly commercial enterprises; their content was sensationalist and included 
crime, sport, and “funeral news” rather than political discussions of any merit.23  The Dutch 
Afrikaner newspapers, on the other hand, responded to what Afrikaners saw as an overly liberal 
English press that often talked about abolition, human rights, the Dutch oppression of the Xhosa, 
as well as the British ambition to colonize the entire African continent. They also often included 
tracts against Black nationalism, and were against the Black press in particular.  Unfortunately, 
English and Afrikaner interests would prevail as far as the Black press was concerned.  Often a 
lack of human and capital resources plagued papers like Jabavu’s, and the white press often 
acquired them soon after they had printed the first run.24
As Afrikaners rose to power and created an authoritarian state in the mid-twentieth 
century, they were much better able than the English to control the press in South Africa.  The 
result was that both Black and English papers were banned, went bankrupt, were bought out, or 
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changed hands and/or mastheads.  Unless they explicitly supported Afrikaner interests, editors 
and journalists—whether English or Black—were intimidated, threatened, jailed, or saddled with 
outrageous legal fees.25  Consequently, coverage of the starvation and disease in the Bantustans 
where most Blacks were relegated rarely made headlines.  On occasion, an English paper 
reported on Afrikaner government violence against the Black population and sometimes even 
published in one of the African languages.  More common in the English press, however, was 
coverage of issues like “housing, transport, recreational environments and education,” topics that 
would not get the paper shut down, but would contribute to the stabilization of the Black urban 
workforce.26  Tomaselli et al. note that white editors, whether English or Afrikaner, chalked up 
the dearth of reportage on Black political issues to the idea that “Blacks ‘have little interest in 
politics’.”27  Black reporters were rare and reporting on Black issues was not done unless there 
was the promise of an exponentially increased circulation.  It was only during events like the 
1976 Soweto uprising that Black reporters and Black political issues became relevant to the 
press.   
The succession of colonial oppression and apartheid that first dominated and then 
standardized the exploitation of the majority of indigenous South Africans, also had a significant 
impact on the national broadcast and telecommunication industries the ANC would inherit.  For 
Black South Africa, both electrical and media systems would have to be built almost from 
scratch.  The original architects of apartheid forced many, if not all Blacks out of urban centers 
where access to both media and the electricity needed to run them was most plentiful.  Masses of 
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people were “relocated” to “homelands” or Bantustans, which were actually barren and 
desiccated tracts of land.  Literally and metaphorically the land could bear neither the fruits of 
agricultural labor nor of a telecommunications infrastructure.  Even an electricity infrastructure 
was rare in most Bantustans.28  As key South African public policy advocates Willie Currie and 
P. Eric Louw argued, the medium of radio maintained pride of place in South African, since the 
network of stations and repeaters were cheap to operate and maintain, because radios could 
operate either by hand crank or by batteries, and because South Africa’s tragically low literacy 
rates worked to sustain the medium.  During apartheid, however, radio programs were not 
designed to uplift impoverished Black South Africans; most South African radio was designed to 
serve the needs of the apartheid state.  Community radio programming created as a public 
resource for the average South African would not even be considered a reasonable goal of the 
leftist movement until the political upheaval of the 1990s.29   
Although radio started out as the domain of commercial industry when the South African 
Railways developed the first broadcast network in 1923, the medium was immediately 
refashioned as an efficient ideological weapon.  Within two decades of the first radio broadcast, 
the Afrikaner National Party had taken over the South African government, and had formed the 
South African Broadcast Corporation (SABC) to regulate the South African media in favor of 
whites while subordinating Blacks.  Under SABC auspices, radio became a conduit for 
entertainment, news, and educational programming or propaganda, depending on which of its 
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two very separate populations of listeners, Black or white, was being addressed.30  According to 
African telecommunications scholar Chuka Onwumechili, radio was “the most visible 
communication instrument of the apartheid South Africa.”31  Most programming favored whites; 
when broadcasts in one of the three local Black South African languages did take place for a few 
hours a day on “Radio Bantu,” the programming was “‘used to counteract the statements of 
popular Black leaders such as Dr. N. Motlana, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and Bishop Desmond 
Tutu’” who often spoke out against apartheid.32  Yet, it seems that the SABC’s goal of using 
radio as a tool of propaganda was a little self-contradictory.  Many Black townships were even 
unable to receive radio broadcasts.  Representing NP policy, the SABC argued against providing 
these services because they amounted to the “‘impression of permanence to urban dwelling at a 
time when Nationalist government policy was that urban Blacks were a temporary 
phenomenon.”33  Nonetheless, the absence of both broadcasting and a broadcast infrastructure 
that addressed the needs of the Black population was demonstrative enough of the NP’s 
manipulations of the truth. 
Ironically, even though it was one of the most developed nations on the African 
continent, South Africa would be one of the last nations on the continent to feature broadcast 
television.  No television programs were broadcast to the general public until 1976.  Until then, 
only closed circuit television for educational, medical, or industrial applications were allowed in 
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South Africa.35  Forbidding broadcasting served the NP in two ways.  The less obvious way was 
that prohibiting television sets reduced the threat of U.S. and British broadcast penetrating South 
African airwaves.36  Although as Tomaselli et al. point out, broadcast programming went far for 
the British and Afrikaners, who worked together to exploit and stabilize Black Labour, these two 
groups also competed with each other for primacy, and thus broadcast equality was constantly at 
issue.37  The dominant population of Afrikaners did not appreciate an increase in English 
language programming, even though the Afrikaans-dominated SABC already had a monopoly 
over all broadcasting and consequently the messages it disseminated.   
The second reason for resistance to foreign programming was its potential to have “an 
agitative political impact on urbanized Blacks who at that time were disallowed from voting.”38  
Unfortunately for the Black population, these policies meant that the development of television 
would mirror their experience with print and radio: it did not meet their needs, nor did it reflect 
their identity; the idea was just to get “as many black population into the SABC audience as 
possible.”39  It was not until 1981 that South Africa would broadcast in African languages such 
as Zulu, Xhosa Sotho, and Tswana to cater to the small Black middle class. Neither these 
broadcasts, nor the ones in Afrikaans or English, were subtitled, however, based on the 
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assumption that most people had no desire to watch programs in another language.  This 
highlights the extent to which the NP segregationist attitude infused almost all aspects of life.  
During its initial stages, the SABC funded local program production with licenses issued 
to each television set owner.  However, the SABC eventually found the cost of producing local 
programs to be prohibitive compared with incoming revenue, and it mostly dumped the British 
model of broadcast in favor of the U.S.-style, advertising-supported media.  The British model 
allowed the National Party to track television set ownership and perhaps prevent its rapid 
dissemination into the Black townships, but the cash-strapped SABC found that the British 
model could do little to support program production.  Not only was South Africa compelled to 
turn to the U.S. to stay afloat, but it also turned to the U.S. for ready-made programming, since 
Australia and England had imposed a boycott on distributing their programming to South Africa, 
despite the fact that U.S. programming was in English (which was perceived to be a chronic 
threat to Afrikaans).  On the surface, this decision seemed to suggest that the NP was ready to 
open itself economically and politically to the international community and potentially face the 
condemnation of apartheid.  This was true only at a superficial level; the NP’s real focus was on 
what they stood to preserve in adopting the more privatized U.S. model.  In the late 1980s, the 
NP had realized that national politics were shifting and that the democratic movement was 
growing in power and scope.  Should the democratic movement, represented by the ANC, ever 
take the majority of government seats, splitting up the national media industry by selling off 
parts of it meant that the ANC would never control South African media.  Thus, the NP’s 
decision to privatize was more than an economic decision; it was a political strategy as well.   
For both the NP and the democratic movement, control of the airwaves and the printed 
press signified something much greater than just access to producing and disseminating 
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messages or managing competition and revenue streams in the 1990s.  In South Africa, it was 
openly admitted that the national media industry was a touchstone of political power, and it 
remained a key point in the debate within the democratic movement about how far the ANC 
could push for positive change, not only in the media industry, but also in all aspects of South 
African society.  Broadcasting in particular was significant because the ANC believed that the 
SABC had to be transformed into a neutral institution in order for free and fair elections to take 
place.  According to Horwitz, the democratic movement at large understood that “no challenger 
to the National Party could contemplate running an election campaign if broadcasting…remained 
in the NP’s pocket.”40  The situation appeared even worse when NP began to sell off parts of the 
South African national media industry to private corporations.  The “‘democratic movement’ 
interpreted…commercialization of the SABC as the first step in a process of creeping 
privatization which would, at a later stage, become an attempt to unilaterally sell the profitable 
parts of the public broadcaster to the private sector.”41   
According to Willie Currie—the General Secretary of the Film and Allied Workers 
Organisation (FAWO) and later a key leader of the Independent Communications Authority of 
South Africa (ICASA)—those vying for the restructuring of South African society were not 
troubled by the privatization of national industries per se.  What they felt they were struggling 
against was privatization and deregulation as an Afrikaner “pre-emptive” strike that would 
“prevent any future government having such a centralized national” media infrastructure from 
which they could broadcast messages in favor of democracy.42  With an attempt by the “existing 
                                                 
40 Horwitz, Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa. 9. 
41 Currie, “The People Shall Broadcast! The Battle for the Airwaves.” 48. 
42 Ibid. 
 150 
authorities” to restructure the South African Broadcasting Company “during a period of 
negotiations” for democracy, more than commercialization of the industry was at stake.43  With 
the NP acting in a dual role as government and primary political negotiator or “elite-pacting” in 
the transition away from apartheid, the ANC felt there could be little hope for a future chipping 
away at Afrikaner hegemony.44  For Currie, it was “all the more reprehensible” that the NP was 
determining the regulation of media technologies and programming for both the present and the 
future “when it was precisely the public’s right to vote and participate in decision-making over 
such questions which was being negotiated.”45  This strategy was one reason that South Africa’s 
transition period became, to use Robert Horwitz’s words, “unusually communication-saturated,” 
with both sides struggling to dominate the media with their own agenda.46
Debates around control of the media infrastructure had begun well before the 
deconstruction of apartheid.  The ban on political organizing had been lifted in 1990s, and as the 
ANC hoped to continue amassing power, the value of media access became crucial.  According 
to Horwitz, the South African media “gives people voice, symbolically and materially.”47  At 
issue was whether universal access to both production and consumption of the media would help 
further the democratic movement, or whether it was likely that the media would be more 
smoothly democratized post-apartheid.  Those such as the FAWO and the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (COSATU), wanted to negotiate openly for an independent, impartial 
board to oversee the development of the South African media industry, for a lift of the SABC 
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“ban on films and videos produced by South Africans of different political persuasions,” for the 
SABC to “take action to redress the racial imbalance in skills and responsibilities regarding 
programme production and management,” and for the free organization of media union 
employees.48   
Broadly speaking, the official NP response to the FAWO and COSATU requests was to 
try first to deny the group the right to demonstrate for their demands; the second response was 
the assurance that the changes at the SABC were being made by experts who were acting on the 
behalf of share holders and that changes toward commercialization would place “‘the SABC on a 
healthy business footing’.”49  To claims made by democratic protesters that SABC programming 
was already biased in favor of the NP, SABC officials typically argued that “because all political 
parties from the far right to the left including the NP attacked them for bias, they were therefore 
getting the news balance right and were unbiased.”50  Often at the center of the debates around 
media was community radio, especially since the SABC had been “allocated almost all the 
available FM frequencies in metropolitan areas.” 51  Protesters believed that the airwaves should 
be opened to other local broadcasters for community radio programming as a means to diversify 
the political messages disseminated throughout the country.  The stage had been set in advance, 
however.  Years before, an NP-appointed Task Group had already granted both the SABC and 
the independent television company M-Net, license protection for their radio stations for several 
years into the future.   
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These grandfathered SABC and M-Net FM radio licenses illuminated a disturbing and 
pervasive problem in the transition from apartheid to democracy: that often one step toward 
democracy seemed to require two steps back, and the ANC had to accept that the NP had 
incumbent power.  Although the ANC had taken control of the government, many criticized that, 
in fact, very little had changed at all, except that a few elite Blacks were now able to share 
control with a powerful white constituency.52  Indeed, numerous public calls for action did not 
stop the sale of parts of the media industry, but some positive regulatory changes did take place.  
In 1993, the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA) Act began to lay the framework for an 
independent and impartial regulation of broadcast content and signal distribution.  The IBA was 
independent because it was not a minion of either the NP or the democratic movement.  Made up 
of representatives from both parties, the IBA was an attempt to balance power.  One of its first 
projects was the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in which it established the South African 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, which as a separate institution, would regulate in the 
public interest for “a range of economic and social goals including the advancement of 
disadvantaged persons and communities.”53  Four years later, the technological convergence of 
broadcast and telecommunications technology that fiber optic cable and satellite represented, 
compelled the IBA and SATRA to merge into one institution, and the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) emerged as the sole regulator of broadcast 
and telecommunications in 2000.  Given the many handicaps with which the NP had saddled the 
national media industry, ICASA was not a magic bullet for reform; however, it did signify a shift 
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away from the NP’s racially motivated and incestuous policies for the political economy of the 
national media industry.  
4.3 SCARS ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 
An institution like ICASA was symbolically significant for it made manifest the hope that 
members of the democratic movement had for ameliorating a dysfunction that seemed inherent 
to South African society.  Comparatively speaking, the story of South Africa is strikingly 
different than much of the rest of the developing world.  For South Africans, or at least Black 
South Africans, gaining “national independence” did not mean the defeat and subsequent flight 
of the majority of colonials back to their home countries and a return to an “original” conception 
of the national heritage in terms of ethnicity, culture, and politics, with an indirect rule or waning 
influence of the colonial nation like Vietnam.  Instead, for Black South Africans, there were 
multiple layers of colonial oppression to overcome.  During the eighteenth century and into the 
nineteenth century, the English and Dutch worked together to quell Black opposition, and were 
the primary enemies of Black South Africans.  Unlike other post-colonial nations, however, 
neither colonial oppressor was ever successfully ousted from power; instead, the colonial 
oppressors eventually became “native” South African themselves and continued to control South 
Africa’s political economy.54  By the twentieth century, the architects of oppression would no 
longer be called “colonials,” but rather considered themselves native South Africans in their own 
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right.  Calling themselves “Afrikaners” from the language “Afrikaans” that they co-opted from 
the native African people into the fabric of the culture that came to be known as “apartheid.”55  
Apartheid became law in 1948 with the election of the National Party.  But by this time, 
oppression and violence had long been part of the daily experience for Black South Africans: 
they had endured being relegated to the least viable spaces in the country, being an industrial 
reserve army, having their needs repressed, and living in fear that their voices and their even 
lives were easily extinguishable.  In addition, new technologies became available around the 
middle of the twentieth century that streamlined the efficacy of this repulsive project.  Most 
odious was the computerized passbook system of surveillance instituted by the National Party.  
Innovated from the original Dutch laws to become “an automated population register,” the 
system included data on “racial classification, name, sex, date of birth, residence, photo, marital 
status, drivers license, dates of departure from and return to the country, place of work or study, 
and fingerprints.”56  At the age of sixteen, every black person was automatically entered into this 
computer database that “guaranteed one’s instant identification and one’s history of government 
opposition.”57   
Especially after the mid-point of the twentieth century when Blacks were not reaping any 
benefits from the lucrative and growing manufacturing industry and violent protests erupted over 
this long history of exploitation, the passbook system was useful in quelling opposition.  The 
1960 Sharpeville Massacre in which 69 were killed, the 1976 Soweto uprising where over 600 
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students were murdered, and the 1984 Vaal uprising where 30 people were killed in what began 
as a school boycott were among those that could be more easily managed with electronic 
monitoring of Black citizens.  According to South African political economist Helen Marais, 
more than other aspects of society, striking and protest reflected the racial heterogeneity that 
existed in South Africa.  In fact, ever since the rise of the South African manufacturing industry, 
the protests of the African, white, Indian, and “coloured” working class populations always 
represented an implied threat of “multiracial industrial action, which could evolve into a more 
forthright challenge against the system.”58  If these passbooks were properly endorsed, the owner 
had the right to work or live in ‘white areas,’ and [a] lack of these endorsements or failure to 
produce the passbook resulted in arrest and jail.”59  Inherent to the apartheid version of 
capitalism, the passbook allowed the government to limit where Black South Africans could 
travel, but also to punish Black South Africans if they breached these borders.  It also allowed 
the NP to decide who was “Black” and who was not.  The NP felt this was necessary if they were 
going to keep South African minorities from protesting, keep them out of the urban labor pool, 
while keeping them ready and waiting in the rural areas when needed by the mining or 
manufacturing industries. 
Since its inception in 1948, the National Party had a history of making decisions that 
jeopardized Black South African claims to political and economic legitimacy in South African 
society.  Furthermore, these decisions mitigated the initial extent to which the ANC was able to 
improve these conditions for the majority of South Africans once they took over 50 years later.  
However, besides Bantustans and the passbook system, two other NP policies were almost as 
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destructive to the future of the nation.  One was the creation and support of parastatals or state 
monopolies of national industries like telecommunications that lived off of the back of exploited 
black labor.  Another was the refusal to acknowledge the extreme disgust the international 
community expressed over these exploitative (and even genocidal tendencies) apartheid policies.  
Rather than being beholden to provide for the interests of South African citizens, the national 
industries of the NP-controlled South Africa were founded on the exploitation of the majority of 
its citizens: Black South Africa.  Perhaps the most problematic of these dysfunctional policies 
was the failure to take seriously the ire of the regional and national community that NP policies 
provoked.  Apartheid served to isolate South Africa from the rest of the continent and even most 
of the rest of the world for almost 50 years.  Those in opposition to apartheid, inside or outside 
the country, could do little to effect change. 
Until the end of their reign the National Party relied on the Reagan and Thatcher 
administrations to help prevent the Communist “invasion” that the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) represented.  The National Party believed, rightly, that the SACP was part of a 
larger movement to overthrow the government.  At the same time, the growing ANC movement 
relied on the support of the Soviet Union against the repressive, Western-allied National party.60  
But as communication scholar Robert Horwitz points out, the end of the Cold War meant that 
both sides lost their “value as a proxy in a larger geopolitical and ideological conflict.”61  After 
the fall of the Soviet Union, Communism could no longer play the ideological bogey for the 
white stalwarts of apartheid; and materially, the National Party government could no longer 
expect to receive the support it had tacitly obtained from the West.  Agents of the Cold War were 
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some of South Africa’s few sponsors, and this political shift posed a threat to the support of the 
big national parastatals, whether technical, industrial, or agricultural.   
According to economist Vishnu Padayachee, until apartheid caught the attention of the 
international community in the 1970s, the NP had one more trick up its proverbial sleeve to 
maintain its destructive political economy.  South Africa had “received its first loan from the 
IMF in 1957-58,” and had been “a founding member of the World Bank.”62  During the post- 
World War period, South Africa had what Padayachee describes as a “rather close and cosy 
relationship” with these major global lenders, which buoyed the National Party during the slow 
close of the Cold War.63  South Africa enjoyed special credits and “special drawing rights” from 
IMF coffers for at least the next twenty years, and nearly $2 billion flowed into the South 
African economy from the IMF alone.64  NP South Africa was fortunate that these special 
relationships with the global lending agencies lasted until the late 1970s.  Knowingly or not, the 
IMF and World Bank helped the National Party prop up its economy, at least until it could pay 
back its debts to the IMF in the mid-1980s.   
By 1983, however, the global financial institutions finally begun to put intense pressure 
on the NP by drafting the Gramm Amendment, a law that “required that the U.S. Executive 
Director at the IMF oppose loans to South Africa, unless the Secretary of the Treasury certifies 
in person before the US Senate and House Banking Committees that the loan would ‘reduce the 
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distortions caused by apartheid’.”65  While the rest of the world was becoming increasingly 
interdependent politically and economically in the later half of the twentieth century, South 
Africa was the subject of increasing international boycotts and other economic sanctions.  Even 
when the NP began to acknowledge that international tensions were boiling over and that its 
institutionalized racism was burning bridges to regional and global financial resources, the NP 
persisted.  Rather than taking steps to answer international hostility toward its racist policies, the 
NP instead invested further in the power of government monopoly as a response to the potential 
“disruption of supplies of vital communications equipment” that international sanctions 
represented.66   
According to Onwumechili, rather than restructuring the nation’s political economy and 
incorporating Blacks equitably into civil society in order to satisfy national and international 
critics, the NP was more concerned about sacrificing the economic benefits they were reaping 
from the exploitation of Black South Africans.  Instead, the National Party’s macroeconomic 
response was to circle the wagons and create an “intensive local manufacturing of 
telecommunications equipment.”67  In Onwumechili’s estimation, South Africa’s “apartheid 
government had believed that it could survive a global isolation by depending on its internal 
mechanisms” and on the few relationships it had with “a handful of other states.”68  But even in 
its relations with neighboring states, the South African government was conflicted.  The NP was 
more invested in South Africa being a dominant regional player by selling its communication 
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services and technology at exorbitant prices to its neighbors than it was in partnering with them 
toward permanent mutual sustainability of national media industries.  The NP plan to remedy the 
threat global isolation posed to the national media industry was an inwardly focused one.  The 
South African Posts and Telecommunications authority (SAPT) would become the home base 
for the manufacture of telecommunications equipment for telephone, data transmission, and 
postal services.  In a completely closed national economic circuit, inexpensive Black South 
African labor would produce the equipment and services and white elite businesses would 
consume them.  However, the NP foolishly underestimated both groups.  As for white business, 
once their demand for products and services was met, they no longer represented a steady stream 
of revenue for the SAPT.  And while the Black industrial reserve army was indeed fairly large, it 
was also unskilled and thus unprepared to manufacture or maintain the new digital 
telecommunication infrastructure of which the NP dreamed.  As the NP began to accept this 
principle in the early 1980s, they also began to consider extending access to radio, television, and 
telephone service to the middle-class Black population to boost revenue.  However, this idea 
would remain in its earliest stage, at least until the NP finally decided it would acquire necessary 
financial support by both liberalizing and privatizing the national industry.    
This was the firestorm into which the ANC walked as they took over the South African 
government.  Relations with regional and international actors were almost non-existent; so were 
funds that would normally be available from them.  Tens of millions of South Africans had 
supported the ANC because they believed that as a government administration, the ANC would 
provide them with the rights and privileges that they had so long been denied.  And the national 
media industry was a strange brew of public and private companies that needed to be carefully 
positioned in the global marketplace if they were going to provide the information Black South 
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Africans required to take their place in a new society.  Establishing a nation-wide digital 
telecommunication infrastructure to accomplish this goal, including fiber optic cables, satellites, 
and cellular transmission towers, would be the most cost-effective options in solving these 
problems.  However, it also meant building the national infrastructure from the ground up, 
especially in impoverished townships.  Although this would be an uphill battle for the ANC, 
their struggle also abrogated claims central to neoliberal thinking about the developing world in 
the 1990s.  Privatization, global lending, foreign direct investment—the “golden 
straightjackets”—were not compulsory as was emphasized by globalization, especially if there 
were no multinational corporations, global lenders, or foreign investors willing to get involved in 
the political problems plaguing a country like South Africa.    
4.4 THE IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES OF APARTHEID AND CAPITALISM 
Shula Marks cites unanticipated compromises with established Afrikaans power, an 
overextended bureaucracy, and the “sheer scale of the task” which the ANC had to undertake as 
possible explanations for the “sluggish pace” of the delivery of provisions, like the job creation, 
healthcare, education, and universal media access.69  However, IMF and World Bank 
prescriptions played a role, too.  Once it became clearer that the fabric of apartheid was 
beginning to unravel, visits from the IMF, the World Bank, as well as prospective foreign direct 
investors intensified; the IMF and World Bank both produced multiple policy reports for South 
Africa, advising that macroeconomic changes would be a precondition for further lending.  
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Padayachee details that even though the IMF and World Bank met with variety of South African 
leaders and policymakers in order to produce these reports—labor, oppositional political 
organizations, and business among them—the global financiers still placed their traditional 
cookie-cutter emphasis on advocating “a contraction of public sector expenditure” for South 
Africa.70  South African development experts immediately responded by questioning the premise 
of this advice, criticizing the neoliberal “trickle down” economic policy because it privileged 
“‘growth first’” and redistribution for the most impoverished later; it directly contradicted their 
goals.71  
The ANC had its own plan in mind, called the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), which contrasted sharply with IMF and World Bank advice.  The RDP 
outlined a radical restructuring of the inequalities institutionalized by apartheid and was the 
flagship attempt to fulfill many of these promises.  The RDP committed the ANC government to 
the following basic human needs objectives starting in 1994: to spend “the same amount on 
African children as it spends on white children by 1999; to increase spending on primary health 
care by 20 percent from 1995 onwards; and to increase the provision of clean water by at least 1 
million people.72  The RDP also had an ambition to increase spending on tertiary education by 
nearly 70 percent; to increase the number of people with access to electricity by 2.5 million; and 
to extend the telephone network by four million lines.73  In the “base document” of the RDP, it 
was proposed that these goals would increase social spending from 2.5 billion rand in 1994 and 
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1995 to 12.5 billion in 1998 and 1999.74  The new government proposed to gather these funds by 
a “number of distinct or combined financial options,” such as “reallocation of spending between 
Social Services departments, reducing non-social service spending (e.g. defense spending), and 
increasing borrowing and raising additional revenue.”75   
Happily, several of these objectives were realized.  For example, the national South 
African electricity provider, Eskom, was “able to meet and even exceed their targets” to extend 
and update the electrical grid.76  But, as 1994 wore on and funding sources like national taxes 
became exhauster, the ANC recognized the sheer economic, not to mention political, magnitude 
of such goals.  At the time, the IMF seemed like the only resource.  Since loan conditionality was 
one of IMF’s main tenets of policy, the South African government was obliged to sign a “Letter 
of Intent.”  The letter was written by the IMF, and in signing it the ANC agreed to favor “the 
virtues of ‘market forces’” over “‘regulatory interventions’” in exchange for IMF funding.77  
Yet, as the history of South Africa would predict, within several years little growth in the area of 
foreign direct investment had occurred.  The market would not be South Africa’s savior.  All too 
predictably the IMF responded to South Africa’s economic problems by blaming the ANC for 
South Africa’s rising criminal activity, political violence, high wages for labor, and high 
corporate taxes, conditions which were not conducive to foreign investment.78  The last two of 
these conditions were most offensive to the IMF, and it called for tax reductions, a lower 
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minimum wage, and “further deregulation as a precondition for new foreign investment.”79  
ANC MP Rob Davies responded astutely by making the observation that there were State-driven 
national growth models around the world that were becoming success stories which directly 
contradicted IMF and World Bank ideals.80  China’s phenomenal growth, he pointed out, 
stemmed not from deregulation, but instead from a tightly controlled State agenda driving 
domestic development.81  
In hindsight, perhaps it was fortunate that funds were not available from these agencies 
any earlier, since they often required a decrease in state spending for infrastructural projects like 
the one a telecommunications network represented. Reflecting Western attitudes about 
development, the IMF or World Bank did not consider it a priority to upgrade the existing 
system from analog to digital in order to expand radio, television, and telephone access, even 
though a digital telecommunication network in a country like South Africa represented valuable 
medical, educational, and political applications, as well as status in the global political economy.  
At the same time, the failure of the IMF and the World Bank to help South Africa motivated the 
ANC to pursue other non-neoliberal avenues.  Garnering funds from regional development banks 
like the African Development Bank (ADB) and relations with neighboring states that were also 
members of the South African Development Community (SADC) would be among these.  
However, gaining membership in the SADC would be no mean feat for South Africa.  Until the 
election of the ANC, positive ties with the SADC had never been cultivated.  In fact, the NP had 
historically antagonized the SADC by engaging in military forays across the borders of member 
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countries and by gouging neighbors for the products and services (like electricity) they 
purchased from South Africa.  In addition, the SAPT was no longer a state-run industry, and 
private corporations would also have a say in these relationships.  However, for the ANC 
carefully negotiating these relationships was important: telecommunications was the first sector 
to be taken through the reform process, and it would be a “model for the reform of other sectors” 
in the commitment to equalizing a kind of social access that had not existed in South Africa for 
hundreds of years.82
4.5 THE SADC: ‘UNITED WE BARGAIN, DIVIDED WE BEG’83 
South Africa had a checkered past when it came to regional alliances.  The NP had been 
determined to disrespect the inherent interdependency between Southern African states, and the 
SADC had responded by refusing South Africa membership.  However, the ANC had worked 
with leaders in neighboring countries to help overthrow apartheid, and so understood that these 
relationships were merely damaged not decimated.  The Congress also recognized what could be 
gained from striving to earn a place among its SADC neighbors.  In the past, when South Africa 
and its neighbors failed to cooperate, vital resources were expended.  For instance, regionalism 
scholar James J. Hentz cites that before South Africa’s elimination of apartheid, neighboring 
nations had to resist South Africa’s attempts at destabilizing their regional alliance by spending 
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financial resources to the tune of “60.5 billion dollars or 1.5 million lives between 1980 and 
1988.”84  On the other hand, when Southern African countries cooperate to combine their 
resources they all serve to benefit.  Thus, “whether” to cooperate regionally was never the 
question, even when South Africa’s overtures were rather coercive.  Rather the question 
surrounding regional alliance in Southern Africa has been “how to” cooperate regionally. 
At the turn of the century, the fourteen SADC member countries represented a population 
of over 200 million people that generated a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of over 
$175.4 billion.85  While this seems relatively small compared with other regional GDPs that 
sometimes climb to over $700 billion, SADC members benefited from combining the few 
resources that each of them had near the turn of the century.  Although the geographic area of the 
SADC at 4,306,723 square miles was nearly the size of the continental United States, only 7.6 
percent of sub-Saharan land was arable.  Southern Africa was rich in precious minerals like 
diamonds and a lucrative industry grew up around a mining infrastructure that was established by 
European colonials.  A munitions industry had also sprung up as a part of the colonial export-led 
economic practices of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  However, very little revenue 
reached Black Southern Africans from either of these industries.  This left a legacy of great 
regional dysfunction: many of the political systems of SADC countries were highly unstable and 
many of the citizens living within SADC borders were buried deep in poverty.  Yet, since 
gaining independence from colonialism, the absence of a viable agricultural industries and the 
lack of control over the mining industries in SADC nations has focused attention instead on 
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improving significant research and development (R&D) infrastructures that had grown up around 
mining and munitions. 
Although improving these infrastructures were among the best options most SADC 
countries had, initially, improvements in R&D infrastructures were best described as a catch-22.  
Funding an update in personnel, equipment, etc. was tied to establishing a modern economy that 
by the 1980s would have to be international in orientation and would rely heavily on installing 
and maintaining new telecommunication technologies like fiber optic cables.  However, adopting 
such modern equipment required a significant investment in an R&D infrastructure.  Ultimately, 
however, SADC countries would have to find a way to adopt the modern telecommunications 
infrastructure.  The harsh terrain and frequently inclement weather of sub-Saharan Africa were 
not conducive to analog technology; and when they could, black marketeers often stole parts of 
the networks to sell the copper as scrap in the informal economy.  Therefore, new digital media 
technologies seemed like the answer to many of the problems SADC member nations faced: 
satellite and fiber optic cable would mitigate the effects of both weather and theft.  And since 
many member countries shared a history of similar problems and ambitions, working together to 
create a shared telecommunication infrastructure seemed like a political and economic 
possibility.   
Southern Africa has a long and complicated history of attempts at institutionalized 
regional integration, The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) were the most prominent of efforts in this direction.  SACU 
formed in 1969 out of customs trade union arrangement that had existed since the turn of the 
century between Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland, eventually metamorphosed 
into a common market and economic union.  The SADC, which formed out of the Southern 
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African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980s had a few of the same 
members, but also included Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, and became an official alliance geared toward building interdependency in 1992.  In 
their earliest days, however, both of these cooperatives reflected the power imbalance that has 
traditionally rendered regional integration problematic in Southern Africa.  SACU was 
particularly demonstrative of the regional challenges Southern Africa faced; with a few of 
Southern Africa’s poorest countries plus South Africa as its only members, SACU embodied the 
polarization between South Africa and its neighbors, in which “the most advanced state attracts 
most of the investment and continues to develop exponentially faster than its partners.”86  This 
allowed South Africa to exploit the weaknesses of its partners by charging higher prices for its 
products and services on the common market.  South Africa would purchase raw supplies, such 
as water from the Cahora Bassam Dam in Mozambique, and South Africa’s electricity giant 
Eskom would transform it into hydroelectricity to sell back to buyers in the region.  Yet in being 
South Africa’s trading partners, SADC countries “reportedly lost between $20 and $30 million 
per year in revenue” in buying back the finished products South Africa made from their raw 
goods.87  Taking its cue from history, the SADCC deliberately left South Africa out of 
membership.  This meant that South Africa had to spend that much more time and effort 
cultivating bi-lateral agreements with each country to exchange products and services. 
Once rejected by the SADCC, the NP government in Pretoria responded by increasing its 
“policy of destabilization” in the region, which included “military forays as far north as Zambia,” 
as well as applying economic pressure such as “cutting off gasoline and delaying rail service to 
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Zimbabwe” or “reducing the use of Mozambique’s railways and ports,” among other tactics.88  
The NP’s response reflects the contradictory nature of South Africa’s position in sub-Saharan 
Africa as both buyer and seller of goods.  Even though South Africa traded more with its 
neighbors than any other market, during apartheid the NP government refused to fit into an 
alliance whose orientation focused on a state-driven development cooperative, or a tightly-knit 
interdependency that required each member to sacrifice their national goals for the greater good 
of the region.  Even in the 1980s when South Africa’s foreign political economy had “sunk to the 
depths of its pariah status” after P.W. Botha announced to the world that South Africa’s 
apartheid structure would not change, it seemed as if South Africa would be forced to play fair 
with its neighbors.89  Yet, the country continued to be an aggressive regional presence until the 
NP lost administrative power.  By the time the SADCC transformed into the SADC in the 1990s, 
member nations were well versed in the regional inequality South Africa’s apartheid state 
fostered.  It was not until the waning of apartheid in 1994 that the SADC reconsidered South 
Africa’s membership.  
The post-apartheid leadership in South Africa was prepared to openly acknowledge the 
value of regional integration, and in fact in the early days of the transition, the ANC “openly, 
even pleadingly” tied its future to the “economic development and stability of the entire 
subcontinent of Southern Africa.”90  The initial position of the ANC in the mid-1990s was that 
South Africa would cultivate a deep interdependency with the SADC and play fair with other 
member nations.  The ANC’s primary political bases, made up of labor unions and smaller 
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business owners, happily endorsed this policy because they could benefit from an increase in 
members or access to regional markets.  However, as the most affluent players in South African 
political economy, big business was opposed to regional economic integration, especially if it 
meant external influence in national affairs.  Large conglomerates only favored a neoliberal 
version of regionalism: ad hoc cooperation, which consisted of very loose regional ties that could 
be revised by the moment.  When it gained SADC membership in 1994, the eventual ANC 
decision was to steer a middle course between these two equally influential players; South 
African participation in SADC would have elements of both a European Union free trade-style of 
partnership and a developing world interdependency.90  
As the ANC struggled with this middle course in the mid-to-late 1990s, the IMF and 
World Bank surprisingly endorsed SADC initiatives.  In fact, South African business expected 
the “World Bank to assist more readily in an economically unified Southern Africa than in the 
various countries separately,” and began to advocate for increased involvement.91  However, the 
ANC recognized that being an SADC member at the behest of the IMF or the World Bank had 
its price.  Part of the World Bank’s support for further South African integration hinged on 
favoring South Africa’s role in dominating the SADC: South Africa would be rewarded for 
managing development projects in other member nations like Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe that would liberalize trade and remove “controls on the flow of capital 
across borders.”92  The ANC acknowledged that its own growth relied on global finance to a 
certain extent, but the obligation to be the ambassador of neoliberalism for Southern Africa was 
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unpalatable.  In his conclusion, Hentz underscores however that global finance and regionalism 
made for a strange partnership for the ANC, but he says, “it would be wrong to assume that 
South Africa had no independence” from these global lending agencies as an SADC member.93  
Therefore, the debate in South Africa was not about “whether to get into bed” with global 
financial institutions, but “rather how comfortable to get.”94  Despite such setbacks, in the late 
1990s SADC member including South Africa states finally were able to begin to formalize a 
framework for their technology transfer and exchange relationships.  The SADC Protocol on 
Transport, Communications, and Meteorology, which “requires South Africa and other regional 
states to harmonise their telecommunications regulatory environments, and create similar 
technical standards, network maintenance and provision…regulatory structures and universal 
service policies, among other objectives,” was exemplary of these first steps.95   
However, the need to operate satellite communication on an economy of scale forced 
some member nations to experiment with this process before technology alliances were codified 
in protocols such as the one on transport and communication in Southern Africa.  In 1993, 
several SADC member states founded the Regional African Satellite Communications 
Organization (RASCOM) out of this necessity.  As a regional treaty-based organization, 
RASCOM would help develop the region’s satellite capability on an improved economy of scale.  
By 1996, 11 satellites hovered over Southern Africa, which served 17 African countries.  
Together members of RASCOM commissioned Lockheed to build a single satellite, Intelsat 804, 
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which they launched in order to broadcast cellular telephone, television, and data over the entire 
African continent, along with South U.S., parts of Europe and the Middle East, and the eastern 
coast of the United States.96   South Africa joined RASCOM in 1997 to demonstrate its new-
founded support of regional initiatives.  South Africa’s participation along with other RASCOM 
members greatly minimized the financial burden each country would have to carry, while it 
maximized the services these countries could provide to citizens.  And more importantly, it 
would not be a multinational corporation that would launch the first satellite for the SADC 
region, because RASCOM was a State-driven initiative primarily beholden to provide for 
national citizens, not corporate profit.  Thus, the RASCOM alliance exemplifies that for the 
SADC “sustainable development is equity-led growth within and among SADC countries.”97  
Even in the face of IMF and World Bank pressure to maintain loose regional ties that were 
subordinate to global obligations, South Africa and its fellow SADC members would not forsake 
the microeconomic priorities of citizens for the macroeconomic neoliberal prescriptions of global 
finance.  Regardless of the face the SADC presented to the foreign investors, it still maintained 
its position that “[g]rowth strategies which fail to improve the lives and livelihoods of the poor 
majority are not socially or politically sustainable.”98     
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4.6 TECHNOLOGY IS COLOR BLIND, RACISM IS NOT 
Comparing South Africa’s technological capacity against many of its SADC neighbors, 
South Africa seemed like it was overqualified to be a “developing” nation.  In its report on 
broadband in South Africa, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) enumerated that 
the Internet community in South Africa is “30 times larger than any other in Africa.”99  Noting 
how fast this sector emerged in South Africa, the ITU reported that between November of 1998 
and end of year 1999, the number of users rose from 600,000 to 1,820,000 to average out to one 
in 65 South Africans with access to the Internet.100  Even as early as 1993, the new South 
African parastatal, Telkom, S.A., had become the “largest telecommunication system in Africa” 
providing telegraph, telephone, telex, radio, television, and data and fax transmission.101  Within 
two years, the telephone system sector of the telecommunication infrastructure was able to 
provide coaxial and fiber optic cable as well as radio-relay.  Private corporations such as Internet 
Solution, UUNET Africa, and SAIX were allowed to lease these Telkom data lines to provide 
value-added services for customers “for less than $1000 a month” which provided “64kbps 
nationally, and 16Kbps on the international link, and a higher priced service ($3000/month) for a 
full 64kbps on the international link.”102  With a coaxial cable installed under the ocean 
connecting South Africa to Europe and South U.S., these services could also be extended abroad 
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to generate further revenue.  South Africa appeared to be adopting the Western way, and scholars 
critical of privileging the private sector were crestfallen that South Africa had succumbed to 
neoliberal principles.103  Indeed, when the ANC first took over, telecommunications like data 
transmission, fax, and telex were the domain of South African business.  This was not 
necessarily the same kind of network that best suited other South Africans, who would 
eventually use the digital network for technologies like cellular phone, Internet, and satellite 
radio.  Yet, the South African media industry was still a work in progress. 
In Prospects for the Digital Economy in South Africa, Derrick Cogburn suggested that 
after the long history of the SAPT’s heavy investment in both the manufacturing and importation 
of information communication technologies under the NP, the rapid move to privatization left 
South Africa with a slightly schizophrenic “society that has elements of both a developed and 
developing country” well after the dissolution of the NP.104  A digital telecommunication 
network to support satellite, broadcast and cellular phone existed since the early 1990s, but only 
a very small population of South African users was able to take advantage of these new Telkom-
managed services.  By far, the corporate, white-collar community dominated with 980,000 users 
in 1999, compared with 280,000 academic users, which was somewhat more racially diverse.  
While the ITU report offered figures to show the progress of information communication 
technologies in South Africa, it also went on to explain what the apparently large number of 
users for the last year of the decade meant: the total population of South Africa was 50 million in 
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1999; and so 1,820,000 users actually placed Internet availability in South Africa “still well 
below the world average of 1 in 4.”105   
For Pinky Moholi, a general manager for Telkom, S.A., it was clear why South Africa did 
not model the Western telecommunication example: over a century’s worth of Dutch and British 
segregation meant that even in the early 1990s, Internet access was highly contingent upon a 
nexus of race and location.  The creation of rural areas, peri-urban informal areas, formal 
townships, and urban residential areas created by apartheid relocation policies resulted in skewed 
access to the telecommunication network, with Blacks inhabiting the least viable 
telecommunications spaces.  Low population densities and large tracts of land characterized the 
telecommunication difficulties for rural areas.  Peri-urban areas, on the other hand, had large 
population densities but were the result of a great influx of unplanned migration to the spaces 
outside of large urban centers; thus, they had little or no planned public infrastructure.  Formal 
townships (typically Black) also had high population densities and some telecommunication 
networks, but these were often the most basic and outdated.  Urban residential areas had some of 
the best network access, primarily because a formal infrastructure was already in place.  
However, like rural residences, urban ones were in places with lower population densities; 
extending the network to new users was not a Telkom priority, and for the few Black 
neighborhoods in urban residential areas, it was difficult to get service, even for the households 
that could afford it.106  White, corporate users inhabiting urban areas were the most privileged 
users in South Africa because they could afford to pay to establish or extend the networks 
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themselves.  Of course, they typically limited the use of the technology to their own commercial 
purposes only and other users could not immediately benefit from their networks.   
This is why, especially when it was contrasted against the racially and economically 
segregated fixed or landline telephone network, the cellular telephone industry proved to be 
superior choice for the ANC.  In fact, South Africa became one of the most important GSM 
(Global Services for Mobile) capable countries outside Europe in the late 1990s, with Vodacom, 
Mobile Telecommunications Network, and Telkom providing such services.107  According to the 
ITU, South Africa had 8.9 million users, a little less than half compared with Italy, which was 
the world’s largest GSM market with about 22 million users.108  Cellular contracts for GSM 
network, in addition to prepaid service, were available nationally.  However, prepaid was the 
most common form of payment, given the economic constraints that the majority of South 
Africans experienced.  The GSM cellular telephone network was also popular with national 
media industry administrators, given both the difficulty and the expense of installing and 
upgrading landlines.  Installing copper wiring for landlines was particularly costly because of the 
chronic theft of the existing network.  Also, in a study done by SATRA in 1997, 40 percent of 
those without service “would not even be able to afford the landline rental from Telkom” in the 
near future.109  By comparison, the “footprint” of a GSM satellite represented an economy of 
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scale that made it a much more palatable alternative for both SATRA and South African citizens.  
Some strides were made in landline service, with “over 80 percent of all households” having 
access to a phone within a “30 minute walk” to the nearest one in 2001.110  Yet, white 
households still outnumbered Black, with 82 percent compared to 18 percent having service, 
respectively; and 64 percent of urban households had access while only 9 percent of rural ones 
had service.111  
In addition to providing GSM cellular phone service, the ability to broadcast television 
and radio programming via satellite made satellite one of the most viable ways for South Africa 
(alongside its RASCOM and SADC partners) to maximize service distribution and access.  
Besides utilizing its regional satellite, South Africa had also been buying satellite services from 
PanAmSat and IntelSat over the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean since 1995.  These 
satellites carried nearly all South African programming, including SABC, 1, 2, 3, E-TV, M-Net, 
and Bop TV and required only three ground stations to deliver programming throughout the 
country.112  After eleven attempts, SunSat micro-satellite—developed by post-graduate 
engineering students at the University of Stellenbosch—was the first launched from South Africa 
in 1999.  The SAPT proposed using it for amateur radio communications, as well as producing 
high-resolution photos of South Africa, and experiments for NASA.113  That year, South Africa 
had also planned to broadcast satellite radio from these and other future satellites, which would 
make radio available to those without access to the analog radio infrastructure.   
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At the same time, as many changes moved ahead in cellular telephone and satellite, many 
others still needed to be made; the issue of ethnic and linguistic representation is demonstrative 
of this need.  A report issued early in the 1990s by the SABC found that only about 17 percent of 
the population had a “reasonable understanding of English, and only five percent of Afrikaans,” 
and that “80 percent of the Black audience prefers to be served in its own language.”114  
Nevertheless, the English language often dominates the public life of South Africans.  Native 
languages are spoken often only in more intimate, private community circles, this in spite of the 
fact that in the mid-1990s, South Africa declared eleven official languages: Afrikaans, English, 
Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu.  The SABC has 
struggled to provide programming to suit the needs of most South Africans via television, radio, 
and even satellite radio.  And yet, a glance at websites hosted by South Africans reveals that 
English, the language of the business community (whether it is white or Black elite), and 
Afrikaans, the language now spoken by those in the white middle and upper-middle classes, are 
still the voices that dominate digital media like Internet in South Africa.115  However, given that 
South Africa has been home to a complex, and often conflicted, racial heterogeneity for hundreds 
of years, it will take more than a decade to change it.116
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4.7  CONCLUSION 
“The test [for South Africa] is to go beyond a mere repetition of the present core 
regulatory principles of the West.” –Onwumechili117
The contrast between analog and digital media in South Africa—between traditional 
television broadcast and satellite, landline telephone and cellular, or even between the kinds of 
information disseminated by radio and the Internet—underscores that technology, media or 
otherwise, has been contested terrain for Black South Africans in a way that few Westerners can 
imagine.  During apartheid, the national technological R&D infrastructure was used to 
manufacture tools of bioterrorism that might restore South Africa’s reputation as a 
technologically advanced nation, and perhaps ultimately could be used against Black South 
Africans, like “cigarettes laced with anthrax, poisoned chocolate…sugar containing salmonella, 
and the computerized passbook system.”118  However, in the era that the democratic movement 
and the ANC inaugurated, national research facilities were transformed into places where new 
media technologies were developed that would help people manage their health, their education, 
their economic status, and their political involvement.  During a national conference on 
telecommunications development in 1994, Pinky Moholi indicated that Telkom, the largest 
telecommunications corporation in South Africa, acknowledged that universal media service 
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access was a key resource through which the average South African could “attain basic life-
sustaining needs…and be allowed to make socio-political and economic choices.”119  
However, as late as 2001 the International Telecommunications Union had grave doubts 
about whether South Africa would be able to benefit from the economy of scale that new digital 
technologies offer without a clear national policy framework of its own making.120  This was in 
part because in the 1990s, South Africa had spent an average of 0.9 percent of its GDP on R&D, 
which “compares favorably with other developing nations,” and yet, the nation still did not have 
a national policy institution, like a Ministry of Science and Technology, to manage this important 
sector until 1999.121  However, as Michael Kahn, University of Cape Town professor of science, 
mathematics, and technology education points out, when a developing nation has to depend on 
“foreign donors” for financial support, technology, and training, “precisely who sets the research 
agenda in some countries is unclear.”122  South Africa’s access to foreign investment was 
somewhat restricted and its post-apartheid development was even more complicated; 
negotiations with fellow regional alliance members, global financial institutions, and the still-
entrenched Afrikaner bureaucracy were delicate.  The trick was not to exchange one form of 
repression for another, or colonialism for neoliberalism.  It was hardly a surprise that establishing 
a policy framework took at least a decade.  
South African business strategy consultant Kelvin Kemm similarly argued that as various 
sanctions were lifted from the country in the 1990s, “the prospect of renewed foreign 
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investment” in South African industries presented a conundrum.123  The investment, he pointed 
out, meant that an investor typically had its own interests in mind; if somebody wanted to put 
money in, it was “to get more out.”124  If technology was being offered, strategists like Kemm 
realized that technology did not “come ready out of a box.  Instead, the South African context 
would be significant to its development, because the technology was the result of local 
“ingenuity and understanding of local conditions.”125  Much energy would need to be exerted to 
reshape technologies to suit local needs.  
The ANC chose several specific projects that might boost revenue as well as progress 
toward universal service.  For example, its project on e-governance, or the ability for anyone to 
vote during national elections either at community call centers, from their cell phones, or the 
Internet exemplified their new-found capacity to privilege local interests.  The ability for smaller 
merchants to conduct credit card transactions over cellular phones made South Africa seem in 
the vanguard, and was another way for Black South Africans to partake of their economic rights 
as full citizens of South Africa.  Medical applications—like SMS text messaging for complicated 
treatment regimes for deadly diseases like AIDS and tuberculosis that South Africa has had to 
manage—were lifelines for many on the socioeconomic fringes of South African society. 
Community radio has flourished under this system also.  Against the conventional wisdom 
expressed by both development scholars and neoliberalism, this chapter demonstrates South 
Africa’s hard-won ability to manage the vicissitudes of globalization on its own terms, whether 
they came in the form of finance, technology, or policy.  Although results may be more 
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immediate, relying on the world market or the world economy are not the prerequisites for the 
sustainable development of national media industries that the globalization rhetoric would have 
the developing world believe. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPING WORLD THROWS OUT THE 
‘WESTERN’ YARDSTICK 
There is this belief that all those other worlds are only being temporarily prevented by wicked 
governments or by heavy crises or by their own barbarity or incomprehension from…adopting 
the Western way of life. Countries are judged on the merit of their progress in this direction. 
However, it is a conception that developed out of Western incomprehension of the essence of 
other worlds, out of the mistake of measuring them all with a Western yardstick.  The real 
picture of our planet’s development is quite different. ~Alexander Solzhenitsyn1
 
 
It is remarkable that Solzhenitsyn made these assertions about Western hegemony in 
1978.  Reading them thirty years later makes them seem incredibly prescient, particularly to 
someone who comes relatively new to such proclamations.  However, Solzhenitsyn’s remarks 
seem advanced in part because the globalization rhetoric that supports the Western attitudes of 
which he speaks, works hard to make it seem as if the ‘Western way of life’ was a phenomenon 
that like bad weather, sprung forth from a confluence of climactic forces beyond human control. 
Within Solzhenitsyn’s words is the astute recognition that Western attitudes and prescriptions 
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about the political economic path the world should take now and in the future are not much more 
than prejudice, hypocrisy, false morality, and self-interest, dressed in positivist finery.  
Following from Solzhenitsyn, the ambition of this project has been to pursue his alternative 
vision of the ‘planet’s development’ in order to reinforce that these ‘other worlds’ of which 
Solzhenitsyn writes were by no means backward, barbaric, or otherwise blind to the dynamics of 
Western globalization in the 1990s.  Political economists of communication began this work 
during the middle of the last century by analyzing the ambitions of dominant economies, yet 
some tangles of the gordian knot remained.    
Wallerstein’s world-systems theory goes a long way toward grappling with these last few 
tangles.  In his Capitalist World-Economy, he finds there have been a variety of paths to national 
development over the last 600 years, and these can be categorized into three that are distinct: 
periphery, semi-periphery, and core.  This simple assertion is powerful.  From it we are released 
from having to think in strictly polarized terms: the West versus the rest.  And no longer are we 
obliged to grant the developed world sole power to affect the global political economy; the 
developing world has room to maneuver in our analyses.  While I would not claim that Vietnam 
and South Africa are exemplary of the developing world per se, they do provide insight into 
choices the developing world can make under certain circumstances.  As Wallerstein goes to 
great lengths to demonstrate throughout his oeuvre, the global political economy is in constant 
flux, with agents shifting places as that which constitutes “power” changes definition and locale.  
Even capitalism is not a permanent and fixed system.2
Denying the claims of neoliberal rhetoric and its promotion of the consolidation of the 
global economy into one system, Wallerstein observes that even if this were to happen, the “this 
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does not mean the likelihood of long-term survival of the capitalist world-system.3  Like a black 
hole, the contradictions inherent to the system will foster its implosion.  First, trying to foment an 
ever greater mass demand within the privileged of the capitalist system in order to drain and 
redistribute a surplus has a finite shelf-life; the “tenants of privilege” (as Wallerstein calls them) 
may not necessarily dispute the system, but they may eventually no longer have the means to go 
along with it.4  Secondly, says Wallerstein, when it is the underprivileged or oppositional groups 
that must be placated to keep the system free from conflict, the “tenants of privilege” who seek 
“to coopt an oppositional movement by including them in a minor share of the privilege” can 
only keep the peace in the short run.5  When opposition arises again, the ante will be upped.  
Respectively, South Africa and Vietnam represent the contradictions in this system where 
Wallersteinian crises play a starring role.  Neoliberalism was not even able to deliver a viable 
macroeconomic policy framework that would support timely development in these parts of the 
world.  As the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement affirms, 
“globalizers…have invested huge quantities of money to 
investigate how to avoid crises and violent uprisings, and that they 
have achieved a degree of mind control through the mass media, 
but they have not succeeded in curbing the discontent, which is 
growing day by day, and every time it becomes more difficult for 
them to make people believe that this system is not responsible for 
world problems; in the north they see the waves of immigrants and 
millions of dollars are sent as humanitarian “aid” to the “under-
developed” countries…The imperialist governments justify this by 
saying that the peoples of the south are lazy and ignorant. Despite 
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this, they too have been affected by an incessant rise in 
unemployment, which although it may be concealed by the 
manipulation of statistics is still undeniably the case and removes 
an important sector from the consumer market.6   
More than anything, new digital technologies—like Internet, cellular telephone, and satellite 
broadcast—alongside a deliberately managed State-driven policy guiding foreign investment, 
were agents more conducive to growth in the developing world, especially as far as the national 
media industries were concerned.  This way, even if they were to draw from IMF or World Bank 
coffers, prioritizing national directives allowed them the flexibility to continue to explore 
avenues outside of the global funding agencies, while minimal support from the IMF or World 
Bank could give them the luxury of time.  The neoliberal paradigm also that suggested the global 
financial and goods markets were the spaces the developing world should privilege in its 
technological innovation plans its goods.  However, developing world nations often defied this 
geographic imperative and ranked regional alliances and regional development banks higher on 
their list of financial and technology transfer relationships.  Regional networks like ASEAN and 
the SADC were a space in which more politically neutral relationships that maximized the 
benefit for all could flourish.  In contrast to the global (e.g. Western) markets, regional alliances 
were more mutually beneficial and more flexible. 
The issue of temporality has also been implicit in globalization rhetoric.  Speed holds 
pride of place for the West, and its yardstick of success measures how fast “progress” can be 
made.  The pace at which a national media industry transitioned from analog to digital, from 
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landline phone to third generation cellular, or from repeater-style broadcasting to satellite 
transmission for example, determined whether the country was worthy of note.  As it was with 
the industrial era, the rate of development determined whether a country was “developed” or 
“developing.” Labels like “developing” and “backward” have significant implications for 
maneuvering in the global marketplace when nations choose to do so.  Vietnam has been 
classified as a developing nation, and yet its literacy rates were consistently in the 90th percentile 
during the 1980s and 1990s, according to the World Bank.7  Yet, the VNCP’s adherence to 
communism has consistently raised protest from the West.  South Africa was also prone to 
classification problems because of the polarized political economy with which apartheid left the 
country, and this has meant foreign investment and loans have run hot and cold during the last 
several decades.  South Africa is still considered a wild card in some circles and its political 
economic reputation is the barometer investors consider.8  Even the World Bank and IMF 
themselves could not determine whether South Africa was developed or it was still developing. 
What was not discussed by Western agencies like the IMF and World Bank were the 
ideological underpinnings of development ratings as a way to define the world; even the notion 
of “development” is to a certain extent a Western concept.  Western notions of progress were 
implied in both pace and development, which hint at moral judgments about what is “best.”  A 
communist nation like Vietnam, whose culture grew around the Confucian ideal of 
intellectuality, preferred to be deliberate about adopting technologies that would leave indelible 
marks on the national consciousness.  Further, the success of telecommunication growth in 
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Vietnam was not determined so much by pace as it was measured by establishing a 
comprehensive, non-commercial telecommunication network.  South Africa, on the other hand, 
contradicts Western notions of progress in other ways.  South Africa has been most commonly 
known for its poverty and disease since the coverage about AIDS and debt forgiveness, but 
South Africa was also the fastest growing GSM cellular market in the world, with an “average 
annual increase of 58 percent.”9  The ANC, along with SATRA and ICASA, directed this growth 
with firm hands, regulating the private companies that had been allowed a stake in the national 
industry.  Significantly, South Africa indicated that Western capitalist democracies were not 
always in the vanguard.  Therefore, by focusing a critical lens on two nations of the developing 
world—Vietnam and South Africa that opted for state-led political economies despite neoliberal 
pressure—the aim of this project also has been to break open the ways in which neoliberal 
globalization failed to get the developing world to sing to this false Western tune.   
Albeit in different ways, this was also the goal of previous chapters.  In the second 
chapter, the field of political economy of communication and its preoccupation with the 
dominance of Western media was scrutinized, not because the analysis is without merit, but 
because it inadvertently reinforces the notion of Western superiority.  This chapter also 
highlighted the growth of Western media, as well as the history of its neoliberal principles as 
they developed out of struggles for dominance that took place in the West—in Europe, the U.S., 
the U.K. and elsewhere—during colonialism, the early moments of cultural imperialism, the 
Bretton Woods conference, and the development of telecommunication technology.  Chapter two 
also introduced the ways in which these principles impinged upon developing world national 
media industries in the 1990s, but also how the developing world responded.  Chapters three and 
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four hoped to reinforce a critique the iconoclasm of my main disagreements with neoliberalism 
by analyzing the national media of Vietnam and South Africa as industries firmly outside the 
West.  
The aim of this last chapter is to understand these principles in a comparative context to 
clarify why a privatized, deregulated, and liberalized media industry was not necessarily a 
fungible model for the rest of the world.  Neoliberals could not prove the efficacy of a market-
oriented media industry lightly regulated by a capitalist democracy on their own home turf.  As 
Nicholas Garnham pointed out well before it became conventional wisdom for critical scholars 
in the field of political economy, most Western national media industries perennially harbored 
fundamental contradictions “between the economic and the political at the level of their value 
systems and of the social relations which those value systems require and support.”10  In 
Capitalism and Communication, Garnham privileged the political realm (as many developing 
nations did), because here the “individual is defined as a citizen exercising public rights of 
debate, voting, etc. within a communally agreed structure of rules and towards communally 
defined ends.  The value system is essentially social and the legitimate end of social action is the 
public good.”11  In sharp contrast, in the economic realm the “individual is defined as a producer 
and consumer exercising private rights through purchasing power on the market in the pursuit of 
private interests, his or her actions being coordinated by the invisible hand of the market.”12  
Western industries more often than not blindly favored the economic.  For Garnham, achieving a 
more healthy balance of these forces would mean recognizing and mitigating the pursuit for 
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political freedom if it began “to override the search for economic efficiency,” while at the same 
time monitoring the level of “material productivity” if it constrained “possible political freedom” 
of the media.13  According to Garnham’s definition, it seemed as if the developing world was 
much more successful at achieving this balance than was the developed. 
Whether privileging the economic created contradictions or not, neoliberals were 
vehement about promoting this palliative as a one-size-fits all answer to what were assumed to 
be homogenous developing world national media industries.  And the only reason that 
globalization rhetoric could claim that this macroeconomic phenomenon was sweeping the globe 
was because its main proponents, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, required impoverished 
developing nations seeking financial succor to apply them.  That is not to say that the developing 
world was without its problems.  Neoliberals were correct that growth and development 
problems did occur across the developing world; in fact, many of them had experienced 
exploitation, colonialism, imperialism, and neoliberal globalization at some point in the last 
century or two.  However, the West presented these patterns as symptomatic of a chronic 
developing world debilitation for which a Western macroeconomic prescription was in order.  
Since many developing nations chose deliberately not to subscribe to neoliberalism because it 
was an inappropriate policy paradigm for them, the crime the West committed in pretending to 
know better was twofold.  One, the West ignored that the setbacks endured by many developing 
world nations were the consequences of past exploitation inflicted by the West itself.  Second, 
the West tried to assert that developing nations were not economically vulnerable because of 
Western involvement, but because the developing world was inept at managing itself.  Absurdly, 
this would be a rationale for yet further exploitation of the developing world in the form of loans, 
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liberalization, and attempts at technology transfer.  That Western neoliberals seemed to have had 
temporary success with this project did not so much signify their policy preeminence, as it did 
our own ignorance about the reality of the developing world. 
From our Western-media saturated, and thus woefully limited perspective, Vietnam and 
South Africa seem to share many similarities when they are generalized.  Both have a 
postcolonial past and have weathered conflicts with powerful Western nations.  The sheer 
demographic and geographic devastation both countries experienced during these conflicts 
resulted in the need to rebuild national industries and consequently foster national economic 
growth.  But for most of the twentieth century, neither nation was able to hurdle the chronic 
economic deficit caused by extreme Western exploitation; it only reinforced their vulnerability.  
One particularly pernicious side effect of these events was a troubled post-secondary educational 
system for both countries due to the legacy of political corruption the West left behind.  In 
Vietnam, U.S. involvement with South Vietnam left behind a geographically uneven national 
economy that fostered a black market for political and academic power.  In South Africa, the 
ANC found it difficult to make space for Blacks in higher education after apartheid had 
segregated the national system for decades.  Both countries also fell prey to internal 
Communist/Capitalist conflicts during the Cold War era, and each was drawn in politically and 
economically as a marginal pawn between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R; but in the political zeitgeist 
that followed the Cold War, the powerful global lending institutions took over the role of trying 
to manipulate both Vietnam and South Africa.  As far as their national media industries were 
concerned, one of the most recent similarities that existed between Vietnam and South Africa 
was that each of them hoped to protect the goal of establishing a digital media industry that 
valued national and regional networks more than it did those of globalization.   
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These historical nodes certainly create the impression of similitude for developing 
nations thousands of miles apart.  In point of fact, regardless of location there were few 
developing nations around the world that did not have many of these experiences.  Developing 
nations, including Vietnam and South Africa, continued to have experiences in common into the 
1990s, and an important one was an attempt to establish an infrastructure for the development of 
the new digital technologies.  There were likely similarities as these innovations began to take 
place around the developing world.  A few of these similarities were: the initial prohibitive cost 
in exchange for the promise for an economy of scale in the future, the temptation to fully 
privatize and then hopefully fund the initial installation of the network, and the careful creation 
of a policy framework to manage this process.  But major differences between countries could be 
found as well.  Some countries galvanized their internal resources to pay for the innovation while 
others looked outside their borders; some countries focused on satellite for radio and cellular 
phones while others felt fiber optic cable for Internet was more important; some valued digital 
technologies for their ability to create national macroeconomic growth and others for their 
capacity to attract foreign direct investment.   
In “Recognising Alternative Rationalities in the Deployment of Information Systems,” 
information systems scholar Chrisanthi Avgerou argued that Western attitudes could not 
accommodate the notion of difference as anything but a deficit.  For the West, developing 
countries “are usually seen as problematic hosts of information and communication 
technologies,” mostly because the West did not take into account “local culture and political 
regimes” that are related to “country differences in IT adoption and economic performance.”14  
Rather than recognition, says Avgerou, the West tried to apply its own “techno-economic 
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rationality of development which stemmed from the western societies’ experience of modernity,” 
which was “blatantly unsuccessful in streamlining people’s behavior” in the developing world 
towards these ends.15  Avgerou advises that information systems professionals working in the 
developing world “need to be attentive to the historically meaningful alternative courses of 
rational action…to avoid interpreting them as ‘failures’.”16  Vietnam and South Africa highlight 
Avgerou’s point that diverging from the Western model did not necessarily translate into a techo-
economic “irrationality” or inadequacy.   
Ever since Vietnam expelled the Western influence the U.S. represented, the VNCP was 
at great pains to reconcile North and South.  Vietnam was largely homogeneous in its linguistic, 
ethnic, and racial make-up.  Since 1975, there was also a political correspondence across the 
majority of the population, which was Communist at least at the official level.  This 
correspondence would not have been possible, however, if the VNCP had not harnessed the 
national media industry as a means to accomplish this goal.  Particularly during the conflict with 
the U.S. the VNCP recognized the value of using the broadcast infrastructure as often as possible 
to bolster war efforts and continue to disseminate Communist ideology.  Once the war was over, 
the Communist Party became the sole national political power.  Since their wish was to create a 
national media monopoly, with few exceptions the VNCP also became the only content provider 
and regulator of all media in Vietnam.  Government censorship was an issue for Vietnamese who 
disagree with the VNCP’s stance toward the access of foreign sources of information via media 
technology.  However, control of the national media infrastructure facilitated the VNCP’s wish 
for a unified Vietnamese national identity.  Vietnamese programming has rarely missed a beat in 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 2. 
16 Ibid. 
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reinforcing Vietnamese national pride, and the VNCP credits Vietnamese pride and self-sacrifice 
as responsible for the possibility of the national digital media infrastructure.   
The African National Congress (ANC) also sought to unify South Africa using the 
national media industry, although they did so not to create ethnic homogeneity, but to foster 
socioeconomic equality.  Since 1994, the year the ANC was elected to office, their goal was to 
represent the needs of the over eleven racial or ethnic groups that make up South African society.  
Doing so was fraught with complications, however, because during its 50 years in power the 
Afrikaner National Party (NP) had devastated the national economy by preventing Black South 
Africans from joining the national workforce as anything but cheap, unskilled labor.  Further, 
apartheid had forced the hand of the international economy to impose sanctions and boycotts that 
punished whites and Blacks together.  The ANC was faced with the need to craft an entirely new 
macroeconomic policy framework for South Africa, despite little experience in doing so at the 
national level.  The national media industry, which the NP had begun to both privatize and 
digitize before they were forced to quit office, would also need to be revised in favor of 
providing for the keystone campaign promise of universal media access.  To begin the process a 
variety of South African interest groups formed the Independent Communication Authority of 
South Africa (ICASA), South Africa’s first independent body regulating the media.  In 2000, 
ICASA began to create spaces within the media industry that fostered an improvement in the 
quality of life for some of the neediest. Since then, ICASA has compelled broadcasters to 
provide programming for different ethnic and racial groups in their own national languages; 
some of this content targets educational initiatives for AIDS prevention and programming for 
children. 
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 The National Party had a significant impact on what the ANC was able to accomplish 
toward the goal of universal access, joining the SADC regional alliance provided a set of 
relationships that helped set the process in motion.  During the mid-1990s, the possibility for 
support from global lending agencies was not a clear option; alongside foreign investors, the 
IMF and the World Bank were skeptical about South Africa’s ability to generate revenue to pay 
back its loans with interest.  Nevertheless, the collective strategies of the SADC helped South 
Africa defray partial cost for acquiring and laying down fiber optic cable or launching a satellite 
for both television and cellular telephone.  It also provided South Africa with a stable market in 
which to sell its wares.  Although most SADC countries were more economically disadvantaged 
than South Africa, that did not mean neoliberalism was correct in positing that their membership 
in a regional alliance was without value.  In fact, the significant savings that the pooling of 
economic, technological, and political resources represented to purchase and implement new 
media infrastructures, clearly demonstrated the value of regional alliances even between a 
collective of impoverished nations.  
The VNCP’s decision to fully embrace a new relationship with ASEAN after 1994 was 
central to its ability to mitigate the expense of creating a network for satellite, cellular telephone, 
and Internet also.  With cost-sharing and standardization agreements with other ASEAN 
members, Vietnam was able to set up fiber optic networks and access regional satellite services 
at its own pace.  Fostering these and other regional relationships was also a calculated strategy to 
avoid the three most powerful neoliberal institutions in the global political economy: the IMF, 
WTO, and World Bank.  Like South Africa, Vietnam had learned several lessons about Western 
political economy earlier in the twentieth century, and the destruction it left behind galvanized 
the VNCP’s belief that Communism should be central to rebuilding the national identity, the 
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national economy, and the national media industry.  Neither membership in ASEAN nor 
technological development relationships with countries like Canada, Australia, or Sweden 
required Vietnam to denounce its allegiance to Communism and forcibly apply market principles 
to its national media industry.  Therefore, it was the best political response to economic 
imperatives that Vietnam had at its disposal. 
In “Regionalisms Compared: The African and Southeast Asian Experience” Boas and 
Hveem point out that regionalism was pursued by the developing world precisely because it was 
a space where the state could be a prime mover in response to the globalization “phenomenon.”17 
Globalization left the impression that it was “mainly the market” driving the global political 
economy, a condition that even the most capitalist democracy in the developing world could find 
frightening because of the absence of a material agent.  Throughout the developing world, 
globalization was perceived as a homogenizing force that subjected nations to the “control of 
transnational corporations,” which mystified that, to some degree, these corporations were 
coordinated with Western “state power and interests.”18  Technology was also implicated as a 
factor in this process because of the growth of “sophisticated systems of modern 
communication,” and the development of “integrated international commodity and financial 
markets.” 19   
                                                 
17 Boas, Morten and Helge Hveem, “Regionalisms Compared: The African and Southeast Asian 
Experience,” in Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development, ed. Bjorn Hettne, 
Andras Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
18 Ibid., 94. 
19 Ibid. 
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Regionalism, on the other hand, represented heterogeneity in action, a way to avoid the 
destruction of “cultural, ethnic, economic and political diversity.”20  In a “broad sense” 
emphasized Boas and Hveem, regionalism was a means to “enhance national and regional 
identity” in the face of global political economic pressure.21  In their own analysis of the benefits 
regionalism offered to Southeast Asian and African nations in the 1990s, Boas and Hveem 
concluded that regionalism clarified that the world was not as “singular” as the West described it.  
Instead, the world offered many possible alternatives for accomplishing a goal like a national 
digital telecommunication network.  Even in the face of economic and technological 
vulnerability, regionalism mitigated the ability of globalization to generate uniform responses in 
developing nations.22  Rather, ASEAN and the SADC allowed Vietnam and South Africa to be 
dynamic in their ability to deal with the “sometimes hostile global political economy” that 
globalization created.23  In their respect regional alliances, Vietnam and South Africa could take 
advantage of the benefits of being independent political agents in an economic collective, and 
this dynamism was crucial to the maintenance of their own internal compasses in creating the 
possibility for Vietnamese and South African citizens to join in the benefits that digital 
technologies could offer.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 98. 
22 Ibid, 125. 
23 Ibid., 126. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY 
A formal methodology for gathering the more interactive elements of my research for the 
third chapter of this work—namely interviews with a variety of professionals from the 
Vietnamese media industries, television, cellular telephone, and Internet—was not easy to 
follow.  I had only succeeded in learning rudimentary Vietnamese in the few months before my 
impending trip.  I could locate no Vietnamese tutors or associations in or around Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania or the University of Pittsburgh where I was completing my graduate degree.  The 
Pimsleur language CD I purchased was a poor substitute for a human tutor.  Therefore, I could 
only conduct interviews with those who could speak English.  Luckily, locating English speakers 
in the upper cadres of the Vietnamese media industries was not impossible; yet, it provides me 
with a somewhat narrow perspective about the benefits and drawbacks that digital media 
represents to Vietnam, and using government documents does not improve the situation to a 
great degree. 
Also, I did not carefully write down and follow questions to ask interviewees about their 
perspective on the media industry within which they worked.  Nor did I use a tape recorder to 
accurately capture these discussions.  The Vietnamese expatriates that I contacted before I left 
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for Hanoi suggested that asking questions about the Vietnamese media industry should be 
practiced with sensitivity, given that the media is managed by the VNCP, which has again 
become increasingly concerned with censorship in the last several years.   
I learned quickly that people spoke most openly to me when we talked about the 
Vietnamese media industry in the form of a casual conversation between two media 
professionals (I had been a journalist in a previous career), comparing the U.S. and Vietnamese 
models and philosophies.  On more than one occasion in Hanoi, people even asked me not to use 
their name and ended our conversation abruptly with little explanation.  On other occasions, 
interviewees expressed curiosity about my interest in speaking to them as a form of research for 
my dissertation; a Vietnamese acquaintance explained to me that it was not a common practice to 
complete case study research for dissertations, and it was likely that I was perceived as either an 
extremely inquisitive tourist, or as another media practitioner writing a story about the 
Vietnamese media industry for the U.S. press, regardless how much I tried to protest this and 
explain my project.   
Therefore, I am not able to quote my Vietnamese interviewees verbatim, and I do not use 
their names in my work.  I reference these individuals by their professional titles only, hoping 
this allows as much anonymity as possible.  In fact, I was somewhat surprised that many of my 
interviewees were as forthcoming as they were, even though the most of the information they 
shared with me was largely historical, factual, or public relations in nature.    
Furthermore, the majority of these interviews take place in Hanoi because I had a more 
extensive and concrete social network established in that city; the level of trust embodied in 
social networks is significant in a country where the penalties for speaking candidly about 
national affairs are applied arbitrarily.  One wants to know to whom one is talking and why. 
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What was even more surprising, though, was that in the supposedly more “Western” and 
“free” Saigon (also Ho Chi Minh City), I could not obtain even one interview.  Towards the end 
of my stay in Vietnam, I flew down to Saigon to meet up with Vietnam Television’s head of 
programming that I had interviewed earlier in the month, in order to pursue the interviewing 
process in the South.  I chose to travel to Vietnam during this time at the invitation of this 
influential broadcasting executive because she suggested she could help me arrange interviews at 
Ho Chi Minh Television; the head of programming at the Ho Chi Minh station was a personal 
acquaintance of hers.  Unfortunately, during my introduction to him, she communicated to me 
that he had declined to be interviewed because he did not speak English adequately and did not 
want to embarrass himself; ironically, I had heard him speaking understandable English just a 
few moments earlier. 
That was not my only missed opportunity, as I could not get anyone who had agreed to 
speak with me earlier to answer my phone calls or emails regarding an interview while I was in 
Saigon.  The rest of my research was then limited to exploring the Vietnamese media from the 
consumer perspective: I frequented email café’s testing the limits of the Vietnamese Intranet, 
consumer electronics storefronts, cell phone stores, etc.  It was not until I returned to Hanoi that 
another American who was fluent in speaking and reading Vietnamese (newspapers especially) 
explained why all of my social capital seemed to disappear.  The 10th Party Congress of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party had just begun to meet and it was likely I would obtain no further 
interviews; many people were worried about an impending increase in arbitrary retribution for 
speaking openly.  I learned that this was also the reason that I had had difficulty obtaining a 
Vietnamese sponsor to vouch for me in order to gain access to libraries and other research 
institutions, and why the Department of International Cooperation at the Vietnamese Department 
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of Posts and Telematics regarded me with great suspicion when I contacted them to visit their 
offices (although it may have been badly written Vietnamese on my part).  Consequently, the 
picture I paint of the Vietnamese media is contingent upon these and other factors; and there is 
still much research to be done on this project.  What I could not obtain by these means I 
supplemented with the research of others, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
ASEAN documents, etc. 
The methodology for the South African case study is quite different, given that I have not 
been able to travel to that country yet to interview those working in the South African media 
industries, and educational centers or to make first-hand observations.  In order to try to 
construct my analysis of this national media industry, I am grateful that plenty other scholars 
have done a significant amount of work before me.  My goal was to attempt to gather that which 
would provide a companion analysis with my Vietnamese case study.  Thus, I have included a 
cursory history of apartheid policies in order to demonstrate the impact they had on 
telecommunication networks in the various socioeconomic spaces into which the National Party 
divided South Africa.  But without being able to observe what digital technologies (Internet, 
cable, satellite, cellular phone) individuals have been able to access more recently in South 
Africa, I have culled evidence from NGOs such as the International Telecommunications Union 
and UNESCO, as well as news articles, national government websites indicating recent 
technology initiatives, and development initiatives that have been undertaken by other nations in 
conjunction with the African National Congress.  The research of scholars such as Christine 
Stilwell, whose research on community calling centers and kiosks been helpful in being able to 
describe the public use of technology in South Africa, and Hilda Korsten, who provides 
documentation on the innovative practice of electronic voting and governance in South Africa.  
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Since Southern Africa has been the site of numerous regional economic alliances over the 
last several decades, I have incorporated the research that has been done on those that are most 
relevant to the history of the SADC (or South African Development Cooperation) since the 
SADC is currently the most salient regional economic alliance for South Africa.  I have also 
included information published by the SADC in order to represent how the SADC understands 
its own policy iniatives and practices.  There are obvious shortcomings with primarily using the 
documents of the organization itself, and I would also like to complete additional research at the 
documentary archives of the SADC headquarters in Gabarone, Botswana to get a more detailed 
picture.  Thus, in order to make my representation of each of these case studies more even, it is 
my intention to travel to South Africa to speak with professionals in similar capacities as those I 
spoke with in Vietnam.  But in the spirit of acknowledging the significant difference between 
these case studies, I would also like to incorporate the observations of those working in the 
academic environment in South Africa since education is so endemic to the technological 
possibilities South Africa can employ.   
Another future hope that I have for this project is to return to Vietnam in order to access 
public libraries and government facilities, given that I can obtain sponsorship from a Vietnamese 
organization.  There are ethical compromises that come with such a sponsorship, however; 
among these compromises are having my activities and research under surveillance by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party.  It will also oblige me to participate in government ceremonies 
and meetings, where I will be asked to celebrate the successes of the VNCP.  On the other hand, 
being an outsider at such ceremonies could provide me with a unique perspective on VNCP party 
practices.  But these are considerations for the future.  At present, it is simply my hope that this 
project has been as useful and interesting for someone else as it has been for me.  
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